Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007
for
AIX 5L for POWER V5.3
with Technology Package 5300-05-02
with Argus Systems Group PitBull Foundation 5.0
and the Virtual IO Server (VIOS) Version 1.3
from
Innovative Security Systems, Inc.
sponsored by
IBM Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 ZS-01-01-F-326 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007
AIX 5L for POWER V5.3
with Technology Package 5300-05-02
with Argus Systems Group PitBull
Foundation 5.0 and the Virtual IO Server
(VIOS) Version 1.3
from
Innovative Security Systems, Inc.
sponsored by
IBM Corporation
Common Criteria Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance: Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b, 8 October 1999
Functionality: PP conformant (plus product specific extensions)
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL4 augmented by ALC_FLR.1 – Basic flaw remediation
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 16 January 2007
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organization that
recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarized assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses), and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
• BSIG2
• BSI Certification Ordinance3
• BSI Schedule of Costs4
• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
• DIN EN 45011 standard
• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.35
• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1 ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2 CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom, and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 with Technology Package 5300-05-02
with Argus Systems Group PitBull Foundation 5.0 and the Virtual IO Server
(VIOS) Version 1.3 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a
re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006. For this evaluation specific
results from the evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006 were re-
used.
The evaluation of the product AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 with Technology
Package 5300-05-02 with Argus Systems Group PitBull Foundation 5.0 and the
Virtual IO Server (VIOS) Version 1.3 was conducted by atsec information
security GmbH. The atsec information security GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6
recognised by BSI.
The vendor is:
Innovative Security Systems, Inc.
dba Argus Systems Group
1809 Woodfield Drive
Savoy, IL 61874 USA
The sponsor is:
IBM Corporation
1140 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758 USA
The certification is concluded with
• the comparability check and
• the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 16 January 2007.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the conditions that
• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed, and
• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
4 Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-34.
The product AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 with Technology Package 5300-05-02
with Argus Systems Group PitBull Foundation 5.0 and the Virtual IO Server
(VIOS) Version 1.3 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7
of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the above-
mentioned website.
7
Innovative Security Systems, Inc.
dba Argus Systems Group
1809 Woodfield Drive
Savoy, IL 61874 USA
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007
Contents of the certification results
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification of the TOE 12
3 Security Policy 13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 14
5 Architectural Information 17
6 Documentation 21
7 IT Product Testing 23
8 Evaluated Configuration 25
9 Results of the Evaluation 27
10 Comments/Recommendations 29
11 Annexes 29
12 Security Target 29
13 Definitions 30
14 Bibliography 32
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
1 Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 with Technology
Package 5300-05-02 with Argus Systems Group PitBull Foundation 5.0 and the
Virtual IO Server (VIOS) Version 1.3. It is a UNIX-based Operating System
which has been developed to meet the requirements of the the Labeled Security
Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b, 8 October 1999 [8].
The TOE can be used on one or more servers running the evaluated version of
AIX which are connected to form a distributed system. The communication
aspects used for this connection are also part of the evaluation. The
communication links themselves are protected against interception and
manipulation by measures which are outside the scope of the evaluation.
This certification is a re-certification of BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006. The TOE is
allowed to be used in an LPAR environment (refer to [6], chapter 2.4.2 for more
details on LPAR). The TOE includes the Virtual Input/Output Server (VIOS)
which allows for the virtualization of SCSI drives and network adapters and
makes use of the LPAR environment.
The TOE and a various set of user guidance for the TOE is delivered on CD-
ROM (for details refer to chapters 2 and 6 of this report). The Licensed Product
Packages (LPPs) which are allowed to be used for the evaluated configuration
of the TOE are specified in [6], chapter 2.3.
The TOE is running in an LPAR on a IBM System p5 POWER5 or POWER5+
server.
The hardware and LPAR are not part of the TOE but support the TSF by
providing separation mechanisms. The BootPROM firmware is not part of the
TOE either.
The IT product AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 with Technology Package 5300-05-02
with Argus Systems Group PitBull Foundation 5.0 and the Virtual IO Server
(VIOS) Version 1.3 was evaluated by atsec information security GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 21 December 2006. The atsec information
security GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)8
recognised by BSI.
The vendor is:
Innovative Security Systems, Inc.
dba Argus Systems Group
1809 Woodfield Drive
Savoy, IL 61874 USA
8
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007
The sponsor is:
IBM Corporation
1140 Burnet Road
Austin, TX 78758 USA
1.1 Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL4 (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement Identifier
EAL4 TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ALC_FLR.1 Life-cycle – Basic flaw remediation
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2 Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement Addressed Issue
FAU Security audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit Data Generation
FAU_GEN.2 User Identity Association
FAU_SAR.1 Audit Review
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
FAU_SEL.1 Selective Audit
FAU_STG.1 Guarantees of Audit Data Availability
FAU_STG.3 Action in Case of Possible Audit Data Loss
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1(1) Discretionary Access Control Policy
FDP_ACC.1(2) TCB Access Control Policy
FDP_ACC.1(3) Authorization Policy
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
Security Functional Requirement Addressed Issue
FDP_ACC.1(4) VIOS Access Control Policy
FDP_ACF.1(1) Discretionary Access Control Functions
FDP_ACF.1(2) TCB Access Control Functions
FDP_ACF.1(3) Authorization Functions
FDP_ACF.1(4) VIOS Access Control Functions
FDP_ETC.1 Export of Unlabeled User Data
FDP_ETC.2 Export of Labeled User Data
FDP_IFC.1(1) Mandatory Access Control Policy
FDP_IFC.1(2) Mandatory Integrity Control Policy
FDP_IFC.1(3) Mandatory Advanced Secure Networking
Policy
FDP_IFF.2(1) Mandatory Access Control Functions
FDP_IFF.2(2) Advanced Secure Networking (ASN) Policy
FDP_IFF.2(3) Mandatory Integrity Control Policy
FDP_ITC.1 Import of Unlabeled User Data
FDP_ITC.2 Import of Labeled User Data
FDP_RIP.2 Object Residual Information Protection
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_ATD.1(1) User Attribute Definition
FIA_ATD.1(2) User Attribute Definition
FIA_SOS.1 Strength of Authentication Data
FIA_UAU.2 Authentication
FIA_UAU.7 Protected Authentication Feedback
FIA_UID.2 Identification
FIA_USB.1(1) User-Subject Binding
FIA_USB.1(2) User-Subject Binding
FMT Security management
FMT_MSA.1(1) Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.1(2) Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.1(3) Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.1(4) Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.1(5) Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.1(6) Management of Object Security Attributes
FMT_MSA.3(1) Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MSA.3(2) Static Attribute Initialization
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007
Security Functional Requirement Addressed Issue
FMT_MSA.3(3) Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MSA.3(4) Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MSA.3(5) Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MSA.3(6) Static Attribute Initialization
FMT_MTD.1(1) Management of the Audit Trail
FMT_MTD.1(2) Management of Audited Events
FMT_MTD.1(3) Management of Audit Treshold
FMT_MTD.1(4) Management of User Attributes
FMT_MTD.1(5) Management of Authentication Data
FMT_MTD.1(6) Management of Privileges
FMT_MTD.1(7) Management of VIOS Mappings
FMT_REV.1(1) Revocation of User Attributes
FMT_REV.1(2) Revocation of Object Attributes
FMT_REV.1(3) Revocation of VIOS User Attributes
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1(1) Security Management Roles
FMT_SMR.1(2) Security Roles
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract Machine Testing
FPT_RVM.1 Reference Mediation
FPT_SEP.1 Domain Separation
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
FPT_TDC.1 InterTSF basic TSF Data Consistency
FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined.
Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue
FDP User data protection
Note 1 (as defined in [8]) Subject Residual Information Protection
FDP_RIP.3-AIX Hard disk drive residual information
protection
FPT Protection of the TSF
FPT_RVM.2-AIX Stack Execution Reference Mediation
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.2.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-
Environment of the TOE.
Security Functional Requirement Addressed Issue
FDP User data protection
FDP_ACC.1. Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control .
FDP_ACC.1 (LPAR) Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1 (LPAR) Security attribute based access control
FIA Identification and authentication
FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action
FMT Security management
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.5.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions.
TOE Security Function Addressed Issue
IA.1 User Identification and Authentication Data Management
IA.2 Common Authentication Mechanism
IA.3 Interactive Login and Related Mechanisms
IA.4 User Identity Changing
IA.5 Login Processing
IA.6 Logoff Processing
AU.1 Audit Record Format
AU.2 Audit Record Generation
AU.3 Audit Record Processing
AU.4 Audit Review
AU.5 Audit File Protection
AU.6 Audit Record Loss Prevention
AU.7 Audit System Privileges
DA.1 Permission Bits
DA.2 Extended Permissions
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TOE Security Function Addressed Issue
DA.3 Discretionary Access Control: File System Objects
DA.4 Discretionary Access Control: IPC Objects
DA.5 Discretionary Access Control: VIOS
PV.1 Identification of privileges
PV.2 Process Privilege Sets
PV.3 File Privilege Sets
AZ.1 Authorization Attributes
AZ.2 Process Authorizations
AZ.3 File Authorization Sets
AZ.4 Authorization Checks
AZ.5 Implementation
MAC Mandatory Access Control
ASN.1 Network and interface rules
ASN.2 Internet Protocol Security Option (IPSO)
MIC.1 Mandatory Integrity Control: MIC Labels
OR.1 Object Reuse: File System Objects
OR.2 Object Reuse: IPC Objects
OR.3 Object Reuse: Queuing System Objects
OR.4 Object Reuse: Miscellaneous Objects
OR.5 Object Reuse: Hard disk drives
SM.1 Roles
SM.2 Audit Configuration and Management
SM.3 Access Control Configuration and Management
SM.4 Management of User, Group and Authentication Data
SM.5 Time Management
TP.1 TSF Invocation Guarantees
TP.2 Kernel
TP.3 Kernel Extensions
TP.4 Trusted Processes
TP.5 TSF Databases
TP.6 Internal TOE Protection Mechanisms
TP.7 Diagnosis
TP.8 Integrity Checks
TP.9 File security flags
Table 5: List of Security Functions
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2.
1.3 Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed „medium“ (SOF-medium) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.3.3 an 8.3.7.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the LSPP, the OSPs defined
there (refer to [8], chapter 3.2) are applied for the TOE as well. Because all
security objectives of the LSPP are derived from OSPs, no specific threats have
been defined in the Protection Profile. In addition to LSPP the following OSPs
are defined in the Security Target (see [6], chapter 3.3):
• P.DATAFLOW,
• P.ERASE,
• P.INTEGRITY,
• P.STATIC,
• P.TCBINTEGRITY,
• P.DIST_USERS.
In addition to the LSPP, the Security Target adds the following threats:
• T.UAUSER (impersonation of an attacker as authorized user),
• T.UAACCESS (access to information by an unauthorized user),
• T.UAACTION (attacker performing unauthorized actions) and
• T.VIOS (unauthorized access of VIOS SCSI/Ethernet device driver to non-
assigned ressources).
which are averted by the TOE (for detailed information on additional threats
please refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.1).
Note that also threats to be averted by the TOEs environment have been
defined (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.2.2 and to chapter 4 of this
report).
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1.5 Special configuration requirements
The configuration requirements for the TOE are defined in chapter 2.4 and
subsequent chapters of the Security Target [6] and are summarized here (for
the complete information please refer to the Security Target).
• The system must be installed according to the PitBull Foundation installation
guide [31].
• AIX 5.3 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, but only IPv4 is included in this
evaluation.
• Only 64 bit architectures are included.
• Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
• Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
• Only the default mechanisms for identification and authentication are
included. Support for other authentication options, e.g., smartcard
authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration.
• If the system console is used, it must be connect directly to the workstation
and afforded the same physical protection as the workstation.
• AIX 5.3 provides both a native and a Sys5 print system. Only Sys5 is
supported in the evaluated configuration, as it implements the labeling
requirements from LSPP.
• System security flags (or kernel security flags) need to be configured as
identified in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2.12.1).
• The system must be configured to disable remote access for an individual
user after five consecutively failed login attempts have occurred for this user.
• The TOE comprises one of the server machines (and optional peripherals)
as listed in section 2.4.2 of the Security Target running the system software
listed in table 1 of the ST chapter 2.3 (a server running the above listed
software is referred to as a “TOE server” below).
• If the product is configured with more than one TOE server, they are linked
by LANs, which may be joined by bridges/routers or by TOE workstations
which act as routers/gateways or they connect using the Virtual Input/Output
Server (VIOS).
• If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured
and managed by the same authority using an appropriate security policy not
conflicting with the security policy of the TOE.
• The following file system types are supported:
• the AIX journaled filesystem, jfs2,
• the High Sierra filesystem for CD-ROM drives, cdrfs,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
• the DVD-ROM file system, udfs,
• the process file system, procfs (/proc),
• the Network File System, nfs (V3, V4).
Please note that cdrfs, udfs, procfs and (client-side) nfs are single level file
systems: For mandatory access control, the labels of their mount point apply to
all objects in the mounted file system. Single level file systems are not subject
to mandatory integrity control and TCB policies, and their objects cannot be
associated with privileges.
1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment
The following assumptions about the technical environment of TOE are made:
Hardware platforms:
• The TOE is running in an LPAR on an IBM System p5 POWER5 or
POWER5+ server.
Periphals:
• All terminals supported by the TOE.
• All storage devices and backup devices supported by the TOE (hard disks,
CDROM drives, streamer drives, floppy disk drives).
• All printer devices supported by the TOE.
• Network connectors supported by the TOE (e.g., Ethernet) supporting
TCP/IP services over the TCP/IP protocol stack.
Since the Security Target claims conformance to LSPP, the assumptions
defined there on physical, personnel and connectivity aspects are also valid for
the TOE (refer to [8], chapter 3.3). For a detailed description of the usage
assumptions, refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.4.
1.7 Disclaimers
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this certification report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organization
that recognizes or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 with Technology Package 5300-05-02 with
Argus Systems Group PitBull Foundation 5.0 and the
Virtual IO Server (VIOS) Version 1.3
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW AIX 5L for POWER V5.3
with Recommended
Technology Package 5300-
05-02, Program Number
5765-G03
AIX 5L TL 5300-
05-02
Shrink wrapped CDs, Fixes are
delivered electronically
2 SW ISSI PitBull Foundation 5.0 PitBull
Foundation 5.0
Shrink wrapped CDs, Fixes are
delivered electronically
3 SW SW: Virtual I/O Server
(VIOS) contained in IBM
Advanced Power
Virtualization Version 1.3,
Program Number 5765-G30
VIOS version 1.3 Shrink wrapped CDs, Fixes are
delivered electronically
Table 6: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE documentation is supplied on CD-ROM (see the documents listed in
chapter 6). The documents [35] (Security Features User Guide) and [24] (AIX
Security Guide) can be used as a starting point for an evaluation conformant
usage of the TOE.
The Licensed Product Packages (LPPs) / File Sets which are allowed to be
installed in the evaluated configuration of the TOE are defined in the Security
Target [6], chapter 2.3.
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3 Security Policy
The TOE is a UNIX based multi-user, multi-tasking operating system, thus
providing service to several users at the same time. After successful login, the
users have access to a general computing environment, allowing the start-up of
user applications, issuing user commands at shell level and creating and
accessing files. The TOE provides adequate mechanisms to separate the users
and protect their data. Privileged commands are restricted to the system
administrator role (root). The PitBull Foundation extension to the standard AIX
implements all the various access control mechanisms provided by AIX: DAC,
MAC, MIC, TCB, ASN, PV, AZ. This extension consists of a kernel extension for
the implementation and enforcement of the access control logic as well as user
space tools to manage these mechanisms.
The TOE provides facilities for on-line interaction with users. Networking is
covered only to the extent to which the TOE can be considered to be part of a
centrally-managed system that meets a common set of security requirements
(refer to the Security Target [6] for the constraints).
It is assumed that responsibility for the safeguarding of the data protected by
the TOE can be delegated to the TOE users. All data is under the control of the
TOE. The data is stored in named objects, and the TOE can associate with
each controlled object a description of the access rights to that object. All
individual users are assigned a unique user identifier. This user identifier
supports individual accountability. The TOE authenticates the claimed identity of
the user before allowing the user to perform any further actions.
The TOE enforces controls such that access to data objects can only take place
in accordance with the access restrictions placed on that object by its owner or
other suitably authorized user. Access rights (e.g., read, write, execute) can be
assigned to data objects with respect to subjects (users). Once a subject is
granted access to an object, the content of that object may be freely used to
influence other objects accessible to this subject.
A detailed description/definition of the Security Policy enforced by the TOE is
given in the Security Target [6] and with even more detail in the developer
document of the Security Policy Model.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage assumptions
Based on the Organisational Security Policies to which the TOE complies the
following usage assumptions arise.
• Only those users who have been authorized to access the information within
the system may access the system (P.AUTHORIZED_USERS).
• Implicit and explicit access rights to an object are granted by the object
owner (P.NEED_TO_KNOW).
• The users of the system shall be held accountable for their actions within the
system (P.ACCOUNTABILITY).
• The TOE is only to be allowed with static LPAR. Dynamic LPAR must not be
used (P.STATIC).
• An administrator has to initiate the hard disk erase function of the TOE in
order to prevent the recovery of the original information stored on the disk
(P.ERASE).
• When the TOE is used in a distributed environment, the administrators shall
ensure that the user databases on each TOE are consistent with each other
(P.DIST_USERS).
Based on the personnel assumptions the following usage conditions apply.
• The TOE and the security of information are managed by one or more
competent individuals (A.MANAGE).
• The system administrative personnel are not careless, malicious and abide
the instruction provided by the TOE documentation (A.NO_EVIL_ADMIN).
• TOE users act in a co-operating manner in a benign environment (A.COOP).
• TOE users are trained well enough to be able to use the security
functionality appropriately (A.UTRAIN).
• TOE users are trusted to some task or group of tasks within a secure IT
environment by exercising complete control over their data (A.UTRUST).
For a detailed description of the usage assumptions refer to the Security Target
[6], especially chapters 3.3 and 3.4.
Also important from a procedural point of view are the following constraints ([6],
chapter 3.4.4).
• Procedures exist for granting users authorization for access to specific
security levels (A. CLEARANCE).
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• Procedures exist for establishing the security level of all information
imported into the system, for establishing the security level for all peripheral
devices (e.g., printers, tape drives, disk drives) attached to the TOE, and
marking a sensitivity label on all output generated (A. SENSITIVITY).
4.2 Environmental assumptions
The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by
the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6], chapter 3.4.1
and 3.4.3).
• It is assumed that the processing resources of the TOE are located within
controlled access facilities which will prevent unauthorized physical access
(A.LOCATE).
• It is assumed that TOE hardware and software (critical to security policy
enforcement) is protected from unauthorized physical modification
(A.PROTECT).
• All network components (like bridges and routers) are assumed to correctly
pass data without modification (A.NET_COMP).
• Any other system with which the TOE communicates is assumed to be
under the same management control and operates under the same security
policy constraints. There are no security requirements which address the
need to trust external systems or the communication links to such systems
(A.PEER).
• It is assumed that all connections to peripheral devices and all network
connections reside within the controlled access facilities. Internal
communication paths to access points such as terminals or other systems
are assumed to be adequately protected (A.CONNECT).
Please consider also the requirements for the evaluated configuration specified
in chapter 8 of this report.
4.3 Clarification of scope
The threats listed below must be averted in order to support the TOE security
capabilities but are not addressed by the TOE itself. They must be addressed
by the operating environment of the TOE (for detailed information about the
threats and how the environment can cover them refer to the Security Target
[6]).
• A unprivileged user or the privileged system administrator is losing stored
data due to hardware malfunction (TE.HWMF).
• Security enforcing or relevant files of the TOE are manipulated or
accidentally corrupted without the system administrator being able to detect
this (TE.COR_FILE).
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• The hardware the TOE is running on, does not provide sufficient capabilities
to support the self-protection of the TSF from unauthorized programs
(TE.HW_SEP).
• When running in a logical partition, software running in a different partition
than the TOE is able to access resources that are assigned to the TOE
(TE.LPAR).
For a detailed description of the threats covered by the TOE environment
please refer to [6], chapter 3.2.2.
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5 Architectural Information
General overview of AIX
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the operating system AIX Version with
technology package 5300-05-02 enhanced by PitBull Foundation 5.0 and the
Virtual IO Server (VIOS) version 1.3.
AIX is a general purpose, multi-user, multi-tasking operating system. It is
compliant with all major international standards for UNIX systems, such as the
POSIX standards, Spec 1170, and FIPS Pub 180. It provides a platform for a
variety of applications in the governmental and commercial environment. AIX is
available on a broad range of computer systems from IBM, ranging from
departmental servers to multi-processor enterprise servers.
The evaluated configuration of AIX with technology package 5300-05-02
consists of a distributed, closed network of high-end, mid-range, and low-end
IBM System p5 servers running the evaluated version of AIX with maintenance
package 5300-05-02. All servers complying with the definition of System p5
POWER5 and POWER5+ with hardware components as defined in the Security
Target are covered by the evaluation.
The network links and cabling are assumed to be physically protected against
eavesdropping and tampering. All hosts within the network must run the
evaluated version of the TOE software and must be configured in accordance
with the configuration resulting from the initial installation the requirements as
described in the guidance documentation.
The TOE Security Functions (TSF) provided by AIX consists of those parts that
run in kernel mode plus some defined trusted processes. These together are
the functions that enforce the security policy as defined in the Security Target.
Tools and commands executed in user mode that are used by the system
administrator need also to be trusted to manage the system in a secure way.
But as with other operating system evaluations they are not considered to be
part of this TSF.
The hardware and the BootProm firmware are considered not to be part of the
TOE but part of the TOE environment.
The TOE includes installation from CDROM and from the network.
The TOE includes standard networking applications, such as ftp, rlogin, rsh, and
NFS.
Configuration of those network applications has to be performed in accordance
with the guidance provided in [24] LSPP/EAL4+ conformant configuration.
The TOE does not include the X-Window graphical interface and X-Window
applications.
System administration tools include the smitty non-graphical system
management tool.
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The TOE environment also includes applications that are not evaluated but are
used as unprivileged tools to access public system services. No HTTP server is
included in the evaluated configuration.
The PitBull Foundation extension to the standard AIX implements all the various
access control mechanisms provided by AIX: DAC, MAC, MIC, TCB, ASN, PV,
AZ. This extension consists of a kernel extension for the implementation and
enforcement of the access control logic as well as user space tools to manage
these mechanisms.
General overview of VIOS
In addition to the AIX OS, VIOS is part of the TOE as well to provide access to
shared SCSI and Ethernet resources.
Conceptually, VIOS resides as a layer between the AIX OS and the physical
hardware. Access to the shared resources is restricted based on the VIOS
configuration performed by the administrator.
VIOS provides discretionary access control between VIOS SCSI device drivers
behavior on behalf of LPAR partitions and logical or physical volumes. In
addition, VIOS provides discretionary access control between shared Ethernet
device drivers accessing a Hypervisormaintained virtual LAN and the VIOS
Ethernet adapter device driver. A VLAN setup with VLAN tags is not supported.
VIOS defines a separate set of roles compared to AIX for system management.
Each VIOS role has a set of commands available to it. Security parameters are
stored in specific files that are protected by the access control mechanisms.
Nevertheless, access to the VIOS management interface must be restricted to
authorized administrators.
Major structural units of the TOE
The TOE contains the following structural units:
• The kernel, which executes in system mode.
• A set of trusted processes that execute in user mode but with root privileges.
They also provide some of the security functions of the TOE.
• A set of configuration files that define the system configuration. Those files
are named the “TSF database” and need to be protected by the access
control mechanisms of the TOE such that they can only be modified by the
system administrator. The document [19] provides the detailed specification
of those files and also defines the access modes for each file.
• VIOS providing access to shared SCSI and Ethernet resources.
Security Functions
The security functions that have been evaluated include:
• Identification and Authentication: The TOE requires users to authenticate
themselves before they can work with the TOE. The mechanism used for
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authentication is a user ID/password combination. The system administrator
has a variety of configuration parameter he can use to enforce users to
select passwords that are hard to guess. In addition the system
administrator can define the maximum and minimum life-time of passwords.
Users need to authenticate themselves when they log in but also when they
change their identity using the su command or when using network
applications like rlogin, telnet, ftp. To protect administrative user IDs, all IDs
are subject to the account blocking mechanism enforced after a configured
number of consecutive failed login attempts. However, the administrative
user IDs with ISSO/SO authorization are always allowed to login on the
physical console which is considered to reside in a physically protected
environment.
• Auditing: The TOE includes the possibility to audit a large number of
events. The system administrator can configure which events are audited
and is also able to define such events on a per file system object basis,
define audit classes and assign them individually to users. This allows for a
great flexibility in the configuration of the events that are audited. The
evaluated configuration supports bin mode auditing only.
• Discretionary Access Control: The TOE supports discretionary access
control for the following different types of objects:
• The discretionary access control for file system objects: The discretionary
access control for file system objects in the TOE support the standard
Unix permission bits extended by access control lists that allow the
system administrator and the owner of the file system object to allow or
restrict the access to the file system object down to the granularity of a
single user.
• The discretionary access control for IPC objects: The TOE supports
discretionary access control based on Unix permission bits for
semaphore, shared memory segments and message queues.
In addition to the AIX DAC mechanisms, VIOS control access to the shared
SCSI and Ethernet resources. This access mediation is subject to the
discretion of the administrator.
• Mandatory Access Control: The TOE supports MAC for the objects listed
for DAC.
• Mandatory Integrity Control: The TOE supports MIC for the objects listed
for DAC.
• Advanced Security Networking: The TOE supports MAC rule enforcement
upon network connections. In addition, the TOE provides the RIPSO/CIPSO
protocols allow the communication of label information to remote systems.
• Privileges: In contrast to the standard AIX, the PitBull Foundation extension
disassembles the root privilege into a large number of hierarchical privileges.
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These privileges are to be used to override access control decisions for
allowing administrative actions.
• Authorizations: The user space is able to implement authorization checks
to verify whether a calling user bears a particular authorization. These
authorizations are hierarchical pendants to privileges in user space.
Authorizations are used to implement a role mechanism.
• Object Reuse: The TOE ensures that objects are cleared before they are
reassigned to and reused by other subjects. This applies to memory and file
system objects as well as to a number of other objects that could transmit
information a user might not want to be transmitted to other users.
• System Management: The AIX part of the TOE supports only two roles:
System administrator and normal users. Additional privileges that exist
within the TOE are not used in the evaluated configuration. System
management within the TOE is restricted to the system administrator. He
may either use the commands provided for system management or the
“smitty” tool, which provides a non-graphical interface. The tool will generate
scripts using the system management commands.
VIOS provides support for different roles for administrative purposes. As
only trusted administrators are allowed to access the management interface
of VIOS, these roles are provided for convenience for a group of
administrators.
• TOE Protection: The TOE protects itself from tampering by untrusted
subjects in a variety of ways. The kernel operates in its own protected
address space, which can not be modified or read by untrusted processes.
The kernel also prohibits any direct access by untrusted processes to
hardware. All non-kernel processes must use the system call interface to get
access to objects in the file system, inter-process communication objects, or
network objects. The kernel controls access to those objects based on the
access control policy for those objects and the access rights defined for the
individual users. There are also a number of system calls restricted to the
system administrator. Some other system calls have specific parameters
that are restricted to system administrators. In addition the TOE uses trusted
processes which run with system administrator privileges to implement some
of the TOE security functions. Those trusted processes are separated by the
kernel from untrusted processes. Also the configuration files used by the
TSF are protected by the access control functions of the TOE from
unauthorized access by untrusted users.
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6 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer:
• Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1, commtrf1.pdf, Third
Edtition September 2005, [9]
• Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2, commtrf2.pdf, Third
Edtition September 2005, [10]
• Commands Reference, Volume 1, aixcmds1.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [11]
• Commands Reference, Volume 2, aixcmds2.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [12]
• Commands Reference, Volume 3, aixcmds3.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [13]
• Commands Reference, Volume 4, aixcmds4.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [14]
• Commands Reference, Volume 5, aixcmds5.pdf, Third Edition September
2005, [15]
• Commands Reference, Volume 6, aixcmds6.pdf Third Edition September
2005, [16]
• Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX, diagunsd.pdf, Sixth
Edition October 2002, [17]
• Diagnostic Information for Multiple Bus Systems, 380509.pdf, Version 5.3,
December 2004, [18]
• Files Reference, aixfiles.pdf, Third Edtition September 2005, [19]
• General Programming Concepts: Writing and Debugging Programs,
genprogc.pdf, Third Edition September 2005, [20]
• System Management Guide: Operating System and Devices, baseadmn.pdf,
Thrid Edition September 2005, [21]
• System Management Concepts: Operating System and Devices,
admnconc.pdf, Third Edition September 2005, [22]
• README addendunm to the AIX guidance, User_Guidance_Docs.txt, [23]
• AIX 5L Version 5.3: Security, security.pdf, Fourth Edition July 2006, [24]
• System Management Guide: Communications and Networks,
commadmn.pdf, Third Edition September 2005, [25]
• Networks and Communication Management, commadmndita.pdf, First
Edition July 2006, [26]
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• AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 1, basetrf1.pdf, Second Edition December 2004, [27]
• AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 2, basetrf2.pdf, Second Edition December 2004, [28]
• Using the Virtual I/O Server, iphb1.pdf, Sixth Edition February 2006, [29]
• Common Criteria configuration manual for Foundation on AIX, Version 1.4,
CC_Configuration_manual.pdf, 2006-12-14, [30]
• PitBull Foundation and Foundation Suite Installation Guide, Version 1.5,
install_guide.pdf, [31]
• Archive with HTML files of PitBull man pages, pb_man.tar.gz, [32]
• Readme first instructions for PitBull, README.first.txt, [33]
• PitBull Foundation Release Notes, foundation_release_notes.pdf, Version
5.0.11.0, [34]
• Security Features User Guide, foundation_user_guide.pdf, 2005-03-15, [35]
• Trusted Facility Manual PitBull Foundation Release 5.0, Version 1.8,
foundation_admin_guide.pdf, [36]
The administrator/user is recommended to use the documents as a starting
point for an evaluation conformant usage of the TOE:
• README addendunm to the AIX guidance, User_Guidance_Docs.txt, [23]
• AIX 5L Version 5.3: Security, security.pdf, Fourth Edition July 2006, [24]
• Readme first instructions for PitBull, README.first.txt, [33]
• PitBull Foundation and Foundation Suite Installation Guide, Version 1.5,
install_guide.pdf, [31]
Please note that the information contained in the Security Target [6] also have
to be taken into account.
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7 IT Product Testing
Test Hardware Configuration
The following System p5 systems were used for testing:
• p520: With Software installed as required by [6]. SCSI and Ethernet
resources have been provided by VIOS
• p550: For VIOS testing
Additional developer tests have been performed on all hardware platforms as
listed in [6].
Evaluator testing on the TOE version with the TOE configuration as described in
the Security Target was also performed on one of the systems mentioned
above.
Test Coverage/Depth
All tests were performed on external interfaces of the TSF. Internal interfaces
were partially tested directly and partially tested indirectly. An argument was
provided for the sufficiency of the indirect tests.
The correspondence between the tests and the functional specification was
found to be accurate and complete. The tests have also been mapped to the
HLD subsystem and show a test depth as required by the chosen EAL.
Summary of Developer Testing Effort
Test configuration:
It was ensured that developer testing was performed on hardware conformant
to the ST. Similarly, the versions of the tested software as well as the
configuration of the TOE was consistent with the requirements from the ST.
Testing approach:
IBM has a large number of different test suites and test cases for each
component. The test suite related to the core AIX functionality is supplemented
by test suites related to the NFS and VIOS. Most of the test are automatic test
but some manual testing remains. The PitBull Foundation extension of AIX is
covered with its own test suite that is responsible for building and running the
test suite and collecting the results of the test cases.
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Summary of Evaluator Testing Effort
Test configuration:
The evaluator performed his test on a p5 p550 systems located in Austin.
Testing approach:
Since the core functinality of the TOE hasn’t changed much compared to the
previous evaluation the evaluator chose to concentrate his tests on the new
features, such as VIOS.
The evaluator has verified that all test cases produced the results that were
expected. Therefore the evaluator has determined that the tests show that the
TOE works as described in the Security Target and the developer’s design
documentation.
Evaluator Penetration Testing:
The evaluator has devised a set of penetration tests based on the developer’s
vulnerability analysis and based on the evaluator’s knowledge of the TOE
gained by the other evaluation activities. All penetration tests have been
designed to assume the the attack potential as defined in AVA_VLA.2.
The evaluator conducted those tests and did not find any test that resulted in a
sucessful penetration of the TOE with the attack potential assumed for
AVA_VLA.2.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
According to the Security Target the evaluated configuration of the TOE is
defined as follows (refer also to the Security Target [6]):
General Aspects
• The system must be installed according to the PitBull Foundation installation
guide [31].
• AIX 5.3 supports the use of IPv4 and IPv6, but only IPv4 is included in this
evaluation.
• Only 64 bit architectures are included.
• Web Based Systems Management (WebSM) is not included.
• Both network (NIM, Network Install Manager) and CD installations are
supported.
• Only the default mechanisms for identification and authentication are
included. Support for other authentication options, e.g., smartcard
authentication, is not included in the evaluation configuration.
• If the system console is used, it must be connect directly to the workstation
and afforded the same physical protection as the workstation.
• AIX 5.3 provides both a native and a Sys5 print system. Only Sys5 is
supported in the evaluated configuration, as it implements the labeling
requirements from LSPP.
• System security flags (i.e., kernel security flags) need to be configured as
identified in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.2.12.1).
• The system must be configured to disable remote access for an individual
user after five consecutively failed login attempts have occurred for that
user.
Networking Aspects:
• The TOE comprises one of the server machines (and optional peripherals)
as listed in section 2.4.2 of the Security Target running the system software
listed in table 1 of the ST chapter 2.3 (a server running the above listed
software is referred to as a “TOE server” below).
• If the product is configured with more than one TOE server, they are linked
by LANs, which may be joined by bridges/routers or by TOE workstations
which act as routers/gateways, or they connect using the Virtual
Input/Output Server (VIOS).
• If other systems are connected to the network they need to be configured
and managed by the same authority and using an appropriate security policy
not conflicting with the security policy of the TOE.
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Technical Aspects:
• The TOE is running in an LPAR a IBM System p5 POWER5 or POWER5+
server.
• The following file system types are supported:
• the AIX journaled filesystem, jfs2,
• the High Sierra filesystem for CD-ROM drives, cdrfs,
• the DVD-ROM file system, udfs,
• the process file system, procfs (/proc),
• the Network File System, nfs (V3, V4).
Please note that cdrfs, udfs, procfs, and (client-side) nfs are single level file
systems: For mandatory access control, the labels of the mount point apply to
all objects in the mounted file system. Single level file systems are not subject
to mandatory integrity control and TCB policies, and their objects cannot be
associated with privileges.
For setting up / configuring the TOE all guidance documents, especially the
documents [23], [24], [31], and [33], must be followed (please refer to chapter 6
of this report for more information on the guidance documentation).
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3], and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
as relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4 (also including ALC_FLR.1).
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation) and the class ASE for the
Security Target evaluation) are summarized in the following table:
Assurance classes and components Verdict
Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE PASS
TOE description ASE_DES.1 PASS
Security environment ASE_ENV.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.1 PASS
PP claims ASE_PPC.1 PASS
IT security requirements ASE_REQ.1 PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements ASE_SRE.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Configuration management CC Class ACM PASS
Partial CM automation ACM_AUT.1 PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures ACM_CAP.4 PASS
TOE CM coverage ACM_SCP.2 PASS
Delivery and operation CC Class ADO PASS
Detection of modification ADO_DEL.2 PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures ADO_IGS.1 PASS
Development CC Class ADV PASS
Fully defined external interfaces ADV_FSP.2 PASS
Security enforcing high-level design ADV_HLD.2 PASS
Subset of the implementation of the TSF ADV_IMP.1 PASS
Descriptive low-level design ADV_LLD.1 PASS
Informal correspondence demonstration ADV_RCR.1 PASS
Guidance documents CC Class AGD PASS
Administrator guidance AGD_ADM.1 PASS
User guidance AGD_USR.1 PASS
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Assurance classes and components Verdict
Life cycle support CC Class ALC PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.1 PASS
Tests CC Class ATE PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: low-level design ATE_DPT.2 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment CC Class AVA PASS
Validation of analysis AVA_MSU.2 PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation AVA_SOF.1 PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis AVA_VLA.2 PASS
Table 7: Verdicts for the assurance components
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0303-2006. New functionality
like VIOS has been subject of the re-evaluation. For details on the functionality
newly integrated in the TOE please refer to [6].
The evaluation has shown that:
• the TOE is conformant to the PP: Labeled Security Protection Profile
(LSPP), Issue 1.b, 8 October 1999, [8],
• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended,
• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.1, and
• the TOE Security Function “Identification and Authentication based on
passwords” fulfils the claimed strength of function: SOF-medium. This
strength applies for the identification and authentication of AIX as well as for
the identification and authentication for VIOS.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE version as outlined
in chapter 2 of this report.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
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modified product in accordance with the procedural requirements and provided
the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10 Comments/Recommendations
The User Guidance documentation as listed in chapter 6 of this report
(especially documents [23], [24], [31] and [33]) contains necessary information
about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage of the TOE
the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target
[6] and the Security Target as a whole must be taken into account. Therefore a
user/administrator must follow the guidance in these documents.
11 Annexes
None.
12 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [6] of the TOE is provided
within a separate document.
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13 Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
HLD High-level Design
ISSI Innovative Security Systems, Inc.
IT Information Technology
PP Protection Profile
SF Security Function
SFP Security Function Policy
SOF Strength of Function
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSC TSF Scope of Control
TSF TOE Security Functions
TSP TOE Security Policy
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security require-
ments for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
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Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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14 Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE.
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-0396-2007, Version 1.1.3, 2006-11-27, “IBM
AIX 5L for POWER V5.3 Technology level 5300040502 with Innovative
Security Systems’ PitBull Foundation Suite Release 5.0 and optional IBM
Virtual I/O Server Security Target”, IBM Corporation
[7] Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0396, Release 2, 2006-12-21,
atsec information security GmbH (confidential document)
[8] Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP), Issue 1.b, 8 October 1999
User Guidance Documentation
[9] Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 1, commtrf1.pdf, Third
Edtition September 2005
[10] Technical Reference: Communications, Volume 2, commtrf2.pdf, Third
Edtition September 2005
[11] Commands Reference, Volume 1, aixcmds1.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[12] Commands Reference, Volume 2, aixcmds2.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[13] Commands Reference, Volume 3, aixcmds3.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[14] Commands Reference, Volume 4, aixcmds4.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[15] Commands Reference, Volume 5, aixcmds5.pdf, Third Edition
September 2005
[16] Commands Reference, Volume 6, aixcmds6.pdf Third Edition September
2005
[17] Understanding the Diagnostic Subsystem for AIX, diagunsd.pdf, Sixth
Edition October 2002
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[18] Diagnostic Information for Multiple Bus Systems, 380509.pdf, Version
5.3, December 2004
[19] Files Reference, aixfiles.pdf, Third Edtition September 2005
[20] General Programming Concepts: Writing and Debugging Programs,
genprogc.pdf, Third Edition September 2005
[21] System Management Guide: Operating System and Devices,
baseadmn.pdf, Thrid Edition September 2005
[22] System Management Concepts: Operating System and Devices,
admnconc.pdf, Third Edition September 2005 [23] README
addendunm to the AIX guidance, User_Guidance_Docs.txt
[24] AIX 5L Version 5.3: Security, security.pdf, Fourth Edition July 2006
[25] System Management Guide: Communications and Networks,
commadmn.pdf, Third Edition September 2005
[26] Networks and Communication Management, commadmndita.pdf, First
Edition July 2006
[27] AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 1, basetrf1.pdf, Second Edition December 2004
[28] AIX 5.3 Technical Reference: Base Operating System and Extensions,
Volume 2, basetrf2.pdf, Second Edition December 2004
[29] Using the Virtual I/O Server, iphb1.pdf, Sixth Edition February 2006
[30] Common Criteria configuration manual for Foundation on AIX, Version
1.4, CC_Configuration_manual.pdf, 2006-12-14
[31] PitBull Foundation and Foundation Suite Installation Guide, Version 1.5,
install_guide.pdf
[32] Archive with HTML files of PitBull man pages, pb_man.tar.gz PB_MAN
[33] Readme first instructions for PitBull, README.first.txt
[34] PitBull Foundation Release Notes, foundation_release_notes.pdf,
Version 5.0.11.0
[35] Security Features User Guide, foundation_user_guide.pdf, 2005-03-15
[36] Trusted Facility Manual PitBull Foundation Release 5.0, Version 1.8,
foundation_admin_guide.pdf
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a) CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b) CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a) CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b) CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a) Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g., EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b) Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-
defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g., EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a) PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorization (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e., increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e., adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2
ACM_CAP 1 2 3 4 4 5 5
ACM_SCP 1 2 3 3 3
Delivery and
operation
ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3
ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Development ADV_FSP 1 1 1 2 3 3 4
ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5
ADV_IMP 1 2 3 3
ADV_INT 1 2 3
ADV_LLD 1 1 2 2
ADV_RCR 1 1 1 1 2 2 3
ADV_SPM 1 3 3 3
Guidance
documents
AGD_ADM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
AGD_USR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Life cycle
support
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 2 2 3
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3
Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3
ATE_DPT 1 1 2 2 3
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_CCA 1 2 2
AVA_MSU 1 2 2 3 3
AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1
AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-
engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-
specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0396-2007 Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g., by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorized access to resources (e.g., data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorized
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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