C098 Certification Report
XPCore v1.0
File name: ISCB-3-RPT-C098-CR-v1
Version: v1
Date of document: 15 July 2019
Document classification: PUBLIC
For general inquiry about us or our services,
please email: mycc@cybersecurity.my
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C098 Certification Report
XPCore v1.0
15 July 2019
ISCB Department
CyberSecurity Malaysia
Level 7, Tower 1
Menara Cyber Axis
Jalan Impact
63000 Cyberjaya, Selangor, Malaysia
Tel: +603 8800 7999 Fax: +603 8008 7000
http://www.cybersecurity.my
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DISTRIBUTION: UNCONTROLLED COPY - FOR UNLIMITED USE AND
DISTRIBUTION
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Copyright Statement
The copyright of this document, which may contain proprietary information, is the
property of CyberSecurity Malaysia.
The document shall be held in safe custody.
©CYBERSECURITY MALAYSIA, 2019
Registered office:
Level 7, Tower 1
Menara Cyber Axis
Jalan Impact
63000 Cyberjaya
Selangor Malaysia
Registered in Malaysia – Company Limited by Guarantee
Company No. 726630-U
Printed in Malaysia
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Foreword
The Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme has been
established under the 9th
Malaysian Plan to increase Malaysia’s competitiveness in quality
assurance of information security based on the Common Criteria (CC) standard and to
build consumers’ confidence towards Malaysian information security products.
The MyCC Scheme is operated by CyberSecurity Malaysia and provides a model for licensed
Malaysian Security Evaluation Facilities (MySEFs) to conduct security evaluations of ICT
products, systems and protection profiles against internationally recognised standards.
The results of these evaluations are certified by the Malaysian Common Criteria
Certification Body (MyCB) Unit, a unit established within Information Security Certification
Body (ISCB) Department, CyberSecurity Malaysia.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, the MyCB asserts that the product complies
with the security requirements specified in the associated Security Target. A Security
Target is a requirements specification document that defines the scope of the evaluation
activities. The consumer of certified IT products should review the Security Target, in
addition to this certification report, in order to gain an understanding of any assumptions
made during the evaluation, the IT product's intended environment, its security
requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the evaluation assurance level) that the
product satisfies the security requirements.
This certification report is associated with the certificate of product evaluation dated 21st
July 2019, and the Security Target (Ref [6]). The certification report, Certificate of product
evaluation and security target are posted on the MyCC Scheme Certified Product Register
(MyCPR) at www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria Portal (the official
website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement).
Reproduction of this report is authorised provided the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Disclaimer
The Information Technology (IT) product identified in this certification report and its
associate certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility
established under the Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC)
Scheme using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5
(Ref [3]), for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1
revision 5 (Ref [2]). This certification report and its associated certificate apply only to the
specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration. The evaluation
has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the MyCC Scheme and the
conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with
the evidence adduced. This certification report and its associated certificate is not an
endorsement of the IT product by CyberSecurity Malaysia or by any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certification report and its associated certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by CyberSecurity Malaysia or by any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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Document Change Log
RELEASE DATE PAGES
AFFECTED
REMARKS/CHANGE REFERENCE
d1 12 July 2019 All Initial draft
v1 15 July 2019 All Final
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Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is XPCore version 1.0. XPCore is a secure cloud services
platform that allows multiple software components, function modules or system to
exchange data and communicate with each other through the XPCore API (Application
Programming Interface). Authorized 3rd party developers will be able to integrate their
own system/program with XPcore platform and utilize XPCore features
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the Security Target (Ref [6]) which identifies
assumptions made during the evaluation, the intended environment for the TOE, the
security functional requirements, and the evaluation assurance level at which the product
is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Prospective consumers are advised to
verify that their operating environment is consistent with the evaluated configuration, and
to give due consideration to the comments, observations and recommendations in this
certification report.
This report confirms the findings of the security evaluation of the TOE to the Common
Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Level 2 (EAL2). This report confirms that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the relevant criteria and the requirements of the
Malaysia Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification (MyCC) Scheme (Ref [4]).
The evaluation was performed by Securelytics SEF Lab - and the evaluation was completed
on 7 July 2019.
The Malaysia Common Criteria Certification Body (MyCB), as the MyCC Scheme Certification
Body, declares that the TOE evaluation meets all the Arrangements on the Recognition of
Common Criteria certificates and the product will be listed in the MyCC Scheme Certified
Products Register (MyCPR) at http://www.cybersecurity.my/mycc and the Common Criteria
portal (the official website of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) at
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
It is the responsibility of the user to ensure that XPCore v1.0 meets their requirements. It
is recommended that a potential user of the TOE refer to the Security Target (Ref [6]) and
this Certification Report prior to deciding whether to purchase the product.
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Table of Contents
Document Authorisation ......................................Error! Bookmark not defined.
Copyright Statement ........................................................................................iii
Foreword iv
Disclaimer .............................................................................................................v
Document Change Log.....................................................................................vi
Executive Summary ...........................................................................................vii
Table of Contents ...........................................................................................viii
Index of Tables..................................................................................................ix
Index of Figures ................................................................................................ix
1 Target of Evaluation..........................................................................................1
1.1 TOE Description ................................................................................................1
1.2 TOE Identification ..................................................................................................2
1.3 Security Policy .....................................................................................................2
1.4 TOE Architecture .................................................................................................3
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries............................................................................3
1.4.2 Physical Boundaries...........................................................................3
1.5 Clarification of Scope.........................................................................................5
1.6 Assumptions ......................................................................................................5
1.6.1 Environmental assumptions....................................................................5
1.7 Evaluated Configuration ....................................................................................6
1.8 Delivery Procedures ..........................................................................................7
2 Evaluation ............................................................................................8
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities ............................................................................8
2.1.1 Life-cycle support......................................................................................8
2.1.2 TOE Delivery ............................................................................................9
2.1.3 Development.............................................................................................9
2.1.4 Guidance documents..............................................................................10
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2.1.5 IT Product Testing ..................................................................................11
3 Result of the Evaluation ...................................................................15
3.1 Assurance Level Information ...........................................................................15
3.2 Recommendation.............................................................................................15
Annex A References ........................................................................................17
A.1 References......................................................................................................17
A.2 Terminology...................................................................................................17
A.2.1 Acronyms........................................................................................................17
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms .........................................................................................18
Index of Tables
Table 1: TOE identification..............................................................................................2
Table 2: Independent Test ............................................................................................12
Table 3: List of Acronyms .............................................................................................17
Table 4: Glossary of Terms ...........................................................................................18
Index of Figures
Figure 1: TOE physical boundary.................................................................................................5
Figure 2 : Evaluated Deployment Configuration of the TOE ....................................................6
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1 Target of Evaluation
1.1 TOE Description
1 The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is XPCore version 1.0. XPCore is a platform that allows
multiple software components, function modules or system to exchange data and
communicate with each other through the XPCore API (Application Programming
Interface).
2 The TOE can be accessible by user via a web browser and can be deploy either in a
cloud environment (hosted by MicroEngine Networks) or in the customer’s
premises/data center (hosted by the customers). Refer to Section 1.5.1 for more detail
explanations. Authorized 3rd party developers will be able to integrate their own
system/program with XPcore platform and utilize XPCore features.
3 XPCore features include managing either third party or MicroEngine’s:
• Alarm Monitoring System
• CCTV Monitoring System
• Door Access Control Management System
• Time Attendance Management System
• System User Authentication
• And many more
4 The major security features of the TOE include:
a) Security Audit
b) Identification and Authentication
c) Security Management
d) Secure Communication
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1.2 TOE Identification
5 The details of the TOE are identified in Table 1 below.
Table 1: TOE identification
Evaluation Scheme
Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
(MyCC) Scheme
Project Identifier C098
TOE Name XPCore
TOE Version v1.0
Security Target Title XPCore Security Target
Security Target Version v1.0
Security Target Date 17 June 2019
Assurance Level EAL2
Criteria
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5 (Ref [2])
Methodology
Common Methodology for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, April 2017, Version 3.1, Revision 5
(Ref [3])
Protection Profile
Conformance
None
Common Criteria
Conformance
CC Part 2 Conformant
CC Part 3 Conformant
Package conformant to EAL2
Sponsor
MicroEngine Networks Sdn Bhd
No.29, Jalan 19/4A, 47600 Subang Jaya, Selangor.
Developer
MicroEngine Networks Sdn Bhd
No.29, Jalan 19/4A, 47600 Subang Jaya, Selangor.
Evaluation Facility
Securelytics SEF
A-19-06, Tower A ATRIA SOFO SUITES, Jalan SS 22/23,
Damansara Utama, 47400 Petaling Jaya, Selangor
1.3 Security Policy
6 No organisational security policies have been defined regarding the use of the TOE.
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1.4 TOE Architecture
7 The TOE includes both physical and logical boundaries which are described in
Section 1.5 of the Security Target (Ref [6]).
1.4.1 Logical Boundaries
8 The scope of the evaluation was limited to those claims made in the Security Target
(Ref [6]) and includes only the following evaluated security functionality:
a) Security Audit
The TOE generates audit records for security events. The Administrator has the
ability to view the audit logs. Types of audit logs are:
• User Login Success/Fail Event
• Event type, date & time, user role and access origin
Only Administrator has the capability to review these audit records via the web
interface.
b) Identification and Authentication
All users (Administrator and Authorised User) are required to perform
identification and authentication with the TOE before any information flows are
permitted. These users must be authenticated prior to performing any TOE
functions by entering a username and password.
c) Security Management
The TOE contains various management functions to ensure efficient and secure
management of the TOE. The TOE maintains role-based access control mechanisms
to ensure that functions are restricted to those who have the privilege to access
them. The Administrator has the ability to manage user and configure the TOE.
d) Secure Communication
The TOE provides a secure SSL channel between the TOE User and the TOE.
1.4.2 Physical Boundaries
9 The TOE is XPCore version 1.0 and it provides security functionality such as Security
Audit, Identification and Authentication, Security Management and Secure
Communication. The TOE can be categorised as Other Devices and Systems in
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accordance with the categories identified on the Common Criteria Portal
(www.commoncriteriaportal.org) that lists all the certified products.
10 The XPCore comprise the following components:
Component Descriptions
TOE XPCore is a secure cloud services platform that allows multiple
software components, function modules or system to
exchange data and communicate with each other through the
XPCore API (Application Programming Interface).
TOE Users There are two types of TOE users; Administrator and User.
Web Browser A web browser is a software program that allows a user to
locate, access, and display web pages. TOE Users interact with
the TOE via a supported web browser stated in Section 1.4.3
of Security Target.
Database A database is an electronic system that allows data to be easily
accessed, manipulated and updated. a database is used as a
method of storing, managing and retrieving data.
Operating System Operating System is a software program that enables the
computer hardware to communicate and operate with the
computer software. The TOE requires an operating system to
function. Refer to Section 1.4.3 of Security Target for
minimum system requirement for operating system.
11 Refer Figure 1 for TOE physical boundary
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Figure 1: TOE physical boundary
1.5 Clarification of Scope
12 The TOE is designed to be suitable for use in accordance with user guidance that is
supplied with the product.
13 Section 1.4 of this document describes the scope of the evaluation, which is limited
to those claims made in the Security Target (Ref [6]).
14 Potential consumers of the TOE are advised that some functions and services of the
overall product have not been evaluated as part of this evaluation. Potential consumers
of the TOE should carefully consider their requirements for using functions and
services outside of the evaluated configuration.
1.6 Assumptions
15 This section summarizes the security aspects of the environment/configuration in
which the product is intended to operate. Consumers should understand their own IT
environment and requirements for secure operation of the TOE as defined in the
Security Target (Ref [6]).
1.6.1 Environmental assumptions
16 Assumptions for the TOE environment are as described in Section 3.4 of the Security
Target (Ref [6]):
Identifier Assumption Statement
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A.PLATFORM The TOE relies upon a trustworthy platform and local network from which
it provides administrative capabilities. The TOE relies on this platform to
provide logon services via a local or network directory service, and to
provide basic audit log management functions. The platform is expected
to be configured specifically to provide TOE services, employing features
such as a host-based firewall which limits its network role to providing
TOE functionality.
A.ADMIN One or more competent, trusted personnel who are not careless, wilfully
negligent, or hostile, are assigned and authorized as the Administrator,
and do so using and abiding by guidance documentation.
A.USER Users are not wilfully negligent or hostile and use the device within
compliance of a reasonable enterprise security policy.
A.TIMESTAMP The platforms on which the TOE operate shall be able to provide reliable
time stamps.
A.PHYSICAL It is assumed that the appliance hosting the operating system and
database are in a secure operating facility with restricted physical access
and non-shared hardware.
1.7 Evaluated Configuration
17 The TOE was evaluated with below Supporting hardware, software and/or firmware.
18 The evaluated configuration of the TOE, shown in Figure 2 is a combination of
hardware and software application suite that provides the evaluated configuration.
Figure 2 : Evaluated Deployment Configuration of the TOE
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1.8 Delivery Procedures
19 The evaluators examined the delivery procedure, in which provide guidance for the
developer to initiate delivery process of the TOE and its components to the intended
recipient(s). It also provides direction on the methods used to deliver the TOE to
consumers and users of the product.
20 The delivery starts from manufacturing until the TOE is delivered to customer for
installation and use as below in Lifecycle Documentation:
• Receiving Customer Order
• Evaluate Customer’s Order
• Planning Stock Delivery
• Product Requisition
• Product Delivery Arrangement
• Product Delivery
• Invoicing
• End
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2 Evaluation
21 The evaluation was conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Common
Criteria, version 3.1 Revision 5 (Ref [2]) and the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation (CEM), version 3.1 Revision 5 (Ref [3]). The evaluation was conducted at
Evaluation Assurance Level 2. The evaluation was performed conformant to the ISCB
Product Certification Schemes Policy (Product_SP) (Ref [4]) and ISCB Evaluation Facility
Manual (ISCB_EFM) (Ref [5]).
2.1 Evaluation Analysis Activities
22 The evaluation activities involved a structured evaluation of the TOE, including the
following components:
2.1.1 Life-cycle support
23 The evaluators checked that the TOE provided for evaluation is labelled with its
reference.
24 The evaluators checked that the TOE references used are consistent.
25 The evaluators examined the method of identifying configuration items to determine
that it describes how configuration items are uniquely identified.
26 The evaluators examined the configuration items to determine that they are identified
in a way that is consistent with the CM documentation.
27 The evaluators checked that the configuration list includes the
28 a) the TOE itself;
29 b) the parts that comprise the TOE;
30 c) the evaluation evidence required by the SARs in the ST
31 The evaluators examined the configuration list to determine that it uniquely identifies
each configuration item.
32 The evaluators checked that the configuration list indicates the developer of each TSF
relevant configuration item.
33 The evaluators examined the delivery documentation to determine that it describes all
procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the
TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
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34 The evaluators examined aspects of the delivery process to determine that the delivery
procedures are used.
2.1.2 TOE Delivery
35 The evaluators examined the delivery documentation and determined that it describes
all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of
the TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
2.1.3 Development
36 The evaluators examined the security architecture description and determined that the
information provided in the evidence is presented at a level of detail commensurate
with the descriptions of the SFR-enforcing abstractions contained in the functional
specification and TOE design.
37 The evaluators examined the security architecture description and concluded that it
contains sufficient information to demonstrate that the TSF is able to protect itself
from tampering by untrusted active entities. The security architecture description
presents an analysis that adequately describes how the SFR-enforcing mechanisms
cannot be bypassed.
38 The evaluators examined the functional specification and determined that the TSF is
fully represented, it states the purpose of each TSF interface and method of use for
each TSFI is given.
39 The evaluators examined the presentation of the TSFI to determine that it completely
identifies all parameters associated with every TSFI and completely and accurately
describes all error messages resulting from an invocation of each SFR-enforcing TSFI.
40 The evaluators examined the presentation of the TSFI to determine that it completely
and accurately describes the SFR-enforcing actions associated with the SFR-enforcing
TSFIs.
41 The evaluators examined that the developer supplied tracing links of the SFRs to the
corresponding TSFIs.
42 The evaluators examined the TOE design to determine that the structure of the entire
TOE is described in terms of subsystems and all subsystems of the TSF are identified.
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43 The evaluators examined the TOE and determined that each SFR-non interfering
subsystem of the TSF was described such that the evaluators could determine that the
subsystem is SFR-non interfering.
44 The evaluators examined the TOE design to determine that it provides a complete,
accurate, and detailed description of the SFR-enforcing behaviour of the SFR-enforcing
subsystems.
45 The evaluators examined the TOE design to determine that it contains a complete and
accurate high-level description of the SFR-supporting and SFR-non interfering
behaviour of the SFR-enforcing subsystems. The evaluators determined that the TOE
design provided a complete and accurate high-level description of the behaviour of
the SFR-supporting subsystems.
46 The evaluators examined the TOE design contained a complete and accurate mapping
from the TSFI described in the functional specification to the subsystems of the TSF
described in the TOE design.
47 The evaluators examined that all SFRs were covered by the TOE design and concluded
that the TOE design was an accurate instantiation of all SFRs.
2.1.4 Guidance documents
48 The evaluators examined the operational user guidance and determined that it
describes, for each user role, the user-accessible functions and privileges that should
be controlled in a secure processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
49 The evaluators examined the operational user guidance to determine that it describes,
for each user role, the secure use of the available interfaces provided by the TOE.
50 The evaluators examined the operational user guidance to determine that it describes,
for each user role, the available security functionality and interfaces, in particular all
security parameters under the control of the user, indicating secure values as
appropriate.
51 The evaluators examined the operational user guidance to determine that it describes,
for each user role, each type of security-relevant event relative to the user functions
that need to be performed, including changing the security characteristics of entities
under the control of the TSF and operation following failure or operational error.
52 The evaluators examined the operational user guidance and other evaluation evidence
to determine that the guidance identifies all possible modes of operation of the TOE
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(including, if applicable, operation following failure or operational error), their
consequences and implications for maintaining secure operation.
53 The evaluators examined the operational user guidance to determine that it describes,
for each user role, the security measures to be followed in order to fulfil the security
objectives for the operational environment as described in the ST.
54 The evaluators examined the operational user guidance to determine that it is clear
and it is reasonable.
2.1.5 IT Product Testing
55 Testing at EAL 2 consists of assessing developer tests, sufficiency test and conducting
penetration tests. The TOE testing was conducted by evaluators from Securelytics SEF
lab. The detailed testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases,
expected results and actual results are documented in a separate Test Plan Report.
2.1.5.1 Assessment of Developer Tests
56 The evaluators verified that the developer has met their testing responsibilities by
repeating the developer test, as documented in the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref
[7]) (not a public document because it contains information proprietary to the
developer and/or the evaluator). The results of the evaluators’ tests are consistent with
the developers’ test results defined in their evaluation evidences submitted.
2.1.5.2 Independent Test
57 At EAL 2, independent test demonstrates the correspondence between the security
functional requirements (SFRs) defined in Security Target, and the test cases that test
the functions and behaviour of the TOE that meets those requirements. The evaluators
have decided to perform testing based on the TOE Security Functions.
58 All testing was planned and documented to a sufficient level of detail to allow
repeatability of the testing procedures and results. The results of the independent
functional tests developed and performed by the evaluators to verify the functionality
as follows:
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Table 2: Independent Test
Test ID Description SFRs Results
F001 –
Identification
and
Authentication
Security
Management
ADMIN
Interface
USER Interface
1. To test that each user to be
successfully authenticated and
identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user.
2. To test that the TOE maintains the
roles Admin and Normal User.
3. To test that the TOE enforces the
access control SFP to restrict the
ability to change default, modify and
delete the security attributes Admin
Account, TOE Configuration, Users
Account to Admin.
4. To test that the TOE maintains the
following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users;
Username, Password, User role, User
Account
5. To test that the TOE enforce access
control SFP to provide permissive
default values for security attributes
that are used to enforce the SFP.
6. To test that the TOE performs the
following management functions:
Refer to objects listed in Section
5.2.13 of the ST.
7. To test that the TOE restricts the
ability to modify the User Accounts to
Admin
8. To test that the TOE enforces the
access control SFP on objects listed in
Section 5.2.4 of the ST.
9. To test that If the Admin and
Normal User are successfully
authenticated accordingly, then
access is granted based on privilege
allocated and If the Admin and
Normal User are not authenticated
successfully, therefore, access
permission is denied
10. To test that the TOE restricts the
ability to disable, enable and modify
the behaviour of the functions of TOE
Configurations to Administrators
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UID.2
FIA_UAU.2
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
Pass
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Test ID Description SFRs Results
F002 –
Trusted Path
SSL_API
1. To test that the TOE provides a
communication path between itself
and remote users that is logically
distinct from other communication
paths and provides assured
identification of its end points and
protection of the communicated data
from modification or disclosure
2. To test that the TOE permits
remote users to initiate
communication via the trusted path
3. To test that the TOE requires the
use of the trusted path for initial user
authentication and all further
communication after authentication
FTP_TRP.1 Pass
F003 –
Security Audit
ADMIN
Interface
1. To test that the TOE able to
generate audit record of the following
auditable events:
a. User Login Success/Fail Event
b. Event type, date & time, user role
and access origin
2. To test that the TOE record within
each audit record at least the
following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of
event, subject identity (if applicable),
and the outcome (success or failure)
of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based
on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included
in the PP/ST (none).
3. To test that the TOE provides the
admin with the capability to read all
audit information from the audit
records and provide the audit records
in a manner suitable for the user to
interpret the information.
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
Pass
59 All testing performed by evaluators produced the expected results and as such the
TOE behaved as expected.
2.1.5.3 Vulnerability Analysis
60 The evaluators performed a vulnerability analysis of the TOE in order to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE. This vulnerability analysis considered public
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domain sources and an analysis of guidance documentation, functional specification,
TOE design, and security architecture description.
61 From the vulnerability analysis, the evaluators conducted penetration testing to
determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
basic attack potential. The following factors have been taken into consideration during
penetration tests:
a) Time taken to identify and exploit (elapse time);
b) Specialist technical expertise required (specialised expertise);
c) Knowledge of the TOE design and operation (knowledge of the TOE);
d) Window of opportunity; and
e) IT hardware/software or other equipment required for exploitation
2.1.5.3.1 Vulnerability testing
62 The penetration tests focused on:
a) SQL Injection
b) Cross Site Scripting
c) Cross-site Request
d) Forgery (CSRF)
e) Security misconfiguration
f) Failure to restrict URL Access
g) Information Disclosure
h) Directory Traversal
63 The results of the penetration testing demonstrate that the TOE is resistant to an
attacker possessing a basic attack potential. However, it is important to ensure that
the TOE is used only in its evaluated configuration and in a secure environment as
specified in the Security Target (Ref [6]).
2.1.5.3.2 Testing Results
64 Tests conducted for the TOE produced the expected results and demonstrated that
the product behaved as specified in its Security Target and its functional specification.
Therefore, the certifiers confirmed that all the tests conducted were PASSED as
expected.
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3 Result of the Evaluation
65 After due consideration during the oversight of the execution of the evaluation by the
certifiers and of the Evaluation Technical Report (Ref [7]), the Malaysian Common
Criteria Certification Body certifies the evaluation of XPCore v1.0 which is performed
by Securelytics SEF.
66 Securelytics SEF found that XPCore v1.0 upholds the claims made in the Security Target
(Ref [6]) and supporting documentations, and has met the requirements of the
Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Level 2.
67 Certification is not a guarantee that a TOE is completely free of exploitable
vulnerabilities. There will remain a small level of risk that exploitable vulnerabilities
remain undiscovered in its claimed security functionality. The risk is reduced as the
certified level of assurance increases for the TOE.
3.1 Assurance Level Information
68 EAL 2 provides assurance by a full security target and analysis of the SFRs in that
Security Target, using functional and complete interface specifications, guidance
documentation and a description of the design of the TOE and the implementation to
understand the security behaviour.
69 The analysis is supported by independent testing of the TSF, evidence of developer
testing based on the functional specification, selective independent confirmation of
the developer test results, and a vulnerability analysis (based upon the functional
specification, TOE design, security architecture description and guidance evidence
provided) demonstrating resistance to an attacker possessing a Basic attack potential.
70 EAL 2 also provides assurance through use of a configuration management system
and evidence of secure delivery procedures.
3.2 Recommendation
71 Securelytics SEF has made recommendation such as:
a) The users should make themselves familiar with the developer guidance provided
with the TOE and pay attention to all security warnings.
b) The users must maintain the confidentiality, integrity and availability of security
relevant data for TOE initialization, start-up and operation if stored or handled
outside the TOE.
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c) System Auditor should review the audit trail generated and exported by the TOE
periodically.
d) The users must ensure appropriate network protection is maintained, the network
on which the TOE is installed must be both physically and logically protected.
72 The Malaysian Certification Body (MyCB) strongly recommended that:
a) Potential purchasers of the TOE should review the intended operational
environment and ensure that they are comfortable that the stated security
objectives for the operational environment can be suitably addressed.
b) Potential purchasers of the TOE should ensure that the administrators responsible
for the TOE are provided sufficient training and are familiar with the guidance
supplements prior to configuring and administering the TOE.
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Annex A References
A.1 References
[1] Arrangement on the recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field of
Information Technology Security, July 2014.
[2] The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version
3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] ISCB Product Certification Schemes Policy (Product_SP), v1b, CyberSecurity Malaysia,
March 2018.
[5] ISCB Evaluation Facility Manual (ISCB_EFM), v1a, March 2018.
[6] XPCore Security Target, Version 1.0, 17 June 2019.
[7] Evaluation Technical Report XPCore, Version 1.0, 7 July 2019.
A.2 Terminology
A.2.1 Acronyms
Table 3: List of Acronyms
Acronym Expanded Term
CB Certification Body
CC Common Criteria (ISO/IEC15408)
CEM Common Evaluation Methodology (ISO/IEC 18045)
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO International Organisation for Standardization
ISCB Information Security Certification Body
MyCB Malaysian Common Criteria Certification Body
MyCC Malaysian Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
MyCPR MyCC Scheme Certified Products Register
MySEF Malaysian Security Evaluation Facility
PP Protection Profile
ST Security Target
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Acronym Expanded Term
TOE Target of Evaluation
A.2.2 Glossary of Terms
Table 4: Glossary of Terms
Term Definition and Source
CC International
Interpretation
An interpretation of the CC or CEM issued by the CCMB that
is applicable to all CCRA participants.
Certificate The official representation from the CB of the certification of
a specific version of a product to the Common Criteria.
Certification Body An organisation responsible for carrying out certification
and for overseeing the day-today operation of an Evaluation
and Certification Scheme. Source CCRA
Consumer The organisation that uses the certified product within their
infrastructure.
Developer The organisation that develops the product submitted for CC
evaluation and certification.
Evaluation The assessment of an IT product, IT system, or any other
valid target as defined by the scheme, proposed by an
applicant against the standards covered by the scope defined
in its application against the certification criteria specified in
the rules of the scheme. Source CCRA and MS-ISO/IEC Guide
65
Evaluation and Certification
Scheme
The systematic organisation of the functions of evaluation
and certification under the authority of a certification body
in order to ensure that high standards of competence and
impartiality are maintained and that consistency is achieved.
Source CCRA.
Interpretation Expert technical judgement, when required, regarding the
meaning or method of application of any technical aspect of
the criteria or the methodology. An interpretation may be
either a national interpretation or a CC international
interpretation.
Certifier The certifier responsible for managing a specific certification
task.
Evaluator The evaluator responsible for managing the technical aspects
of a specific evaluation task.
Maintenance Certificate The update of a Common Criteria certificate to reflect a
specific version of a product that has been maintained under
the MyCC Scheme.
National Interpretation An interpretation of the CC, CEM or MyCC Scheme rules that
is applicable within the MyCC Scheme only.
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Term Definition and Source
Security Evaluation Facility An organisation (or business unit of an organisation) that
conducts ICT security evaluation of products and systems
using the CC and CEM in accordance with Evaluation and
Certification Scheme policy
Sponsor The organisation that submits a product for evaluation and
certification under the MyCC Scheme. The sponsor may also
be the developer.
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