PREMIER MINISTRE
General Secretariat for Defence and National Security
French Network and Information Security Agency
Certification Report ANSSI-CC-2009/56
Multiapp ID IAS ECC Smart card
Paris, 17 February 2010
Courtesy Translation
Certification report ANSSI-CC-2009/56 Multiapp ID IAS ECC smart card
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Warning
This report is designed to provide sponsors with a document enabling them to assess the
security level of a product under the conditions of use and operation defined in this report for
the evaluated version. It is also designed to provide the potential purchaser of the product with
the conditions under which he may operate or use the product so as to meet the conditions of
use for which the product has been evaluated and certified; that is why this certification report
must be read alongside the evaluated user and administration guidance, as well as with the
product security target, which presents threats, environmental assumptions and the supposed
conditions of use so that the user can judge for himself whether the product meets his needs in
terms of security objectives.
Certification does not, however, constitute a recommendation product from ANSSI (French
Network and Information Security Agency), and does not guarantee that the certified product
is totally free of all exploitable vulnerabilities.
Any correspondence about this report has to be addressed to:
Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale
Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information
Centre de certification
51, boulevard de la Tour Maubourg
75700 PARIS cedex 07 SP
France
certification.anssi@ssi.gouv.fr
Reproduction of this document without any change or cut is authorised.
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Certification report reference
ANSSI-CC-2009/56
Product name
Multiapp ID IAS ECC smart card :
electronic signature application v4.2.7.A loaded on
Multiapp v1.0 Java Card platform with v1.2 soft mask
embedded on NXP P5CD144 VOB
Product reference
Applet version: v4.2.7.A
Multiapp Java Card platform version : v1.0
soft mask version: v1.2
Microcontroller version : V0B
Protection profile conformity
[BSI-PP-0005-2002] : SSCD Type 2, version 1.04
[BSI-PP-0006-2002] : SSCD Type 3, version 1.05
Evaluation criteria and version
Common Criteria version 3.1
Evaluation level
EAL 4 augmented
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5
Developer(s)
Gemalto SA1
6 rue de la Verrerie
92197 Meudon, France
NXP Semiconductors GmbH1
Stresemannallee 101
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
Sponsor
Gemalto SA
6 rue de la Verrerie, 92197 Meudon, France
Evaluation facility
Serma Technologies
30 avenue Gustave Eiffel, 33608 Pessac, France
Phone: +33 (0)5 57 26 08 75, email : e.francois@serma.com
Recognition arrangements
CCRA
The product is recognised at EAL4 level.
SOG-IS
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Introduction
The Certification
Security certification for information technology products and systems is governed by decree
number 2002-535 dated April, 18th 2002, and published in the "Journal Officiel de la
République Française". This decree stipulates that:
• The French Network and Information Security Agency draws up certification
reports. These reports indicate the features of the proposed security targets. They may
include any warnings that the authors feel the need to mention for security reasons.
They may or may not be transmitted to third parties or made public, as the sponsors
desire (article 7).
• The certificates issued by the Prime Minister certify that the copies of the products or
systems submitted for evaluation fulfil the specified security features. They also
certify that the evaluations have been carried out in compliance with applicable rules
and standards, with the required degrees of skill and impartiality (article 8).
The procedures are available on the Internet site www.ssi.gouv.fr.
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Contents
1. THE PRODUCT........................................................................................................................... 6
1.1. PRESENTATION OF THE PRODUCT........................................................................................... 6
1.2. EVALUATED PRODUCT DESCRIPTION ..................................................................................... 6
1.2.1. Product identification.................................................................................................... 7
1.2.2. Security services............................................................................................................ 8
1.2.3. Architecture................................................................................................................... 8
1.2.4. Life cycle ....................................................................................................................... 9
1.2.5. Evaluated configuration.............................................................................................. 11
2. THE EVALUATION.................................................................................................................. 12
2.1. EVALUATION REFERENTIAL ................................................................................................. 12
2.2. EVALUATION WORK ............................................................................................................. 12
2.3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS ACCORDING TO ANSSI TECHNICAL
FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................................................................... 13
2.4. RANDOM NUMBER GENERATOR ANALYSIS .......................................................................... 13
3. CERTIFICATION...................................................................................................................... 14
3.1. CONCLUSION........................................................................................................................ 14
3.2. RESTRICTIONS...................................................................................................................... 14
3.3. RECOGNITION OF THE CERTIFICATE..................................................................................... 15
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS).................................................................................. 15
3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)................................................... 15
ANNEX 1. EVALUATION LEVEL OF THE PRODUCT.......................................................... 16
ANNEX 2. EVALUATED PRODUCT REFERENCES .............................................................. 17
ANNEX 3. CERTIFICATION REFERENCES ........................................................................... 19
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1. The product
1.1. Presentation of the product
The evaluated product is the Gemalto Multiapp ID IAS ECC smart card product: electronic
signature application v4.2.7.A loaded on Multiapp v1.0 Java card platform with v1.2 soft
mask embedded on NXP P5CD144 VOB.
The TOE (Target of Evaluation) is dedicated to electronic administration. The TOE is the
Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) functionalities provided by the IAS ECC
(Identification Authentication Signature / European Citizen Card) application, and supported
by the Multiapp Java Card platform.
The Gemalto IAS ECC application is compliant with E-sign specifications (cf. [E-sign]).
It provides the two main SSCD type 2 and type 3 product services:
- SCD / SVD generation (Signature Creation Data / Signature Verification Data ) ;
- Signature creation.
1.2. Evaluated product description
The security target [ST] defines the evaluated product, its evaluated security functionalities
and its operational environment.
This security target is strictly conformed1
to [BSI-PP-0005-2002] protection profile - SSCD
Type 2 - and [BSI-PP-0006-2002] - SSCD Type 3.
1
Although the [BSI-PP-0005-2002] - SSCD Type 2 - and [BSI-PP-0006-2002] - SSCD Type 3 Protection
profiles were written with CCv2.1, so did not (yet) specify strict conformance (or demonstrable), it is accepted
for the [ST], written with CCv3.1, to claim strict conformance as that [ST] integrates all protection profiles
requirements, with some CC adaptation explained in the [ST] §2.4 PP REFINEMENTS.
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1.2.1. Product identification
The configuration list [CONF] identifies the product’s constituent elements.
The certified version of the product can be identified by the following elements:
Subject reference supplier
Commercial name MultiApp ID IAS ECC Gemalto
TOE internal reference T1009875 Gemalto
Micro-controller reference P5CD144 VOB NXP
Platform reference - Hard mask V1.0 (ref. MPH076)
- soft mask V1.2
Gemalto
Applet reference Applet IAS ECC V4.2.7.A Gemalto
The TOE is uniquely referenced by the answers to the following Get Data commands:
- For the platform, one gets: B0 85 14 21 01 12 40 70 51 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00,
These data have the following meaning:
o « BO » Gemalto Family Name: Java Card;
o « 85 » Gemalto OS Name: Multiapp ID v1.0;
o « 14 » Gemalto Mask Number: MPH076;
o « 21 » Gemalto Product Name: IAS ECC configuration;
o « 01 » Gemalto Flow version;
o « 12 » Gemalto filter set: version 1.2;
o « 40 70 » Chip Manufacturer: NXP;
o « 51 44 » Chip version: P5CD144;
o « 00 00 » RFU;
o the remaining « 00…00 » will be completed by specific teams during
manufacturing and personalization process;
- For IAS ECC applet, one gets : A0 0C 49 41 53 20 45 43 43 20 31 2E 30 31 A1 07 34
2E 32 2E 37 2E 41, where:
o « 49 41 53 20 45 43 43 20 31 2E 30 31 » indicates the applet label (IAS ECC
1.01) in ASCII (American standard Code for Information Interchange);
o « 34 2E 32 2E 37 2E 41 » applet version (4.2.7.A) in ASCII.
This information allows tracing back to all items constituting of the TOE (IC, hard mask, soft
mask/filter and applet). It allows properly and uniquely identifying the TOE. The above
information was checked on the TOE samples provided for evaluation.
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1.2.2. Security services
The product provides mainly the following security services:
- Security services provided by the platform (see [ST] on chapter §7.1) :
o Emanation protection in order to protect data, the RAD (Reference
Authentication Data) and the SCD ;
o Card operation protection (in particular, check of operations consistancy
depending on the card life-cycle, management of security highlights provided
by the underlying IC) ;
- Security services provided by applet IAS ECC (see [ST] on chapter §7.2) :
o Authentication management (for role management and for secure channel
management) ;
o Cryptography management (Key generation and correspondence verification
(for RSA key pairs), Key destruction and cryptographic operations);
o Integrity monitoring of sensitive user data and of the DTBS (Data To Be
Signed) ;
o Operation management and access control;
o Secure messaging management.
1.2.3. Architecture
The product consists of:
• IAS ECC applet loaded in EEPROM ;
• Soft mask (v1.2) loaded in EEPROM ;
• Multiapp hard mask in ROM ;
• Integrated Circuit.
The general structure is summarized in the figure below:
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1.2.4. Life cycle
The product’s life cycle is organised as follow (cf. [ST] chapter §1.4.3 TOE life-cycle) :
As show above, TOE delivery is done at the end of phase 5 (pre-personalization), after soft
mask and applet loading.
Other phases, former to that delivery point, have been evaluated considering TOE in
construction, phase 6 (personalization) have been evaluated regarding guidance, the evaluated
product is the product used in phase 7 (use).
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Applet, platform and soft mask have been developed on the following site:
Gemalto Meudon
6 rue de la Verrerie
92197 Meudon,
France.
Pre- personalization (phase 5), including applet loading, assembling and packaging (phase 4),
have been done on Gemalto Gemenos site and Gemalto Vantaa site (back up):
Gemalto Gemenos
Avenue du Pic de Bretagne – BP 100
13881 Gémenos Cedex,
France.
Gemalto Vantaa
Turvalaaksonkaari 2 - P.O. Box 31
FI-01741 Vantaa,
Finlande
Microcontroller has been developed and produced by NXP on their sites (cf. [BSI-DSZ-CC-
0411-2007-MA-04]), main:
NXP Semiconductors GmbH1
Stresemannallee 101
D-22502 Hamburg
Germany
For the evaluation, the evaluator considered:
- As product administrator :
o The Smart Card product manufacturer : load applet and soft mask;
o The Personalizer : load user data ;
o The Card Issuer : typically a national administration, managing card
personalization and, in the context of the digital signature, creating the user
PIN (Personal Identification Number) and , potentially, import the first SCD in
the TOE ;
- As product user :
o The end-user, who, in the context of the digital signature, is also the signatory
and so could sign with his/her SCD, destruct it or generate a new key pair
SCD/SVD. At the first usage of the TOE, the Signatory must change his PIN
code. A new PIN is also required each time a new SCD/SVD pair is generated.
All these roles are defined in the [ST] chapter §1.4.5 the actors and roles.
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1.2.5. Evaluated configuration
The certificate applies to the smart card Integrated Circuit NXP P5CD144 (VOB), in contact
configuration, with its embedded software including:
• The part of Java Card MultiApp platform (v1.0) providing a Card Manager and
Global Platform (the remaining part is out of the evaluation scope);
• The Soft mask (v1.2),
• The digital signature IAS ECC v4.2.7.A application instanciated and activated.
Other applications may also be embedded in the product ROM (Read Only Memory); they are
out of the scope of the evaluation. All these applications are deactivated in the evaluated
product configuration.
The figure below represents the product. The TOE is bordered with bold and un-continuous
line.
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2. The evaluation
2.1. Evaluation referential
The evaluation has been performed in compliance with Common Criteria version 3.1 [CC],
with the Common Evaluation Methodology [CEM].
For assurance components above EAL4 level, the evaluation facility own evaluation methods,
validated by ANSSI, have been used.
In order to meet the specificities of smart cards, the [CC IC] and [CC AP] guides have been
applied.
2.2. Evaluation work
The evaluation has been performed according to the composition scheme as defined in the
guide [COMP] in order to assess that no weakness comes from the integration of the software
in the microcontroller already certified.
Therefore, the results of the evaluation of the microcontroller NXP P5CD144V0B at EAL5
level augmented with ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4, compliant with the
[BSI-PP-0002-2001] protection profile, have been used. This microcontroller maintenance has
been done by the BSI (cf. [BSI-DSZ-CC-0411-2007-MA-04]).
The evaluation technical report [ETR], delivered to ANSSI the 6th January 2010, provides
details on the work performed by the evaluation facility and assesses that all evaluation tasks
are “pass”.
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2.3. Cryptographic mechanisms robustness analysis according to ANSSI
technical framework
The robustness of cryptographic mechanisms has been analysed by ANSSI according to
ANSSI cryptographic framework [REF-CRY]. The results are stated in the cryptographic
analysis report [ANA-CRY].
Cryptographic mechanisms can be considered conformant to the ANSSI cryptographic
framework [REF-CRY] if guidance [GUIDES] is fully followed. In particular, regarding the
product’s qualification1
, [GUIDES] requires that the RSA keys used length must be higher or
equal to 1 536 bits and requires the usage of SHA-256 algorithm.
The cryptographic implementation, evaluated by the evaluator, was found meeting the
qualification1
requirements at reinforced level.
These results have been taken into account in the evaluator vulnerability analysis and did not
allow him highlighting exploitable vulnerabilities for the AVA_VAN.5 level targetted.
2.4. Random number generator analysis
The random number generator has been analysed by ANSSI.
It is a mix between physical generator and cryptographic reprocessing mechanism. This
mechanism is found reaching the standard level as defined in the ANSSI cryptographic
framework [REF-CRY].
Regarding physical generator, statistical analysis could not be performed by evaluator because
of the non accessibility of the physical generator on the TOE. Nevertheless, some analyses
were done by the ITSEF involved in the IC certification.
1
Qualification process is described on ANSSI web site (cf. http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/site_article39.html)
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3. Certification
3.1. Conclusion
The evaluation was carried out according to the current rules and standards, with the required
competency and impartiality of a licensed evaluation facility. All the work performed permits
the release of a certificate in conformance with the decree 2002-535.
This certificate testifies that the evaluated product, Multiapp ID IAS ECC smart card:
electronic signature application v4.2.7.A loaded on Multiapp v1.0 Java card platform with
v1.2 soft mask embedded on NXP P5CD144 VOB, fulfils the security features specified in its
security target [ST] for the evaluation level EAL 4 augmented.
3.2. Restrictions
This certificate only applies on the product specified in chapter 1.2 of this certification report.
The user of the certified product shall respect the security objectives for the operational
environment specified in the security target [ST] and shall respect the recommendations in the
guidance [GUIDES], in particular:
- To use RSA keys having their length higher or equal to 1 536 bits ;
- To use SHA-256 algorithm.
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3.3. Recognition of the certificate
3.3.1. European recognition (SOG-IS)
This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the SOG-IS agreement [SOG-
IS].
The European Recognition Agreement made by SOG-IS in 1999 allows recognition from
Signatory States of the agreement1
, of ITSEC and Common Criteria certificates. The
European recognition is applicable up to ITSEC E6 and CC EAL7 levels. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
3.3.2. International common criteria recognition (CCRA)
This certificate is released in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA [CC RA].
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement allows the recognition, by signatory
countries2
, of the Common Criteria certificates. The mutual recognition is applicable up to the
assurance components of CC EAL4 level and also to ALC_FLR family. The certificates that
are recognized in the agreement scope are released with the following marking:
1 The signatory countries of the SOG-IS agreement are: Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom.
2 The signatory countries of the CCRA arrangement are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
Netherlands, New-Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the
United States of America.
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Annex 1. Evaluation level of the product
Components by assurance level Assurance level of the product
Class Family
EAL
1
EAL
2
EAL
3
EAL
4
EAL
5
EAL
6
EAL
7
EAL
4+
Name of the component
ADV_ARC 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Security architecture
description
ADV_FSP 1 2 3 4 5 5 6 4
Complete functional
specification
ADV_IMP 1 1 2 2 1
Implementation
representation of the TSF
ADV_INT 2 3 3
ADV_SPM 1 1
ADV
Development
ADV_TDS 1 2 3 4 5 6 3 Basic modular design
AGD_OPE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Operational user guidance
AGD
Guidance AGD_PRE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Preparative procedure
ALC_CMC 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 4
Production support,
acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS 1 2 3 4 5 5 5 4
Problem tracking CM
coverage
ADO_DEL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2 2
Sufficiency of security
measures
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD 1 1 1 1 2 1
Developer defined life-cycle
model
ALC
Life-cycle
support
ALC_TAT 1 2 3 3 1
Well defined development
tools
ASE_CCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Conformance claim
ASE_ECD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Extended component
definition
ASE_INT 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ST introduction
ASE_OBJ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Security objectives
ASE_REQ 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Derived security
requirements
ASE_SPD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Security problem definition
ASE
Security
Target
Evaluation
ASE_TSS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 TOE summary specifications
ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3 2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT 1 1 3 3 4 1 Testing: basic design
ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 Functional testing
ATE
Tests
ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 Independant testing, sample
AVA
Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN 1 2 2 3 4 5 5 5
Advanced methodical
vulnerability analysis
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Annex 2. Evaluated product references
[ST] Reference security target for the evaluation:
- MISTRAL Security Target
v1.9, D1111555
Gemalto.
For the needs of publication, the following security target has been
provided and validated in the evaluation:
- MultiApp ID IAS ECC - Security Target
Jan 6, 2010
Gemalto.
[ETR] Evaluation technical report :
- Evaluation Technical Report - MISTRAL Project
MISTRAL_ETR_v1.1 / 1.1
Serma Technologies.
[ANA-CRY] ANSSI Cryptographic analysis report :
Cotation de mécanismes cryptographiques - Qualification MISTRAL,
N°2356/SGDN/ANSSI/DR, 22/09/2009.
[CONF] Configuration list
LIS: Configuration List – MISTRAL
D1132920, V1.5, 06/01/2010
Gemalto.
[GUIDES] Installation guidance:
- Card Initialization Specification for MultiApp ID v1.0: MPH076
for IAS ECC products
D1088720, v1.5
Gemalto.
- Preparative procedure
D1116279, v1.1
Gemalto.
Administration guidance:
- Card Personalization Specification requirement for SSCD
security evaluation
IASECCv4_002_CPS_Req_For_CC_Evaluation, v1.1
Gemalto.
User guidance:
- IAS-ECC Operational user guidance
D1115162, v1.1
Gemalto.
[BSI-PP-
0005-2002]
Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 2,
Version: 1.04, 25 July 2001. Certified by the BSI (Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under reference BSI-PP-0005-
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2002T.
[BSI-PP-
0006-2002]
Protection Profile — Secure Signature-Creation Device Type 3,
Version: 1.05, 25 July 2001. Certified by the BSI under reference BSI-
PP-0006-2002T.
[BSI-PP-
0002-2001]
Protection Profile, Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile Version
1.0 July 2001. Certified by the BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik) sous la référence BSI-PP-0002-2001.
[E-sign] Application Interface for Smart Cards used as Secure Signature Creation
Device
CEN/ISSS WS/E-Sign Draft CWA Group K part 1 – Basic
requirements. Version 1, Release 9 (17th September 2003)
Application Interface for Smart Cards used as Secure Signature Creation
Device
CEN/ISSS WS/E-Sign Draft CWA Group K part 2 – Additional
services. Version 0, Release:19 (12th December 2003)
[BSI-DSZ-
CC-0411-
2007-MA-
04]
BSI maintenance report delivered on the 7th
July 2009 for NXP Smart
Card Controller P5CD144V0B, P5CN144V0B and P5CC144V0B each
with specific IC Dedicated Software
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Annex 3. Certification references
Decree number 2002-535 dated 18th
April 2002 related to the security evaluations and
certifications for information technology products and systems.
[CER/P/01] Procedure CER/P/01 - Certification of the security provided by IT
products and systems, DCSSI.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation :
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
September 2006, version 3.1, revision 1, ref CCMB-2006-09-001;
Part 2: Security functional components,
September 2007, version 3.1, revision 2, ref CCMB-2007-09-002;
Part 3: Security assurance components,
September 2007, version 3.1, revision 2, ref CCMB-2007-09-003.
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation :
Evaluation Methodology,
September 2007, version 3.1, révision 2, ref CCMB-2007-09-004.
[CC IC] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, reference
CCDB-2006-04-003 version 2.0, revision 1, April 2006.
[CC AP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - Application of attack potential to smart-cards, reference
CCDB-2008-04-001 version 2.5 revision 1, April 2008.
[COMP] Common Criteria Supporting Document - Mandatory Technical
Document - Composite product evaluation for smart cards and similar
devices, reference CCDB-2007-09-001 version 1.0, revision 1,
September 2007.
[CC RA] Arrangement on the Recognition of Common criteria certificates in the
field of information Technology Security, May 2000.
[SOG-IS] «Mutual Recognition Agreement of Information Technology Security
Evaluation Certificates», version 2.0, April 1999, Management
Committee of Agreement Group.
[REF-CRY] Cryptographic mechanisms - Rules and recommendations about the
choice and parameters sizes of cryptographic mechanisms version 1.11,
24th October 2008, see www.ssi.gouv.fr