



Certification Report

BSI-DSZ-CC-0761-2013

for

STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1

from

Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111



Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat

erteilt vom



Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0761-2013

Security IC with MRTD BAC Application

STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1

from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009

Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2



Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4



The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 05 July 2013

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department

L.S.



This page is intentionally left blank.

Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG¹ Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

¹ Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

Contents

A Certification.....	7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.....	7
2 Recognition Agreements.....	7
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification.....	8
4 Validity of the Certification Result.....	9
5 Publication.....	9
B Certification Results.....	11
1 Executive Summary.....	12
2 Identification of the TOE.....	13
3 Security Policy.....	15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....	15
5 Architectural Information.....	16
6 Documentation.....	16
7 IT Product Testing.....	16
8 Evaluated Configuration.....	17
9 Results of the Evaluation.....	18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....	20
11 Security Target.....	20
12 Definitions.....	20
13 Bibliography.....	23
C Excerpts from the Criteria.....	27
CC Part1:.....	27
CC Part 3:.....	28
D Annexes.....	37

A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

- BSIG²
- BSI Certification Ordinance³
- BSI Schedule of Costs⁴
- Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the Interior)
- DIN EN 45011 standard
- BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
- Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1⁵ [1]
- Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
- BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]

2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical domains only.

The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined. It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.

² Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821

³ Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

⁴ Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

⁵ Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 23 February 2007, p. 3730

As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found at <https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung>.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on the website: <http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org>.

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.

This evaluation contains the component ALC_DVS.2 that is not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0760-2013. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0760-2013 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 02 July 2013. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)⁶ recognised by the certification body of BSI.

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.

The product was developed by:
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

⁶ Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

4 Validity of the Certification Result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

- all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,
- the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed. Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

5 Publication

The product STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: <https://www.bsi.bund.de> and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer⁷ of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

⁷ Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
81677 München
Deutschland

This page is intentionally left blank.

B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

- the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
- the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
- complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

1 Executive Summary

Target of evaluation (TOE) is the product STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 provided by Giesecke & Devrient GmbH and based on the hardware platform M7820 A11 by Infineon Technologies [31].

Three configurations are covered by this certificate:

- STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/360,
- STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/800, and
- STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/1280.

The only difference between the three configurations is the size of the available non-volatile memory provided by the M7820 A11 Infineon hardware platform.

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD's chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [21] and providing Basic Access Control (BAC), Active Authentication and Extended Access Control (EAC) according to the ICAO documents [22] [23] [24] and Chip Authentication according to the technical report TR-03110 [19].

The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]. Please note that in consistency to the claimed protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7] the security mechanism Basic Access Control is in the focus of this evaluation process. The security mechanisms Extended Access Control, Active Authentication and Chip Authentication are subjects of a separate evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0760-2013 [18].

The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE Security Functions:

TOE Security Functions	Addressed issue
SF_AccessControl	Access control for different users
SF_Authentication	Authentication mechanisms and protection of the communication channel
SF_AssetProtection	Protection of assets in the TOE
SF_TSFPProtection	Resistance against physical tampering
SF_KeyManagement	Key management for generating and using cryptographic keys
SF_SignatureGeneration	Digital signature creation of the TOE

Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.1.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:

- the circuitry of the MRTD's chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software,
- the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
- the MRTD application,
- the associated guidance documentation,
- the Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool, Version 4.0 (GMA-Verifier Tool ⁸),
- the configuration files for the GMA-Verifier Tool and
- the Reference Initialisation Tables for the GMA-Verifier Tool containing the IC Embedded Software (operating system STARCOS 3.5) and the MRTD application (dedicated file for the ICAO application in a file system on the chip).

The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
1	HW/SW	M7820 A11 by Infineon Technologies ⁹ with hardware for the contactless interface and including its IC Dedicated Test Software	Rom Mask CIF9DSCSR35-01c _V200	An initialised module (type: MCC8) embedded into an inlay

⁸ The GMA-Verifier Tool (including its three configuration files) and the three Reference Initialisation Tables are part of the TOE but not part of the deliverables. Since the TOE may be initialised with different initialisation tables that have to be compliant to one of the certified Reference Initialisation Tables without exceeding the CC certificate, the developer has to ensure this compliance by checking the initialisation table with the GMA-Verifier Tool.

⁹ For details on the ID Card chip and the IC Dedicated Software see Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0813-2012 [31].

No	Type	Identifier	Release	Form of Delivery
		IC Embedded Software (the operating system)	STARCOS 3.5	Implemented in ROM/EEPROM of the IC
		ePass – electronic passport application as initialisation table, that has to be compliant to associated reference images as described in Table 3.	CIFxDSCSI35-y-12 01-B_V001 to CIFxDSCSI35-y-12 01-B_V999, where x and y are set as defined in [14]	Implemented by the File System
2	Keys	Cryptographic keys for initialisation or personalisation, securing the TOE from modification by illegal entities, e.g. during transport		Item in electronic form, encrypted and signed to protect against disclosure and modification.
3	DOC	Guidance Documentation STARCOS 3.5 ID – Main Document	Version 0.6, 11.10.2011 [11]	Document in electronic form
4	DOC	Guidance Documentation for the Personalisation Phase for STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1, STARCOS 3.5 ID SAC+EAC+AA C1 ¹⁰	Version 2.3, 26.07.2012 [12]	Document in electronic form
5	DOC	Guidance Documentation for the Usage Phase for STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1 ¹¹	Version 1.5, 08.03.2012 [13]	Document in electronic form
6	DOC	Correspondence between initialisation table and Common Criteria Evaluation, STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 products	Version 0.3, 26.07.2012 [14]	Document in electronic form

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The customer specific ROM mask for the STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 on the hardware platform M7820 A11 is labelled *CIF9DSCSR35-01c_V200*. The name of the ROM file transferred from G&D to IFX is *CIF9DSCSR35-01c_V200.hex*.

Since the TOE may be initialised with different initialisation tables (that have to be compliant to one of the following three reference initialisation tables "Reference_EAC_MRTD_SC35_036_V01.hex", „Reference_EAC_MRTD_SC35_080_V01.hex“ or „Reference_EAC_MRTD_SC35_128_V01.hex“) to be compliant with the CC certificate, the developer provides a special document [14] to the user (in this case: the personalisation agent), which states the initialisation table identification in correspondence with the acquired Common Criteria certificate. In this document for each initialisation table the following identification data is provided to the user (personalisation agent):

- a unique value, retrievable with the GET PROTOCOL DATA with tag 9F67 (last 16 bytes),
- the associated identifier with format CIFxDSCSI35-y-1201-B_Vzzz, with
 - x values for NVM size of the TOE and therefore:

¹⁰ This guidance document contains a TOE reference list, where STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 is included.

¹¹ This guidance document contains a TOE reference list, where STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 is included.

- A for STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/800,
- B for STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/360,
- 9 for STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/1280.
- **y** values for communication protocol:
 - A for T=CL type A,
 - B for T=CL type B.
- **B** stands for BSI-DSZ-CC-0761-2013.
- **zzz** values for a consecutive number, where the range is fixed to 001-999.
- the correspondence with the certification ID.

All initialisation tables listed in this document have to pass a validation by the GMA Verifier.

The TOE is finalized after the Initialisation resp. Pre-Personalisation phase. Delivery of the initialised inlay is performed from the Initialisation facility to the Personalisation facility by a secured transport to a specific person of contact at the Personalisation site. Furthermore, the Personaliser receives information about the Personalisation commands and process requirements. To ensure that the Personaliser receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the Personalisation process as described in the Guidance Documentation for the Personalisation Phase [12] have to be followed.

3 Security Policy

The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [7] by the Security Objectives and Requirements for the contact-less chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy address the advanced security methods Basic and Extended Access Control as well as Chip Authentication and Active Authentication.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are of relevance: Personalization of the MRTD's chip, Inspection Systems for global interoperability, PKI for Passive Authentication and PKI for Inspection Systems. Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2.

5 Architectural Information

The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC), IC Embedded Software, IC Embedded Software / Part Application Software (containing the ICAO Application) and the Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool (GMA-Verifier). While the IC Embedded Software contains the operating system STARCOS 3.5 and keys, the part Application Software contains the ICAO application (also referred as MRTD application). As all these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC, the

EAL 5+ certified M7820 A11 by Infineon Technologies (for details concerning the CC evaluation of the Infineon IC see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0813-2012).

The GMA-Verifier Tool is not running inside the IC, but on a standard PC. It checks the MRTD application (in form of a hex file) that is designed to be loaded onto the IC whether it contains only allowed modifications in comparison with the reference initialisation file (see chapter 8).

6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7 IT Product Testing

The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with simulator tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to demonstrate its expected behaviour including error cases. Hereby a representative sample including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs. Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.

Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 [19] APDU command sequences, the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality. Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing. During their independent testing, the evaluators covered

- testing APDU commands related to Key Management and Crypto Functions,
- testing APDU commands related to NVM Management and File System,
- testing APDU commands related to Security Management,
- testing APDU commands related to Secure Messaging,
- testing APDU commands related to Runtime System and System Library,
- penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
- source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
- fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
- testing GMA Verifier,
- testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase,
- testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms.

The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against enhanced basic potential during their penetration testing.

The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.

8 Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:

- STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 (/360, /800 and /1280) on the hardware platform M7820 A11 and configured as described in [15],
- GMA Verifier version 4.0, with configuration files and reference initialisation tables,
- The documents
 - Guidance Documentation – Main Document [11],
 - Guidance Documentation for the Initialisation phase STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1, STARCOS 3.5 ID SAC+EAC+AA C1 and STARCOS 3.5 ID ECC C1, [16],
 - Guidance Documentation for the Personalisation Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1 and STARCOS 3.5 ID SAC+EAC+AA C1 [12],
 - Guidance Documentation for the Usage Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1 [13],
 - Correspondence between initialisation table and Common Criteria Evaluation, STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1 products [14].

The GMA Verifier version 4.0 is a configurable comparison tool for initialisation table images, which is used by the developer in order to verify the created initialisation table against the Generic Application Specification [15]. The Verifier is part of the TOE but not part of the delivery to the user.

The generic application specification is implemented in the reference images. These images and the corresponding configuration file are used by the Verifier to ensure the correctness of the developed initialisation tables. The following implementations were part of the Verifier evaluation:

TOE name	Reference image for each TOE	Configuration file
STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 /360	Reference_EAC_MRTD_SC35_036_V01.hex, 20.06.2012	verifier-config_eac_036.xml, 20.06.2012
	MD5: 5FC86E1595C413461B0D65C78734A7A4	MD5: 8AEAD046842A7BE79CEB9B01C081 5240
STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 /800	Reference_EAC_MRTD_SC35_080_V01.hex, 20.06.2012	verifier-config_eac_080.xml, 20.06.2012
	MD5: 83ABBCC0C01E71901476F1663DB820A0	MD5: 455C1B6EA4DDC3F043F22BBD1B0 BA9D6
STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 /1280	Reference_EAC_MRTD_SC35_128_V01.hex, 20.06.2012	verifier-config_eac_128.xml, 20.06.2012
	MD5:	MD5:

TOE name	Reference image for each TOE	Configuration file
	526929F75F3096D27905E0796D2A0DAD	BE6506F5F22B95746668B27A352D384E

Table 3: Application reference images and Verifier configuration files

The initialisation and personalisation agent can use the ‘GET PROTOCOL DATA’ command as described in [14] to read out the chip information and identify the chip. The following table describes the evaluated configuration:

Description	TOE name	Identifier data
Chip manufacturer data (Chip manufacturer’s ROM mask ID) varying in dependence on the used hardware (different NVM amounts)	STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/360	05 77 33 00 B1 00 8B 01
	STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/800	05 77 33 00 A9 00 8A 01
	STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1/1280	05 77 33 00 A7 00 23 00
Version of the operating system (OS-Manufacturer OS version number Version of ROM mask)	All	47 44 00 B5 02
Version of the completion level of the operating system and initialisation table	All	02 01 01

Table 4: Evaluated TOE configuration and identifier

9 Results of the Evaluation

9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

The following guidance specific for the technology was used:

- For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36) were used.
- Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices (see AIS 36). According to this concept the relevant guidance documents of the underlying platform and the documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e. on hardware [17], [31] have been applied in the TOE evaluation.

A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in the course of this certification procedure. It could be provided by the ITSEF and submitted to the certification body for approval subsequently.

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

- All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)
- The components ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0760-2013, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the change of the PP conformance claim from BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009 [32] to BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]. The TOE itself did not change.

The evaluation has confirmed:

- PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]
- for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
- for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:

Algorithm	Bit Length	Purpose	Security Function	Standard of Implementation	Standard of Usage
Document Basic Access Control Key Derivation Algorithm	112	Diffie-Hellman Keys for Chip Authentication	Cryptographic key generation – BAC keys (FCS_CKM.1)	ICAO Doc 9303-1	ICAO Doc 9303-1 [20]
SHA-1		BAC key derivation	Cryptographic operation – Hash for key derivation by MRTD (FCS_COP.1/SHA)	FIPS 180-2	[ICAO Doc 9303-1 [20]
TDES	112	Secure Messaging	Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption 3DES (FCS_COP.1/ENC)	FIPS PUB 46-3	ICAO Doc 9303-1 [20]

Algorithm	Bit Length	Purpose	Security Function	Standard of Implementation	Standard of Usage
Retail-MAC	112	Secure Messaging message authentication code	Cryptographic operation – MAC (FCS_COP.1/ MAC)	NIST-800-38B or ISO/IEC 9797-1 respectively	ICAO Doc 9303-1 [20]
AES	128	Symmetric Authentication of Personalisation Agent	Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption AES (FSC_COP.1/AUTH)	FIPS PUB 197	ICAO Doc 9303-1 [20]

Table 5: Cryptographic Algorithms used by the TOE

All cryptographic algorithms listed in table 3 are implemented by the TOE because of the standards building the TOE application (e.g. TR-03110 [19]). For that reason an explicit validity period is not given.

The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation (see BSI Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to Technical Guideline BSI-TR-03110, Version 2.05 [19], the algorithms are suitable for securing integrity, authenticity and confidentiality of the stored data for Electronic Identity Cards.

10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE

The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.

The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.

11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).

12 Definitions

12.1 Acronyms

- AIS** Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
- APDU** Application Protocol Data Unit
- BAC** Basic Access Control
- BSI** Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
- BSIG** BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security

CCRA	Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC	Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM	Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DES	Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DOC	Document
EAC	Extended Access Control
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES	Embedded Software
ETR	Evaluation Technical Report
IC	Integrated Circuit
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT	Information Technology
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS	Logical Data Structure
MRTD	Machine Readable Travel Document
NVM	Non Volatile Memory
PP	Protection Profile
RAM	Random Access Memory
RNG	Random Number Generator
ROM	Read Only Memory
SAR	Security Assurance Requirement
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
ST	Security Target
TOE	Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES	Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSF	TOE Security Functionality

12.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a TOE type.

Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.

Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied by guidance.

TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs

13 Bibliography

- [1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
- [2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
- [3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
- [4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE¹².
- [5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also in the BSI Website
- [6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0761-2013, Version 2.6, 26.07.2012, STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 Security Target, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential document)
- [7] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
- [8] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0761-2013, Version 2.6, 26.07.2012, STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 Security Target lite, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (sanitised public document)
- [9] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.6, 01.07.2013, STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential document)
- [10] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.4, 01.08.2012, STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1 (confidential document)
- [11] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 0.6, 11.10.2011, Guidance documentation STARCOS 3.5 ID – Main Document, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
- [12] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 2.3, 26.07.2012, Guidance documentation for the Personalisation Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1 and STARCOS 3.5 ID SAC+EAC+AA C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

¹²specifically

- AIS 20, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 25, Version 7, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 26, Version 8, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
- AIS 31, Version 2, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
- AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
- AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
- AIS 35, Version 2.0, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
- AIS 36, Version 3, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document

- [13] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.5, 08.03.2012, Guidance documentation for the Usage Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
- [14] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 0.3, 26.07.2012, Correspondence between initialisation table and Common Criteria Evaluation, STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 products, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
- [15] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.0, 17.07.2012, Generic BAC MRTD Application STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
- [16] Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.5, 15.06.2012, Guidance Documentation for the Initialization Phase STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1, STARCOS 3.5 ID SAC+EAC+AA C1 and STARCOS 3.5 ID ECC C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
- [17] ETR for composition according to AIS36, M7820 A11 from Infineon Technologies, BSI-DSZ-CC-0813-2012, Version 1, 01.06.2012
- [18] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0760-2013 for STARCOS 3.5 ID EAC+AA C1 from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Version 1.0, 05.07.2013, BSI
- [19] Technical Guideline TR-03110, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE), and Restricted Identification (RI), Version 2.05, 14.10.2010, BSI
- [20] ICAO Doc 9303-1, Specifications for electronically enabled passports with biometric identification capabilities. In Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 1: Machine Readable Passport, volume 2, ICAO, 6th edition, 2006
- [21] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision 1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 18.05.2004
- [22] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version 1.1, October 01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
- [23] ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006
- [24] ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 3 - Machine Readable Official Travel Documents. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2008
- [25] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0007-2011 for Inlay Production and Initialisation of SMARTRAC Site Bangkok of SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd. Thailand, 25.10.2011, BSI
- [26] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0008-2011 for SMARTRAC eID product manufacturing site RW2 in Reichshof-Wehnrath, Germany of SMARTRAC TECH-NOLOGY GERMANY GmbH, 04.10.2011, BSI
- [27] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0009-2012 for Development Center Germany (DCG) of Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, 16.08.2012, BSI

- [28] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0010-2012 for Giesecke & Devrient Dienstleistungszentrum (DLC) of Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, 23.10.2012, BSI
- [29] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0012-2012 for Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia s.r.o of Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, 02.11.2012, BSI
- [30] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0015-2012 for Assembly of Inlays and Similar Products and Initialisation of HID Global Ireland Teoranta, 19.09.2012, BSI
- [31] Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0813-2012 for Infineon smart card IC (Security Controller) M7820 A11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.008, EC v1.02.008, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.008 libraries and with specific IC dedicated software from Infineon Technologies AG, Version 1.0, 06.06.2012, BSI
- [32] Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009

This page is intentionally left blank.

C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)

“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC conformance claim that:

- describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
 - **CC Part 2 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
 - **CC Part 2 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
- describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
 - **CC Part 3 conformant** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
 - **CC Part 3 extended** - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:

- **Package name Conformant** - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g. EAL) if:
 - the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
 - the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
- **Package name Augmented** - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
 - the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
 - the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the package.

Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.

Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection Profiles:

- **PP Conformant** - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.
- **Conformance Statement (Only for PPs)** - This statement describes the manner in which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”

CC Part 3:

Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)

“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent, and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation	APE_INT.1 PP introduction
	APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements

APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”

Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)

“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
	ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
	ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
	ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
	ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design summary

ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition

Security assurance components (chapter 7)

“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance classes, families, and components.”

“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”

“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”

The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.

Assurance Class	Assurance Components
ADV: Development	ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
	ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional error information ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with additional formal specification
	ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
	ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
	ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
	ADV_TDS.1 Basic design ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-level design presentation

Assurance Class	Assurance Components	
AGD:	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance	
Guidance documents	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures	
ALC: Life cycle support	ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support	
	ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage	
	ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures	
	ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures	
	ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation	
	ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model	
	ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts	
	ATE: Tests	ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
		ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
		ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete		
AVA: Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis	

Assurance class decomposition

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)

“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended assurance requirements.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Assurance Components by Evaluation Assurance Level						
		EAL1	EAL2	EAL3	EAL4	EAL5	EAL6	EAL7
Development	ADV_ARC		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ADV_FSP	1	2	3	4	5	5	6
	ADV_IMP				1	1	2	2
	ADV_INT					2	3	3
	ADV_SPM						1	1
	ADV_TDS		1	2	3	4	5	6
Guidance Documents	AGD_OPE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	AGD_PRE	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Life cycle Support	ALC_CMC	1	2	3	4	4	5	5
	ALC_CMS	1	2	3	4	5	5	5
	ALC_DEL		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ALC_DVS			1	1	1	2	2
	ALC_FLR							
	ALC_LCD			1	1	1	1	2
	ALC_TAT				1	2	3	3
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_ECD	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_INT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_OBJ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASR_REQ	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
	ASE_SPD		1	1	1	1	1	1
	ASE_TSS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tests	ATE_COV		1	2	2	2	3	3
	ATE_DPT			1	1	3	3	4
	ATE_FUN		1	1	1	1	2	2
	ATE_IND	1	2	2	2	2	2	3
Vulnerability assessment	AVA_VAN	1	2	2	3	4	5	5

Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)

“Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through security objectives.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)

“Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)

“Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practises.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)**“Objectives**

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)**“Objectives**

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)**“Objectives**

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter 8.9)

"Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis."

Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)

"The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE."

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)

"Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate the SFRs.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users."

This page is intentionally left blank

D Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment

39

This page is intentionally left blank.

Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0761-2013

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment



The IT product STARCOS 3.5 ID BAC C1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 05 July 2013, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)

are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:

- a) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Development Centre Germany, Zamdorferstrasse 88, 81677 Munich, Germany, Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0009-2012 [27] (Development)
- b) Smartrac Technology, 142 Moo, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate Tambon Ban Laean, Amphor Bang-Pa-In, 13160 Ayutthaya, Thailand, Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0007-2011 [25] (Inlay Embedding)
- c) Smartrac Technology Germany GmbH, Gewerbeparkstr. 10, 51580 Reichshof-Wehnraath, Germany, Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0008-2011 [26] (Inlay Embedding)
- d) HID Global Ireland Teoranta, Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh, Baile na hAbhann, Co. Galway, Ireland, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0015-2012 [30] (Inlay Embedding)
- e) Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia, s.r.o., Dolné Hony 11, 949 01 Nitra, Slovakia, Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0012-2012 [29] (Inlay Embedding, Initialisation and Card Production)
- f) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, G&D Dienstleistungszentrum, Prinzregentenstrasse 159, 81677 Munich, Germany, BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0010-2012 [28] (Initialisation and Card Production)

For development and production sites regarding the Infineon Technologies Smart Card IC (Security Controller) M7820 A11 refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0813-2012 [31].

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

This page is intentionally left blank.