BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021
for
CryptoServer CSPLight Version 1.0.0
from
Utimaco IS GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0 CC-Zert-327 V5.41
BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021 (*)
Cryprographic Service Provider Light
CryptoServer CSPLight, Version 1.0.0
from Utimaco IS GmbH
PP Conformance: Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL)
Version 1.0, 12 November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider Light – Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-
CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-
0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit –
Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl), Version 1.0, 26 February
2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020
Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by
Scheme Interpretations for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
(*) This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report and Notification. For
details on the validity see Certification Report part A chapter 5.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 1 April 2021
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Sandro Amendola L.S.
Head of Division
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
recognition for components
up to EAL 2 and ALC_FLR
only
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021 Certification Report
Contents
A. Certification......................................................................................................................6
1. Preliminary Remarks....................................................................................................6
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure...............................................................6
3. Recognition Agreements..............................................................................................7
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification................................................................8
5. Validity of the Certification Result.................................................................................8
6. Publication....................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.......................................................................................................10
1. Executive Summary....................................................................................................11
2. Identification of the TOE.............................................................................................12
3. Security Policy............................................................................................................14
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.....................................................................14
5. Architectural Information.............................................................................................14
6. Documentation...........................................................................................................16
7. IT Product Testing.......................................................................................................16
8. Evaluated Configuration.............................................................................................17
9. Results of the Evaluation............................................................................................18
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.....................................................19
11. Security Target..........................................................................................................19
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)..............................................................19
13. Definitions.................................................................................................................20
14. Bibliography..............................................................................................................21
C. Excerpts from the Criteria..............................................................................................23
D. Annexes.........................................................................................................................24
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021
A. Certification
1. Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1
Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
2. Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
● Act on the Federal Office for Information Security1
● BSI Certification and Approval Ordinance2
● BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs 3
● Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
● DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) [3]
● BSI certification: Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility, its
approval and licencing process (CC-Stellen) [3]
● Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.14
[1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
2
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of Security Certificates and approval by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungs- und -Anerkennungsverordnung - BSIZertV) of 17 December
2014, Bundesgesetzblatt 2014, part I, no. 61, p. 2231
3
BMI Regulations on Ex-parte Costs - Besondere Gebührenverordnung des BMI für individuell
zurechenbare öffentliche Leistungen in dessen Zuständigkeitsbereich (BMIBGebV), Abschnitt 7 (BSI-
Gesetz) - dated 2 September 2019, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1365
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021 Certification Report
● Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045
● BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
3. Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
3.1. European Recognition of CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4. For "Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in
place. For "HW Devices with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, details on
recognition, and the history of the agreement can be seen on the website at
https://www.sogis.eu.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the related bodies of the signatory nations. A disclaimer
beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of recognition.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
3.2. International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), CC certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or
the assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and CC certificates for Protection
Profiles and for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the related bodies
of the signatory nations. A disclaimer beneath the logo indicates the specific scope of
recognition.
This certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2014, i. e. up to and including
CC part 3 EAL 2+ ALC_FLR components.
4
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021
4. Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product CryptoServer CSPLight, Version 1.0.0 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product CryptoServer CSPLight, Version 1.0.0 was conducted by
SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 25 March
2021. SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)5
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Utimaco IS GmbH.
The product was developed by: Utimaco IS GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
5. Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report applies only to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is valid on the condition that
● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
● the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance components and assurance levels please refer to CC
itself. Detailed references are listed in part C of this report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-assessment or
re-certification). Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation
and certification procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk
management needs regularly updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-
assessment on a regular e.g. annual basis.
In order to avoid an indefinite usage of the certificate when evolved attack methods would
require a re-assessment of the products resistance to state of the art attack methods, the
maximum validity of the certificate has been limited. The certificate issued on 1 April 2021
is valid until 31 March 2026. Validity can be re-newed by re-certification.
The owner of the certificate is obliged:
1. when advertising the certificate or the fact of the product's certification, to refer to
the Certification Report as well as to provide the Certification Report, the Security
Target and user guidance documentation mentioned herein to any customer of the
product for the application and usage of the certified product,
5
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021 Certification Report
2. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately about vulnerabilities of the
product that have been identified by the developer or any third party after issuance
of the certificate,
3. to inform the Certification Body at BSI immediately in the case that security relevant
changes in the evaluated life cycle, e.g. related to development and production sites
or processes, occur, or the confidentiality of documentation and information related
to the Target of Evaluation (TOE) or resulting from the evaluation and certification
procedure where the certification of the product has assumed this confidentiality
being maintained, is not given any longer. In particular, prior to the dissemination of
confidential documentation and information related to the TOE or resulting from the
evaluation and certification procedure that do not belong to the deliverables
according to the Certification Report part B, or for those where no dissemination
rules have been agreed on, to third parties, the Certification Body at BSI has to be
informed.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
6. Publication
The product CryptoServer CSPLight, Version 1.0.0 has been included in the BSI list of
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer6
of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Utimaco IS GmbH
Germanusstraße 4
52080 Aachen
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021
B. Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021 Certification Report
1. Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Utimaco CryptoServer CSPLight, Version 1.0.0. It is a
Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPLight) claiming the Common Criteria Protection
Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light – Time Stamp And Audit – Clustering (PPC-
CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl). The TOE is a pure Software Product consisting of a Java application
and firmware for the Hardware Security Module. It is intended to be used with products
requiring a certified Cryptographic Service Provider Light.
The TOE runs on the CryptoServer CSPLight server platform which includes a Hardware
Security Module (HSM). As the TOE is a pure software product, the hardware was not part
of the evaluation.
The non-TOE software is installed by Utimaco on the dedicated non-TOE Hardware. The
software itself is outside of the TOE Scope but can be updated via Utimacos own RPM
package repository as described in [12] section 2.2.1.5
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL) Version
1.0, 12 November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider Light –
Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26 February 2020,
BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider Light -
Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl), Version 1.0, 26
February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020 [8].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 2
augmented by ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.]
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.USER_AUTH: User
Authentication
The TOE provides user authentication. The use of any of the
security-relevant services of the TOE is not possible without
user authentication.
SF.TRUSTED_CHANNEL:
Trusted Channel
The TOE supports to establish a cryptographically protected
trusted channel between the TOE and external entities.
SF.ATTESTATION:
Authentication and Attestation of
the TOE
TOE samples are delivered with attestation keys to attest
these samples as genuine certified products. Attestation of
the TOE’s identity to external entities is part of establishing
trusted channels like PACE, terminal authentication or chip
authentication.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021
TOE Security Functionality Addressed issue
SF.CRYPTO: Cryptographic
Support
The TOE’s security function provides cryptographic support
for the other TSFs using cryptographic mechanisms, and it
enables cryptographic services like signature generation and
verification for the user and provides key derivation services
for internal purposes.
SF.ADMIN: Administration The TOE provides functionality to administrate itself in a
secure and controlled way, via its security function provides
access control on cryptographic TSF and cryptographic keys
using also the internal cryptographic services.
SF.KEY_MAN: Key Management The Key Management of the TOE covers the security
functionality related to management of cryptographic keys
with security attributes including key generation, key
derivation and key agreement, internal storage of keys,
import and export of keys with protection of their
confidentiality and integrity.
SF.SWUPDATE: Software
Update
The TOE security function supports downloading, integrity
and authenticity verification and decryption of Update Code
Packages (UCP) for the CryptoServer CSPLight.
SF.CLUSTER: Clustering of the
TOE
The TOE provides functionality to establish a cluster of TOE
samples for scalability of performance and availability of
security services.
SF.TIMESTAMP: Time Stamp
Service
The TOE provides a time service as well as a time stamp
service.
SF.AUDIT: Audit The TOE provides secure auditing functionality which
generates audit records on selected user activities and
security events of the TOE.
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 9.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapters 4.5, 4.3 and 4.4, respectively.
This certification covers the configurations of the TOE as outlined in chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2. Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
CryptoServer CSPLight, Version 1.0.0
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021 Certification Report
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery
1 SW CryptoServer CSPLight Version 1.0.0 Preinstalled on the dedicated
non-TOE CryptoServer
CSPLight Server platform
delivered via a shipping
company from the developer
production to the customer
2 DOC CryptoServer CSPLight
Betriebsanleitung [11]
SHA256:
780A033D7DADB557DADFAB8324F84
94AD6E4AE317D49F6076DC0B5A67F
FA4EF1
2021-03-18
Version 1.0.1
Delivered on a CD-ROM
together with the TOE
3 DOC CryptoServer CSPLight Administration
Manual [12]
SHA256:
AE9927ED5923806A9538AD007109FE
504B010D01A36481CBECDC08FBF73
23119
2021-03-17
Version 1.0.0
Delivered on a CD-ROM
together with the TOE
4 DOC CryptoServer CSPLight Clustering API
SHA256:
A5D97D72A4DA1BA025AE5D0E439E5
90FAAF8F8D63074C841EBFD260BCD
A505E5
2020-11-13
Version 1.4.0
Delivered on a CD-ROM
together with the TOE
5 DOC CryptoServer CSPLight Core API
SHA256:
F8ECC0414E44288D11E57A695CF8F4
6E88F2393BF28DEC34FF0469BF72D8
D0F6
2020-02-19
Version 1.6.0
Delivered on a CD-ROM
together with the TOE
6 DOC CryptoServer CSPLight Crypto API
SHA256:
B6C95FF166C1D472BC3FF4FB6BBEA
871B0DC51887309B66501B1C022D0D
3352A
2020-11-13
Version 1.2.0
Delivered on a CD-ROM
together with the TOE
7 DOC CryptoServer CSPLightUI Logic API
SHA256:
137D86EC36A5F2A7273A33667B5C5D
B6FCC0F454179B9A93EDEB566D7AB
9E5FF
2020-12-17
Version 1.5.0
Delivered on a CD-ROM
together with the TOE
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered preinstalled onto the dedicated non-TOE server platform. This
installation is performed during production by the developer Utimaco IS GmbH.
Delivery of sensitive electronic data and guidance documentation is performed via CD-
ROM together with the TOE installed on its dedicated non-TOE Server Hardware which
contains seals and serial numbers that are unique for each TOE instance.
In parallel, the customer is provided with related delivery information that contain the serial
numbers of the delivered Product containing the TOE via E-Mail, which is electronically
signed. The authenticity of the key used for signing the E-Mail can be verified by the
customer via telephone call with Utimaco IS GmbH.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021
Further details on TOE verification can be found in the developer’s documentation [11].
3. Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
● authentication of users
● authentication and attestation of the TOE to entities
● data authentication and non-repudiation including time stamps
● encryption and decryption of user data
● trusted channel functionality
● management of cryptographic keys
● generation of random bits
● time service, time stamp service
● secure auditing functionality
● clustering
Specific details concerning the above mentioned security policies can be found in chapter
9 of the Security Target [6] and [9].
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
● OE.CommInf: Communication infrastructure
● OE.AppComp: Support of the Application component
● OE.SecManag: Security management
● OE.SecComm: Protection of communication channel
● OE.SUCP: Signed Update Code Packages
● OE.SecPlatform: Secure Hardware Platform
● OE.Audit: Review and availability of audit records
● OE.TimeSource: External time source
● OE.ClusterCtrl: Control of the cluster
● OE.TSFdataTrans: Transfer of TSF data within the CSPLight cluster
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 5.2.
5. Architectural Information
The TOE is a software TOE running preinstalled on dedicated non-TOE hardware as well
as dedicated non-TOE software provided by Utimaco. The CryptoServer CSPLight
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BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021 Certification Report
hardware consists of a physically hardened server in which an HSM is additionally
installed. The HSM hardware is considered non-TOE while the HSM firmware belongs to
the TOE part of the product. A modified version of the HPE ProLiant DL360 Gen9 Server
including CryptoServer HSM (in the form of a PCIe card) constitute the hardware of the
CryptoServer CSPLight product. The server itself is not TOE but together with its operating
system it provides the platform for the TOE software modules.
The SFR-enforcing subsystems of the TOE are:
● CSPLight Core
● CSPLight Clustering
● CSPLight UI Logic
● CSPLight Crypto API
● CSPLight Crypto Services
● CSPLight HSM Firmware
The subsystems provide the following functionality:
User Authentication
The use of any of the security-relevant TSFI services of the TOE is not possible without
appropriate user identification & authentication (I&A).
Trusted Channel
Establish a cryptographically protected trusted channel between the TOE and external
entities. The application component (in client role) uses the security services of the TOE
(in server role). TOE provides PACE protocol in ICC role for the trusted channel to protect
the integrity of the messages exchanged.
Authentication and Attestation of the TOE
The attestation keys are generated by the TOE manufacturer and securely imported into
the TOE during its production. The published attestation public key can be used to verify
i.e. attest that the TOE owns the corresponding private key and is directly linked to the
TOE manufacturer as the certified product variant.
Cryptographic Support
Contains all the cryptographic operations required and used by the TOE, in order to be
able to fulfil its required functionality. This includes random number generation and the
functionalities listed in table 3.
Administration
Provides functionality to administrate itself in a secure and controlled way.
Key Management
Provides security functionality related to management of cryptographic keys with security
attributes including key generation, key derivation and key agreement, internal storage of
keys, import and export of keys with protection of their confidentiality and integrity.
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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021
Software Update via UCP
Supports downloading, integrity and authenticity verification and decryption of Update
Code Packages (UCP) for the CryptoServer CSPLight. Only after its successful verification
of authenticity and UCP payload decryption, the UCP Payload is stored to proceed with the
TOE platform software update procedures.
Clustering of the TOE
Provides security functionality to establish a cluster of TOE samples for scalability of
performance and availability of security services via Master-Slave-Cluster-Configuration
composed of two TOE samples.
Time Stamp Service
Provides a time stamp service. All time-related services take place using access to the
TOE’s internal system clock which is synchronized using a secure local trusted Network
Time Protocol (NTP) Server.
Audit
Provides secure auditing functionality which generates audit records on selected user
activities and security events of the TOE. The audit records are generated in the TOE and
can be exported to a SMA for further use.
6. Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7. IT Product Testing
7.1. TOE Test configuration
Tests are performed on a TOE installed on the real dedicated non-TOE Hardware in a
Master-Slave-Cluster-Configuration. The tested TOE version was 1.0.0. For testing, the
TOE was running on the dedicated non-TOE hardware platform.
The configuration respectively the version of the TOE can be retrieved from the test
environment via the test function IF_CSPL_UI_LOGIC__getInfo__ok(). The evaluators
verified that the tested version 1.0.0 of the TOE is compliant with the provided
documentation.
7.2. Testing approach and coverage
Developer Testing
The tests performed can be categorized into several groups: Unit and TSFI API tests. With
the TSFI API tests the developer specified and implemented test cases for each defined
TSFI. Thus all TSFIs are covered by several test cases and each SFR-enforcing
subsystem is covered by at least one test case.
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The test environment is configured by the developer and does not need any actions by the
evaluator to run the tests. This means that all necessary configuration is done by the
developer.
The relevant TSFI API tests cover all TSFIs and operations that are externally accessible.
Automatic TSFI API tests are implemented as test cases and consist of 350 test cases.
The unit tests are written during development and are executed on the build system
automatically and check the low-level implementation of all modules/classes and their
methods to verify that these work as designed.
All TSFI API test cases were executed successfully and ended up with the expected result.
Independent Testing
The TOE is placed inside a test environment in the developer premises which provides
operational capabilities. During a dedicated workshop the developer presented this testing
approach to the ITSEF and the Certification Body.
For independent testing, the ITSEF repeated all developer TSFI API Tests. In addition,
some independent evaluator tests were performed that were based on the test suite of the
developer.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results.
7.3. Penetration Testing
For penetration testing, the same environment was used as for independent testing. The
overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the actual
test results; moreover, no attack scenario with the attack potential “Basic” was actually
successful.
8. Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
● CryptoServer CSPLight (preinstalled on the dedicated non-TOE CryptoServer CSPLight
Server Platform)
● The guidance documentation:
• CryptoServer CSPLight Betriebsanleitung [11]
• CryptoServer CSPLight Administration Manual [12]
● The Developer Documentation of the TOE REST API:
• CryptoServer CSPLight Clustering API
• CryptoServer CSPLight Core API
• CryptoServer CSPLight Crypto API
• CryptoServer CSPLight UI-Logic API
The following software constitutes the non-TOE software platform:
● Hypervisor: SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP1
● 2 Virtual Machines: Leap 15.1 JeOS SuSE Linux System
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● JVM Version 1.8.0_242-b08
● nginx: 1.14.0nt
● ntpd (Host): chronyd (chrony) 3.2
● Apache Webserver: Apache 2.4.33-3.15.1
● Apache Tomcat: 9.0.29
● MariaDB: 10.2.29-MariaDB SUSE package
● System Daemon: 3.0.0 (used for all operations that can only be performed by the
hypervisor)
● Keepalived: 2.0.19
9. Results of the Evaluation
9.1. CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used.
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
● All components of the EAL 2 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
● The components ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
● PP Conformance: Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL)
Version 1.0, 12 November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider Light – Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-
CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-
0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic
Service Provider Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit –
Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl), Version 1.0, 26 February
2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020 [8]
● for the Functionality: PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
● for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 2 augmented by ALC_CMS.3 and ALC_LCD.1
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The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2. Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with a
security level of lower than 100 bits can no longer be regarded as secure without
considering the application context. Therefore, for these functionalities it shall be checked
whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system. Some
further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102'
(https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The table in annex B of part D of this report gives an overview of the cryptographic
functionalities inside the TOE to enforce the security policy and outlines its rating from
cryptographic point of view. All applicable Cryptographic Functionalities achieve a security
level above 100 Bits.
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the TOE
itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process, too.
If available, certified updates of the TOE should be used. If non-certified updates or
patches are available the user of the TOE should request the sponsor to provide a re-
certification. In the meantime a risk management process of the system using the TOE
should investigate and decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or
take additional measures in order to maintain system security.
11. Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12. Regulation specific aspects (eIDAS, QES)
None
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13. Definitions
13.1. Acronyms
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
AIS Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CBC Cipher Block Chaining
CC Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CMAC Cryptographic Message Authentication Code
cPP Collaborative Protection Profile
CSPLight Cryptographic Service Provider Light
DRG Deterministic RNG
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
ECC Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorihm
ECDHE Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
EMSA-PSS Encoding Method for Signature Appendix, Probabilistic Signature Scheme
ECKA-EG Elliptic Curve ElGamal Key Agreement
ETR Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization
IT Information Technology
ITSEF Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JVM Java Virtual Machine
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
NTP Network Time Protocol
PACE Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest–Shamir–Adleman
SAR Security Assurance Requirement
SFP Security Function Policy
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SFR Security Functional Requirement
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
ST Security Target
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security Functionality
UCP Update Code Package
13.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-
established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
14. Bibliography
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 5, April 2017
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 5, April 2017
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 5, April 2017,
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
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[3] BSI certification: Scheme documentation describing the certification process (CC-
Produkte) and Scheme documentation on requirements for the Evaluation Facility,
approval and licencing (CC-Stellen), https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung
[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE7
https://www.bsi.bund.de/AIS
[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
on the BSI Website, https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierungsreporte
[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021, Version 1.0.2, 2021-03-18, Security Target
for CryptoServer CSPLight, Utimaco IS GmbH (confidential document)
[7] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.5, 2021-03-26, Evaluation Technical Report
(ETR) – Summary, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential
document)
[8] Protection Profile Cryptographic Service Provider Light (CSPL) Version 1.0, 12
November 2019, BSI-CC-PP-0111-2019,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
Light – Time Stamp Service and Audit (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au) Version 1.0, 26
February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0112-2020,
Common Criteria Protection Profile Configuration Cryptographic Service Provider
Light - Time Stamp Service and Audit – Clustering (PPC-CSPLight-TS-Au-Cl),
Version 1.0, 26 February 2020, BSI-CC-PP-0113-2020
[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021, Version 1.0.2, 2021-03-18, Security Target
Lite for CryptoServer CSPLight, Utimaco IS GmbH (sanitised public document)
[10] Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.0.1, 2021-03-18, CryptoServer CSPLight
Configuration Management (confidential document)
[11] Preparative guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.0.1, 2021-03-18,
CryptoServer CSPLight Betriebsanleitung, Utimaco IS GmbH
[12] Operative guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.0.0, 2021-03-17,
CryptoServer CSPLight Administration Manual, Utimaco IS GmbH
7
specifically
• AIS 14, Version 7, Anforderungen an Aufbau und Inhalt von Einzelprüfberichten für Evaluationen
nach CC
• AIS 19, Version 9, Gliederung des ETR
• AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
• AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
• AIS 35, Version 2, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
• AIS 46, Version 3, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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C. Excerpts from the Criteria
For the meaning of the assurance components and levels the following references to the
Common Criteria can be followed:
• On conformance claim definitions and descriptions refer to CC part 1 chapter 10.5
• On the concept of assurance classes, families and components refer to CC Part 3
chapter 7.1
• On the concept and definition of pre-defined assurance packages (EAL) refer to CC
Part 3 chapters 7.2 and 8
• On the assurance class ASE for Security Target evaluation refer to CC Part 3
chapter 12
• On the detailed definitions of the assurance components for the TOE evaluation
refer to CC Part 3 chapters 13 to 17
• The table in CC part 3 , Annex E summarizes the relationship between the
evaluation assurance levels (EAL) and the assurance classes, families and
components.
The CC are published at https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/
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D. Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B: Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented in the TOE
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1145-2021
Overview and rating of cryptographic functionalities implemented
in the TOE
No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Comments
1 Authenticity RSA-signature
generation and
verification (EMSA-
PSS)
ISO/IEC 14888-2,
PKCS #1, v2.2
modulus length:
2048, 3072, 4096
FCS_COP.1/CDS-
RSA
2 Authenticity ECDSA-signature
generation and
verification
RFC5639,
TR-03111 section
4.1.3
all key sizes
according to the
elliptic curves
brainpoolP256rl
brainpoolP384r1,
brainpoolP512r1
Curve P-256
Curve P-384
Curve P-521
FCS_COP.1/CDS-
ECDSA
3 Authenticity Signature verification
of the Update Code
Package using
ECDSA with
brainpoolP256r1 and
cryptographic key
size 256 bits
RFC5639,
TR-03111 section
4.1.3
256 FCS_COP.1/VDSUCP
4 Authentication ECDSA-signature
verification
RFC5639,
TR-03111 section
4.1.3
all key sizes
according to the
elliptic curves
brainpoolP256rl
brainpoolP384r1,
brainpoolP512r1
Curve P-256
Curve P-384
Curve P-521
FDP_DAU.2/Att
FDP_DAU.2/Sig
FDP_DAU.2/TS
5 Key
Agreement
ECDHE with
parameters:
Elliptic curve:
brainpoolP256r1 and
256-bit random ECP
group with IANA
assigned ID value of
19
Key Derivation
Function: X9.63
TR-03111 section
4.3.2.1
256 (ECC keys) FCS_CKM.5.1/
ECDHE
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Comments
6 Key
Agreement
ECKA-EG with
parameters:
Elliptic curve:
brainpoolP256r1
Key Derivation
Function: X9.63
TR-03111 section
4.3.2.2
256 (ECC keys) FCS_CKM.5/ECKA-
EG
FCS_CKM.1/ECKA-
EG
7 Key
Agreement
PACE with
brainpoolP256r1 and
Generic Mapping in
ICC role
ICAO Doc9303
Part 11 section 4.4
256 FIA_API.1/PACE
FCS_CKM.1/PACE
8 Key
Agreement
Cluster Key
Agreement using
PACE with generic
mapping in ICC role
(TOE Master only)
and PACE in
Terminal role (TOE
Slave only) for
FCS_CKM.5/CLDH
with
brainpoolP256r1
ECC curve
TR-03111 256 FCS_CKM.5/CLDH
9 Key
Generation
AES key generation
using a byte string
derived from input
parameters with a
X9.63 KDF
NIST-SP800-56C 128, 256 FCS_CKM.5/AES
10 Key
Generation
ECC Key pair
generation with all
elliptic curves
RFC5639,
TR-03111 section
4.1.3
all key sizes
according to the
elliptic curves
brainpoolP256rl
brainpoolP384r1,
brainpoolP512r1
Curve P-256
Curve P-384
Curve P-521
FCS_CKM.1/ECC
11 Key
Generation
RSA key pair
generation
PKCS #1 v2.2 2048, 3072, or
4096 modulus size
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
12 Key
Generation
ECC key pair
generation with
brainpoolP256r1 for
Cluster Key
Generation
TR-03111 section
4.1.3
256 FCS_CKM.5/CLDH
13 Key
Generation
Seed generation for
hybrid data
encryption/decryptio
n with data integrity
AIS 20 chapter 4.9 256 FCS_CKM.1/
AES_RSA for seed
generation
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Comments
14 Key Derivation AES Key derivation
via AES key
generation using a
bit string derived
from input
parameters with a
X9.63 KDF
NIST-SP800-56C 128, 256 FCS_CKM.1/TCAP
15 Key Derivation ECC Key pair
derivation with the
curve:
brainpoolP256r1 and
ANSI X9.63 Key
Derivation Function
RFC5639,
TR-03111 section
4.1.3
256 FCS_CKM.5/ECC
16 Confidentiality AES decryption and
encryption with AES
in CBC mode
FIPS PUB 197
(AES),
NIST-SP800-38A
(CBC)
128, 256 FCS_COP.1/ED
17 Confidentiality Decryption of
encrypted Update
Code Packages
using AES block
cipher in CBC mode
with PKCS#5
padding
NIST-SP800-38A
chapter 6.2,
FIPS PUB 197
chapter 5
256 FCS_COP.1/DecUCP
18 Confidentiality hybrid data
encryption and
decryption with
asymmetric key
encryption
NIST-SP800-38A,
NIST-SP800-38B,
FIPS PUB 197
asymmetric keys
2048, 3072, or
4096 modulus size
FCS_COP.1/HEM
FCS_CKM.1/
AES_RSA
FCS_COP.1/HDM
CS_CKM.5/AES_RSA
19 Confidentiality Key wrapping and
unwrapping with
AES-Keywrap
NIST-SP800-38F 128, 256 FCS_COP.1/KW
FCS_COP.1/KU
20 Integrity,
Authenticity
HMAC with SHA-256 RFC2104
ISO/IEC 9797-2
512 FCS_COP.1/HMAC
21 Integrity,
Authenticity
AES CMAC with
AES-128 and AES-
256
FIPS PUB 197
(AES),
NIST-SP800-38A
(CBC)
128, 256 FCS_COP.1/MAC
22 Trusted
Channel
PACE with
brainpoolP256r1 and
Generic Mapping in
ICC role
ICAO Doc9303
Part 11 section 4.4
256 FIA_API.1/PACE
FTP_ITC.1
FCS_CKM.1/PACE
FCS_COP.1/TCE
FCS_COP.1/TCM
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No. Purpose Cryptographic
Mechanism
Standard of
Implementation
Key Size in Bits Comments
23 Trusted
Channel
PACE in Terminal
role for Cluster Key
Agreement
ICAO Doc9303
Part 11 section 4.4
256 FCS_CKM.5/CLDH
FCS_COP.1/TCE
FCS_COP.1/TCM
24 Trusted
Channel
Chip Authentication
Version 2
TR-03110 Part 2
section 3.4
256 FCS_CKM.1/TCAP
FCS_COP.1/TCE
FCS_COP.1/TCM
25 Trusted
Channel
Terminal
Authentication
Version 2
TR-03110 Part 2
section 3.3
256 FCS_CKM.1/TCAP
FCS_COP.1/TCE
FCS_COP.1/TCM
26 Cryptographic
Primitive
Hash SHA-256,
SHA-384, SHA-512
FIPS PUB 180-4 n/a FCS_COP.1/Hash
27 Cryptographic
Primitive
Random Number
Generation: hybrid
deterministic RNG
class DRG.4
AIS 20 chapter 4.9 n/a FCS_RNG.1
Table 3: TOE cryptographic functionality
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