National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Validation Report
Architecture Technology Corporation Machete Router
Report Number: CCEVS-VR-VID11414-2024
Dated: February 15, 2024
Version: 0.2
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
National Security Agency
Information Assurance Directorate
9800 Savage Road STE 6740
Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6740
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Validation Team
James J Donndelinger
Marybeth Panock
Deron Graves
Fernando Guzman
The Aerospace Corporation
Common Criteria Testing Laboratory
Allison Keenan
Douglas Kalmus
Yoel Fortaleza
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary .........................................................................................................1
2 Identification ....................................................................................................................1
3 Architectural Information.................................................................................................3
3.1 TOE Description ......................................................................................................3
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms ........................................................................................3
3.3 Physical Boundaries.................................................................................................3
4 Security Policy .................................................................................................................3
4.1 Security audit ...........................................................................................................4
4.2 Cryptographic support..............................................................................................4
4.3 Identification and authentication..............................................................................4
4.4 Security management...............................................................................................4
4.5 Packet filtering .........................................................................................................4
4.6 Protection of the TSF ...............................................................................................4
4.7 TOE access...............................................................................................................5
4.8 Trusted path/channels...............................................................................................5
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope ............................................................................5
6 Documentation.................................................................................................................6
7 IT Product Testing ...........................................................................................................6
7.1 Developer Testing....................................................................................................7
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing.....................................................................7
8 Evaluated Configuration ..................................................................................................7
9 Results of the Evaluation .................................................................................................7
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE) .................................................................7
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV) ...................................................................8
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD) ......................................................8
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC) ..........................................8
9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE).......................9
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)..............................................................9
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results...............................................................................9
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations .........................................................................9
11 Annexes............................................................................................................................9
12 Security Target...............................................................................................................10
13 Glossary .........................................................................................................................10
14 Bibliography...................................................................................................................11
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1 Executive Summary
This report documents the assessment of the National Information Assurance Partnership
(NIAP) validation team of the evaluation of Architecture Technology Corporation Machete
Router solution provided by Architecture Technology Corporation. It presents the evaluation
results, their justifications, and the conformance results. This Validation Report is not an
endorsement of the Target of Evaluation by any agency of the U.S. government, and no
warranty is either expressed or implied.
The evaluation was performed by the Gossamer Security Solutions (Gossamer) Common
Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL) in Columbia, MD, United States of America, and was
completed in February 2024. The information in this report is largely derived from the
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) and associated test reports, all written by Gossamer
Security Solutions. The evaluation determined that the product is both Common Criteria Part
2 Extended and Part 3 Conformant, and meets the assurance requirements of the PP-
Configuration for Network Devices and Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version
1.2, 31 March 2022 which includes the Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network
Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e) with the PP-Module for Virtual Private
Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.2, 31 March 2022 (VPNGW12).
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Architecture Technology Corporation Machete Router.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) identified in this Validation Report has been evaluated at a
NIAP approved Common Criteria Testing Laboratory using the Common Methodology for
IT Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5) for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (Version 3.1, Rev 5). This Validation Report applies only to the specific
version of the TOE as evaluated. The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme and the
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence provided.
The validation team monitored the activities of the evaluation team, provided guidance on
technical issues and evaluation processes, and reviewed the individual work units and
successive versions of the ETR. The validation team found that the evaluation showed that
the product satisfies all of the functional requirements and assurance requirements stated in
the Security Target (ST). Therefore the validation team concludes that the testing laboratory’s
findings are accurate, the conclusions justified, and the conformance results are correct. The
conclusions of the testing laboratory in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the
evidence produced.
The technical information included in this report was obtained from the Architecture
Technology Corporation Machete Router Security Target, version 0.6, November 29, 2023
and analysis performed by the Validation Team.
2 Identification
The CCEVS is a joint National Security Agency (NSA) and National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) effort to establish commercial facilities to perform trusted product
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evaluations. Under this program, security evaluations are conducted by commercial testing
laboratories called Common Criteria Testing Laboratories (CCTLs) using the Common
Evaluation Methodology (CEM) in accordance with National Voluntary Laboratory
Assessment Program (NVLAP) accreditation.
The NIAP Validation Body assigns Validators to monitor the CCTLs to ensure quality and
consistency across evaluations. Developers of information technology products desiring a
security evaluation contract with a CCTL and pay a fee for their product’s evaluation. Upon
successful completion of the evaluation, the product is added to NIAP’s Validated Products
List.
Table 1 provides information needed to completely identify the product, including:
• The Target of Evaluation (TOE): the fully qualified identifier of the product as evaluated.
• The Security Target (ST), describing the security features, claims, and assurances of the
product.
• The conformance result of the evaluation.
• The Protection Profile to which the product is conformant.
• The organizations and individuals participating in the evaluation.
Table 1: Evaluation Identifiers
Item Identifier
Evaluation Scheme United States NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
TOE Architecture Technology Corporation Machete Router
(Specific models identified in Section 8)
Protection Profile • PP-Configuration for Network Devices and Virtual Private Network (VPN)
Gateways, version 1.2, 31 March 2022 (CFG_NDcPP-VPNGW_V1.2) which
includes the following components:
o Base PP: collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version
2.2e, 23 March 2020 (NDcPP22e)
o PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.2,
31 March 2022 (VPNGW12)
ST Architecture Technology Corporation Machete Router Security Target, version
0.6, November 29, 2023
Evaluation Technical
Report
Evaluation Technical Report for Architecture Technology Corporation Machete
Router , version 0.2, January 30, 2024
CC Version Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
rev 5
Conformance Result CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant
Sponsor Architecture Technology Corporation
Developer Architecture Technology Corporation
Common Criteria
Testing Lab (CCTL)
Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Columbia, MD
CCEVS Validators James J Donndelinger, Marybeth Panock, Deron Graves, Fernando Guzman
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3 Architectural Information
Note: The following architectural description is based on the description presented in the
Security Target.
The Architecture Technology Corporation Machete Router is a ruggedized, compact, secure
and high-performance router that also provides VPN gateway functionality.
3.1 TOE Description
The functions of Machete are implemented in a software suite called ATCorp Routing and
Encryption Suite (ARES).
3.2 TOE Evaluated Platforms
Detail regarding the evaluated configuration is provided in Section 8 below.
3.3 Physical Boundaries
Each TOE appliance runs version 2.0 of the ARES software and has physical network
connections to its environment to facilitate managing and filtering network traffic. The TOE
appliance can also be the destination of network traffic, where it provides interfaces for its
own management.
The TSF requires the following equipment/services to be present in the operational
environment:
• IPsec Peers
• CRL server
• Syslog server reachable through either an SSH client connection or through a VPN
connection
• NTP server reachable through a VPN connection
• Administrative SSH client
• Web Browser for ESXi Console Management
4 Security Policy
This section summaries the security functionality of the TOE:
1. Security audit
2. Cryptographic support
3. Identification and authentication
4. Security management
5. Packet filtering
6. Protection of the TSF
7. TOE access
8. Trusted path/channels
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4.1 Security audit
The TOE is capable of auditing all required events and information. Each audit record includes
the identity of the user that caused the event (if applicable), date and time of the event, type
of event, and the outcome of the event.
The TOE protects storage of audit information from modification or deletion. The TOE can
transmit audit records to a remote syslog server using either SSH or IPsec.
4.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE contains CAVP-tested cryptographic support that provides key management,
random bit generation, encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-
hashing features in support of higher-level cryptographic protocols including IPsec and SSH.
4.3 Identification and authentication
The TOE supports passwords consisting of alphanumeric and special characters. The TSF also
allows administrators to set a minimum password length of 6 to 100 characters.
The TOE requires all administrative users to authenticate before allowing the user to perform
any actions other than:
• Viewing the warning banner.
After an administrator-specified number of failed attempts, the user account is locked out. The
TOE also protects, stores and allows authorized administrators to load X.509.v3 certificates
for use to support authentication for IPsec connections.
4.4 Security management
The TOE provides a custom CLI that allows users with the Security Administrator role to
administer the TOE locally and remotely. This interface allows the Security Administrator to
initiate manual updates, manage cryptographic keys, manage the TOE configuration, and
configure audit data transmission.
4.5 Packet filtering
The TOE provides extensive packet filtering capabilities for IPv4, IPv6, TCP, and UDP. The
authorized administrator can define packet filtering rules that apply to most every field within
the identified packet types. The authorized administrator can define each rule to permit, deny,
and log each decision.
4.6 Protection of the TSF
The TOE prevents the reading of secret keys, private keys, and passwords.
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The TOE maintains a local real-time clock to provide accurate timestamps. This clock can be
periodically updated by synchronizing with an NTP server and/or manually set by a Security
Administrator.
The TOE performs a suite of power-up self-tests that verify the correct operation of the
entropy source, RAM, and cryptographic algorithms as well as the integrity of the firmware.
The TOE verifies the authenticity and integrity of all firmware updates using ECDSA
signature verification. The TOE shuts down if any of these tests fail.
4.7 TOE access
Before establishing an administrative session, the TOE displays an administrator configurable
warning banner. The TOE locks inactive local administrative sessions and terminates inactive
remote administrative sessions.
The TOE allows the administrator to configure restrictions on the establishment of client IPsec
tunnels based on the client IP address, time of day, date, day of week, or day of month. The
TOE assigns a private IP address (internal to the trusted network for which the TOE is the
headend) to a VPN client upon successful establishment of a session.
4.8 Trusted path/channels
The TOE supports either SSH or IPsec to provide a trusted communication channel between
itself and all authorized IT entities that is logically distinct from other communication
channels and provides assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel
data from disclosure and detection of modification of the channel data. The TOE uses SSH or
IPsec to provide the trusted path with remote administrative users as well.
5 Assumptions & Clarification of Scope
Assumptions
The Security Problem Definition, including the assumptions, may be found in the following
documents:
• collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e)
• PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.2, 31 March
2022 (VPNGW12)
That information has not been reproduced here and the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 should be
consulted if there is interest in that material.
The scope of this evaluation was limited to the functionality and assurances covered in the
NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 as described for this TOE in the Security Target. Other functionality
included in the product was not assessed as part of this evaluation. All other functionality
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provided by the devices needs to be assessed separately, and no further conclusions can be
drawn about their effectiveness.
Clarification of scope
All evaluations (and all products) have limitations, as well as potential misconceptions that
need clarification. This text covers some of the more important limitations and clarifications
of this evaluation. Note that:
• As with any evaluation, this evaluation only shows that the evaluated configuration
meets the security claims made with a certain level of assurance (the assurance
activities specified in the collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices with
the VPNGW PP-Module and performed by the evaluation team).
• This evaluation covers only the specific device models and software as identified in
this document, and not any earlier or later versions released or in process.
• Apart from the Admin Guide, additional customer documentation for the specific
VPNGW models was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should
not to be relied upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
• This evaluation did not specifically search for, nor attempt to exploit, vulnerabilities
that were not “obvious” or vulnerabilities to objectives not claimed in the ST. The
CEM defines an “obvious” vulnerability as one that is easily exploited with a
minimum of understanding of the TOE, technical sophistication and resources.
• The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional
requirements specified in the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 and applicable Technical
Decisions. Any additional security related functional capabilities of the TOE were not
covered by this evaluation.
6 Documentation
The following documents were available with the TOE for evaluation:
• Machete Router Common Criteria Operational Guidance, Version 1.6, December 14,
2023
Any additional customer documentation provided with the product, or that is available
online was not included in the scope of the evaluation and therefore should not to be relied
upon when configuring or operating the device as evaluated.
To use the product in the evaluated configuration, the product must be configured as
specified in the Guidance Documentation listed above. Consumers are encouraged to
download the configuration guides from the NIAP website to ensure the device is configured
as evaluated.
7 IT Product Testing
This section describes the testing efforts of the developer and the Evaluation Team. It is
derived from information contained in the proprietary Detailed Test Report for Architecture
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Technology Corporation Machete Router, Version 0.2, January 30, 2024 (DTR), as
summarized in the evaluation Assurance Activity Report (AAR).
7.1 Developer Testing
No evidence of developer testing is required in the assurance activities for this product.
7.2 Evaluation Team Independent Testing
The evaluation team verified the product according to a Common Criteria Certification
document and ran the tests specified in the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 including the tests
associated with optional requirements. The AAR, in sections 1.1 lists the tested devices,
provides a list of test tools, and has diagrams of the test environment.
8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE consists of the following hardware models running ARES v 2.0:
Model Identification Platform CPU Architecture CPU Part Number
MACHETE-FIT2 Fitlet2 Intel Apollo Lake Atom x7-E3950
MACHETE-OTN4 OnTime 4000 Series Intel Apollo Lake Atom x7-E3950
MACHETE-OTN6 OnTime 6000 Series Intel Apollo Lake Atom x7-E3950
MACHETE-OTN7 OnTime 7000 Series Intel Apollo Lake Atom x7-E3950
MACHETE-DCS2 DCS003289 Intel Apollo Lake Atom x7-E3950
MACHETE-V1 VMware ESXi v7.0 AMD Ryzen 4000 Ryzen 4600G
MACHETE-AMD-R1 OL-ML100 Series AMD Ryzen V1000 V1605B
MACHETE-WL1 BKNUC8V5PNB Intel Whiskey Lake Core i5-8365U
MACHETE-FIT3 Fitlet3 Intel Elkhart Lake Atom x6425E
9 Results of the Evaluation
The results of the assurance requirements are generally described in this section and are
presented in detail in the proprietary ETR. The reader of this document can assume that all
assurance activities and work units received a passing verdict.
A verdict for an assurance component is determined by the resulting verdicts assigned to the
corresponding evaluator action elements. The evaluation was conducted based upon CC
version 3.1 rev 5 and CEM version 3.1 rev 5. The evaluation determined the Architecture
Technology Corporation Machete Router TOE to be Part 2 extended, and to meet the SARs
contained in the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12.
9.1 Evaluation of the Security Target (ASE)
The evaluation team applied each ASE CEM work unit. The ST evaluation ensured the ST
contains a description of the environment in terms of policies and assumptions, a statement of
security requirements claimed to be met by the Architecture Technology Corporation Machete
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Router products that are consistent with the Common Criteria, and product security function
descriptions that support the requirements.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.2 Evaluation of the Development (ADV)
The evaluation team applied each ADV CEM work unit. The evaluation team assessed the
design documentation and found it adequate to aid in understanding how the TSF provides the
security functions. The design documentation consists of a functional specification contained
in the Security Target and Guidance documents. Additionally the evaluator performed the
assurance activities specified in the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 related to the examination of the
information contained in the TSS.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.3 Evaluation of the Guidance Documents (AGD)
The evaluation team applied each AGD CEM work unit. The evaluation team ensured the
adequacy of the user guidance in describing how to use the operational TOE. Additionally,
the evaluation team ensured the adequacy of the administrator guidance in describing how to
securely administer the TOE. All of the guides were assessed during the design and testing
phases of the evaluation to ensure they were complete.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.4 Evaluation of the Life Cycle Support Activities (ALC)
The evaluation team applied each ALC CEM work unit. The evaluation team found that the
TOE was identified.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
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9.5 Evaluation of the Test Documentation and the Test Activity (ATE)
The evaluation team applied each ATE CEM work unit. The evaluation team ran the set of
tests specified by the assurance activities in the NDcPP22e/VPNGW12 and recorded the
results in a Test Report, summarized in the AAR.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.6 Vulnerability Assessment Activity (VAN)
The evaluation team applied each AVA CEM work unit. The vulnerability analysis is in the
Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis includes a
public search for vulnerabilities. The public search for vulnerabilities did not uncover any
residual vulnerability.
The evaluator searched the National Vulnerability Database
(https://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search) and Vulnerability Notes Database
(http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/) with the following search terms: “Architecture Technology
Corporation”, “Machete Router “, “ATCorp”, “ARES”, “OpenSSL”, “Intel Atom x7-
E3950”, “AMD Ryzen V1605B”, “Intel Core i5-8365U”, “Intel Atom x6425E”, “Ryzen
4600G”, “TCP”. The search was conducted on January 30, 2024.
The validator reviewed the work of the evaluation team, and found that sufficient evidence
and justification was provided by the evaluation team to confirm that the evaluation was
conducted in accordance with the requirements of the CEM, and that the conclusion reached
by the evaluation team was justified.
9.7 Summary of Evaluation Results
The evaluation team’s assessment of the evaluation evidence demonstrates that the claims in
the ST are met. Additionally, the evaluation team’s testing also demonstrated the accuracy of
the claims in the ST.
The validation team’s assessment of the evidence provided by the evaluation team is that it
demonstrates that the evaluation team followed the procedures defined in the CEM, and
correctly verified that the product meets the claims in the ST.
10 Validator Comments/Recommendations
The validation team notes that the evaluated configuration is dependent upon the TOE being
configured per the evaluated configuration instructions in the Machete Router Common
Criteria Operational Guidance, Version 1.6, December 14, 2023. No versions of the TOE
and software, either earlier or later were evaluated.
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Administrators should take note of the fact that The TOE transmits audit records to the syslog
server in real-time. The TOE does not have the ability to cache or retransmit audit records if
the syslog server is unavailable.
The TOE allocates 2GB of space to local audit storage. The TOE maintains 4 separate log
types and up to 10 files for each log type, one active file and 9 archive files. The current file
for each log type is allowed to reach 50MB in size before it is rotated, when the TOE attempts
to write an audit log message to an audit file which would increase the size beyond 50MB
then that audit log type is rotated. Audit log rotation will delete the oldest archive file, if
archiving the current file will create more than 9 archive files. Each archive file is renamed
with a suffix .1.gz through .9.gz, indicating the age of the archive file, 1 being the newest and
9 being the oldest. Then the current audit log is compressed and renamed with the suffix .1.gz.
Once rotation is completed, a new empty current file is created and the queued audit message
is written to the file.
The functionality evaluated is scoped exclusively to the security functional requirements specified in
the Security Target. Other functionality included in the product was not assessed as part of this
evaluation. Other functionality provided by devices in the operational environment need to be
assessed separately and no further conclusions can be drawn about their effectiveness.
All other concerns and issues are adequately addressed in other parts of this document.
11 Annexes
Not applicable
12 Security Target
The Security Target is identified as: Architecture Technology Corporation Machete Router
Security Target, Version 0.6, November 29, 2023.
13 Glossary
The following definitions are used throughout this document:
• Common Criteria Testing Laboratory (CCTL). An IT security evaluation facility
accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) and
approved by the CCEVS Validation Body to conduct Common Criteria-based evaluations.
• Conformance. The ability to demonstrate in an unambiguous way that a given
implementation is correct with respect to the formal model.
• Evaluation. The assessment of an IT product against the Common Criteria using the
Common Criteria Evaluation Methodology to determine whether or not the claims made
are justified; or the assessment of a protection profile against the Common Criteria using
the Common Evaluation Methodology to determine if the Profile is complete, consistent,
technically sound and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more TOEs that may be evaluated.
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• Evaluation Evidence. Any tangible resource (information) required from the sponsor or
developer by the evaluator to perform one or more evaluation activities.
• Feature. Part of a product that is either included with the product or can be ordered
separately.
• Target of Evaluation (TOE). A group of IT products configured as an IT system, or an
IT product, and associated documentation that is the subject of a security evaluation under
the CC.
• Validation. The process carried out by the CCEVS Validation Body leading to the issue
of a Common Criteria certificate.
• Validation Body. A governmental organization responsible for carrying out validation
and for overseeing the day-to-day operation of the NIAP Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Scheme.
14 Bibliography
The Validation Team used the following documents to produce this Validation Report:
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation: Part 1:
Introduction and General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[2] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security
functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017.
[3] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security
assurance components, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017.
[4] collaborative Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 2.2e, 23 March 2020
(NDcPP22e).
[5] PP-Module for Virtual Private Network (VPN) Gateways, version 1.2, 31 March 2022
(VPNGW12).
[6] Architecture Technology Corporation Machete Router Security Target, Version 0.6,
November 29, 2023 (ST).
[7] Assurance Activity Report for Architecture Technology Corporation Machete Router,
Version 0.2, January 30, 2024 (AAR).
[8] Detailed Test Report for Architecture Technology Corporation Machete Router,
Version 0.2, January 30, 2024 (DTR).
[9] Evaluation Technical Report for Architecture Technology Corporation Machete
Router, Version 0.2, January 30, 2024 (ETR)