TrustCB B.V.
Registered address:
Van den Berghlaan 48, 2132 AT
Hoofddorp, The Netherlands
nscib@trustcb.com
https://trustcb.com/common-criteria/nscib/
https://nscib.nl
TrustCB B.V. is a registered company at the
Netherlands Chamber of Commerce (KVK),
under number 858360275.
Version
2024-12
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Certification Report
JCOP 4 P71, versions JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.00.4, JCOP 4 P71
v4.7 R1.01.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7
R2.00.11, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11
Sponsor and developer: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Beiersdorfstrasse 12
22529 Hamburg
Germany
Evaluation facility: SGS Brightsight B.V.
Brassersplein 2
2612 CT Delft
The Netherlands
Report number: NSCIB-CC-2300172-02-CR
Report version: 1
Project number: NSCIB-2300172-02
Author(s): Haico Haak
Date: 12 February 2026
Number of pages: 15
Number of appendices: 0
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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CONTENTS
Foreword 3
Recognition of the Certificate 4
International recognition 4
European recognition 4
1 Executive Summary 5
2 Certification Results 7
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation 7
2.2 Security Policy 8
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 8
2.3.1 Assumptions 8
2.3.2 Clarification of scope 8
2.4 Architectural Information 8
2.5 Documentation 9
2.6 IT Product Testing 10
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth 10
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing 10
2.6.3 Test configuration 11
2.6.4 Test results 11
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results 11
2.8 Evaluated Configuration 11
2.9 Evaluation Results 11
2.10 Comments/Recommendations 11
3 Security Target 13
4 Definitions 13
5 Bibliography 14
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Foreword
The Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security (NSCIB) provides a third-party
evaluation and certification service for determining the trustworthiness of Information Technology (IT)
security products. Under this NSCIB, TrustCB B.V. has the task of issuing certificates for IT security
products, as well as for protection profiles and sites.
Part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product, protection profile or site
according to the Common Criteria assessment guidelines published by the NSCIB. Evaluations are
performed by an IT Security Evaluation Facility (ITSEF) under the oversight of the NSCIB Certification
Body, which is operated by TrustCB B.V. in cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom
Relations.
An ITSEF in the Netherlands is a commercial facility that has been licensed by TrustCB B.V. to
perform Common Criteria evaluations; a significant requirement for such a licence is accreditation to
the requirements of ISO Standard 17025 “General requirements for the accreditation of calibration and
testing laboratories”.
By awarding a Common Criteria certificate, TrustCB B.V. asserts that the product or site complies with
the security requirements specified in the associated (site) security target, or that the protection profile
(PP) complies with the requirements for PP evaluation specified in the Common Criteria for
Information Security Evaluation. A (site) security target is a requirements specification document that
defines the scope of the evaluation activities.
The consumer should review the (site) security target or protection profile, in addition to this
certification report, to gain an understanding of any assumptions made during the evaluation, the IT
product's intended environment, its security requirements, and the level of confidence (i.e., the
evaluation assurance level) that the product or site satisfies the security requirements stated in the
(site) security target.
Reproduction of this report is authorised only if the report is reproduced in its entirety.
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Recognition of the Certificate
Presence of the Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement (CCRA) and the SOG-IS logos on the
certificate indicates that this certificate is issued in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA and
the SOG-IS Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOG-IS MRA) and will be recognised by the participating
nations.
International recognition
The CCRA was signed by the Netherlands in May 2000 and provides mutual recognition of certificates
based on the Common Criteria (CC). Since September 2014 the CCRA has been updated to provide
mutual recognition of certificates based on cPPs (exact use) or STs with evaluation assurance
components up to and including EAL2+ALC_FLR.
For details of the current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes, see
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
European recognition
The SOG-IS MRA Version 3, effective since April 2010, provides mutual recognition in Europe of
Common Criteria and ITSEC certificates at a basic evaluation level for all products. A higher
recognition level for evaluation levels beyond EAL4 (respectively E3-basic) is provided for products
related to specific technical domains. This agreement was signed initially by Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Italy joined the SOG-IS
MRA in December 2010.
For details of the current list of signatory nations, approved certification schemes and the list of
technical domains for which the higher recognition applies, see https://www.sogis.eu.
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1 Executive Summary
This Certification Report states the outcome of the Common Criteria security evaluation of the JCOP 4
P71, versions JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.00.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4, JCOP
4 SE050 v4.7 R2.00.11, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11. The developer of the JCOP 4 P71, versions
JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.00.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7
R2.00.11, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11 is NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in
Hamburg, Germany and they also act as the sponsor of the evaluation and certification. A Certification
Report is intended to assist prospective consumers when judging the suitability of the IT security
properties of the product for their particular requirements.
The TOE consists of the Micro Controller and a software stack which is stored on the Micro Controller
and which can be executed by the Micro Controller. The software stack can be further split into the
following components:
• Firmware for booting and low level functionality of the Micro Controller (MC FW) like writing to
flash memory. This includes software for implementing cryptographic operations, called Crypto
Library.
• Software for implementing a Java Card Virtual Machine [JCVM], a Java Card Runtime
Environment [JCRE] and a Java Card Application Programming Interface [JCAPI], called JCVM,
JCRE and JCAPI.
• Software for implementing content management according to GlobalPlatform [GP], called
GlobalPlatform Framework
• Software for executing native libraries, called Secure Box.
The TOE is referred to as JCOP 4 P71. The JCOP 4 Operating System (JCOP 4 OS) consists of the
software stack without the Crypto Library (Crypto Lib) and without the Micro Controller Firmware (MC
FW). The TOE uses one or more communication interfaces to communicate with its environment.
The TOE was evaluated initially by SGS Brightsight B.V. located in Delft, The Netherlands and was
certified on 04-04-2024. The re-evaluation of the TOE has also been conducted by SGS Brightsight
B.V. and was completed on 12 February 2026 with the approval of the ETR. The re-certification
procedure has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Netherlands Scheme for
Certification in the Area of IT Security [NSCIB].
This second issue of the Certification Report is a result of a “recertification with major changes”.
The major changes consist of an update of the certificate of the underlying platform, and associated
guidance and Security Target updates.
The security evaluation reused the evaluation results of previously performed evaluations. A full, up-
to-date vulnerability analysis has been made, as well as renewed testing.
The scope of the evaluation is defined by the security target [ST], which identifies assumptions made
during the evaluation, the intended environment for the JCOP 4 P71, versions JCOP 4 P71 v4.7
R1.00.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.00.11, JCOP
4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11, the security requirements, and the level of confidence (evaluation assurance
level) at which the product is intended to satisfy the security requirements. Consumers of the JCOP 4
P71, versions JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.00.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4, JCOP
4 SE050 v4.7 R2.00.11, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11 are advised to verify that their own
environment is consistent with the security target, and to give due consideration to the comments,
observations and recommendations in this certification report.
The results documented in the evaluation technical report [ETR] 1 for this product provide sufficient
evidence that the TOE meets the EAL6 augmented (EAL6+) assurance requirements for the evaluated
security functionality. This assurance level is augmented with ASE_TSS.2 (TOE summary
specification with architectural design summary) and ALC_FLR.1 (Basic flaw remediation).
1 The Evaluation Technical Report contains information proprietary to the developer and/or the
evaluator, and is not available for public review.
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The evaluation was conducted using the Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CEM] for conformance to the Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 5 [CC] (Parts I, II and III).
TrustCB B.V., as the NSCIB Certification Body, declares that the evaluation meets all the conditions
for international recognition of Common Criteria Certificates and that the product will be listed on the
NSCIB Certified Products list. Note that the certification results apply only to the specific version of the
product as evaluated.
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2 Certification Results
2.1 Identification of Target of Evaluation
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) for this evaluation is the JCOP 4 P71, versions JCOP 4 P71 v4.7
R1.00.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.00.11, JCOP
4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11 from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH located in Hamburg, Germany.
The TOE is comprised of the following main components:
Delivery
item type
Identifier Version
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with
IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library
(R1/R2/R3/R4)
B1
Software
IC Dedicated Test Software (as part of [CR-
N7121])
9.2.3.0
Boot Software (as part of [CR-N7121]) 9.2.3.0
Firmware (as part of [CR-N7121]) 9.2.3.0
FlashLoader OS (as part of [CR-N7121]) 1.2.5
Library Interface (as part of [CR-N7121]) 9.2.3.0
System Mode OS (as part of [CR-N7121]) 13.2.3.0
Crypto Library (as part of [CR-N7121]) 0.7.6 / 0.7.72
IC Embedded Software (for “Configuration
Banking & Secure ID”)
JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.00.4”
Platform ID (ASCII) =
“J3R35101FA9E0400”
SVN rev: 129694
JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4
Platform ID (ASCII) =
“J3R3510236310400”
SVN rev: 144945
“JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4
Platform ID (ASCII) =
“J3R35103B01B0400”
SVN rev: 241691
IC Embedded Software (for “Configuration
Secure Authentication”)
JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.00.11
Platform ID (ASCII) =
“J3R351021EEE0400”
SVN rev: 138990
JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11”
Platform ID (ASCII) =
“J3R3510264571100”
SVN rev: 156759
To ensure secure usage a set of guidance documents is provided, together with the JCOP 4 P71,
versions JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.00.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4, JCOP 4
SE050 v4.7 R2.00.11, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11. For details, see section 2.5 “Documentation” of
this report.
For a detailed and precise description of the TOE lifecycle, see the [ST], Chapter 1.3.3.
2 The Crypto Library version used for JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4 is 0.7.7, whereas for other configurations it is
0.7.6.
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2.2 Security Policy
The TOE is a composite product on top of CC certified Hardware, Firmware and Crypto Library. Part of
the TOE are the JCVM, JCRE and JCAPI features and the GP Framework.
The TOE features a Modular Design which allows features to be present or removed upon customer
needs. Each module is part of the JCOP OS and implements specific use-case features and can be
accessed through APDUs or APIs. A module can only be removed but not added. Modules included in
the TOE are detailed in [ST] section 1.3.2.
The SecureBox Module (securebox) provides a feature allowing execution of non-certified native
software within the TOE.
The following cryptographic primitives are supported and included within the TSF:
• 3DES for encryption/decryption (CBC and ECB) and MAC generation and verification (Retail-
MAC, CMAC and CBC-MAC)
• AES for encryption/decryption (CBC, ECB and Counter Mode) and MAC generation and
verification (CMAC, CBC-MAC)
• RSA and RSA-CRT for encryption/decryption and signature generation/verification and key
generation
• ECC over GF(p) for signature generation/verification (ECDSA) and key generation
• RNG according to DRG.3 or DRG.4 of AIS 20
• Diffie-Hellman with ECDH and modular exponentiation
• Hash algorithms SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
2.3 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
2.3.1 Assumptions
The assumptions defined in the Security Target are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead
to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. For detailed information on the
security objectives that must be fulfilled by the TOE environment, see section 5.2 of the [ST].
2.3.2 Clarification of scope
The evaluation did not reveal any threats to the TOE that are not countered by the evaluated security
functions of the product.
There are no security claims relating to the following cryptographic algorithms:
• KoreanSEED
• AES in Counter with CBC-MAC mode (AES CCM)
• Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
• HMAC-based Key Derivation Function (HKDF). [RFC-5869]
• Elliptic Curve Direct Anonymous Attestation (ECDAA) [TPM]
• ECC based on Edwards and Montgomery curves
2.4 Architectural Information
The TOE is a Java Card with a GP Framework. It can be used to load and execute off-card verified
Java Card applets. It is a composite product on top of a CC certified Hardware (Micro Controller
component) with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (MC FW and Crypto Library component).
The logical architecture, originating from the Security Target [ST], of the TOE can be depicted as
follows:
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In the above figure, the blue parts are in scope of the TOE, with the items in darker grey being
provided by the composite (certified hardware and crypto library). The items in light-grey are out of
scope.
2.5 Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to the customer:
Configuration Identifier Version
Configuration Banking &
Secure ID
(TOE versions svn129694,
svn144945 & svn241691)
JCOP 4 P71, User Manual for JCOP 4 P71,
NXP Semiconductors
V4.7, 24 June 2025
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121,
Product data sheet, v3.3, 2020- 04-15, NXP
Semiconductors
V3.3, 15 April 2020
Configuration Secure
Authentication
(TOE version svn138990)
JCOP 4 SE050, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.00.11
User Guidance and Administration Manual,
NXP Semiconductors
V2.5, 25 June 2025
SE050 Family, Data Sheet, NXP
Semiconductors
V3.7, 27 October
2022
Configuration Secure
Authentication
(TOE version svn156759)
JCOP 4 SE050, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11
R2.03 User Guidance and Administration
Manual, NXP Semiconductors
V2.8, 25 June 2025
SE050 Family, Data Sheet, NXP
Semiconductors
V3.7, 7 October 2022
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2.6 IT Product Testing
Testing (depth, coverage, functional tests, independent testing): The evaluators examined the
developer’s testing activities documentation and verified that the developer has met their testing
responsibilities.
2.6.1 Testing approach and depth
The developer performed extensive testing on functional specification, subsystem and module level.
All parameter choices were addressed at least once. All boundary cases identified were tested
explicitly, and additionally the near-boundary conditions were covered probabilistically. The testing
was largely automated using industry standard and proprietary test suites. Test scripts were used
extensively to verify that the functions return the expected values.
The underlying hardware and crypto-library test results are extendable to composite evaluations,
because the underlying platform is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
For the testing performed by the evaluators, the developer provided samples and a test environment.
The evaluators reproduced a selection of the developer tests, as well as a small number of test cases
designed by the evaluator.
2.6.2 Independent penetration testing
The methodical analysis performed was conducted along the following steps:
• When evaluating the evidence in classes ASE, ADV and AGD, potential vulnerabilities were
identified from generating questions to the type of TOE and the specified behaviour.
• For ADV_IMP a thorough implementation representation review was performed on the TOE.
During this attack-oriented analysis, the protection of the TOE was analysed using the knowledge
gained from all previous evaluation classes. This resulted in the identification of additional
potential vulnerabilities. This analysis was performed taking into account the attack methods in
[JIL-AM] and attack potential in [JIL-AP]. An important source for assurance in this step is the
technical report [ETRfC- N7121] of the underlying platform
• All potential vulnerabilities were analysed using the knowledge gained from all evaluation classes
and information from the public domain. A judgment was made on how to assure that these
potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable by using [JIL-AP]. For most of the potential
vulnerabilities a penetration test was defined. Several potential vulnerabilities were found to be
not exploitable due to an impractical attack path.
The validity of test results from earlier (re-)evaluations have been confirmed by gaining assurance
from similar penetration tests during subsequent re-evaluations, and as a result, all test results are
still valid for the current TOE.
The tests performed during the initial evaluation were described in 11 test cases. An additional two
test cases were identified during the second re-evaluation. The total test effort expended by the
evaluators during the second re-evaluation was 5 weeks. During that test campaign 25.5% of the total
time was spend on Perturbation attacks, 49% on side channel testing and 25.5% on logical tests.
There was no additional testing performed in the third re-evaluation. During the fourth re-evaluation
the total test effort expended by the evaluators was two weeks. During that test campaign, 50% of the
total time was spent on perturbation attacks, and 50% on side-channel attacks. During this fifth re-
evaluation performed between November 2023 and March 2024, the total test effort expended by the
evaluators was seven weeks. During that test campaign, 29% of the total time was spent on
perturbation attacks, and 57% on side-channel attacks, and 14% on the logical attacks.
During this re-evaluation performed between October 2024 and March 2025., the total test effort
expended by the evaluators is four weeks. During that test campaign, 0% of the total time was spent
on physical attacks, 0% overcoming sensors and filters, 25% perturbation attacks, 0% retrieving keys
with FA, 50% side-channel attacks, 0% attacks on RNG, 25% of the total time was spent on logical
attacks, 0% on fuzzing attacks, and 0% application isolation penetration tests.
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2.6.3 Test configuration
The testing performed during this re-evaluation was executed on the configuration JCOP 4 P71 v4.7
R1.01.4 and JCOP 4 P71 R1.00.4. Due to the minor differences between these configurations, the
results equally apply to other configurations of the TOE. As the JCOP implementation is the same
between versions R1.01.4 and R1.02.4, the test results are considered to be equally applicable to the
other variants of the TOE.
2.6.4 Test results
The testing activities, including configurations, procedures, test cases, expected results and observed
results are summarised in the [ETR], with references to the documents containing the full details.
The developer’s tests and the independent functional tests produced the expected results, giving
assurance that the TOE behaves as specified in its [ST] and functional specification.
No exploitable vulnerabilities were found with the independent penetration tests.
The algorithmic security level of cryptographic functionality has not been rated in this certification
process, but the current consensus on the algorithmic security level in the open domain, i.e., from the
current best cryptanalytic attacks published, has been taken into account.
For composite evaluations, please consult the [ETRfC] for details.
2.7 Reused Evaluation Results
This is a re-certification. Documentary evaluation results of the earlier version of the TOE have been
reused, but vulnerability analysis and penetration testing has been renewed.
There has been extensive reuse of the ALC aspects for the sites involved in the software component
of the TOE. Sites involved in the development and production of the hardware platform were reused
by composition.
2.8 Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is defined uniquely by its name and version number JCOP 4 P71, versions JCOP 4 P71 v4.7
R1.00.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.00.11, JCOP
4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11. The user can identify the TOE and its version by following the guidance in
section 1.3.4.2 in the [ST].
2.9 Evaluation Results
The evaluation lab documented their evaluation results in the [ETR], which references an ASE
Intermediate Report and other evaluator documents. To support composite evaluations according to
[COMP] a derived document [ETRfC] was provided and approved. This document provides details of
the TOE evaluation that must be considered when this TOE is used as platform in a composite
evaluation.
The verdict of each claimed assurance requirement is “Pass”.
Based on the above evaluation results the evaluation lab concluded the JCOP 4 P71, versions JCOP
4 P71 v4.7 R1.00.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.01.4, JCOP 4 P71 v4.7 R1.02.4, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7
R2.00.11, JCOP 4 SE050 v4.7 R2.03.11, to be CC Part 2 extended, CC Part 3 conformant, and to
meet the requirements of EAL 6 augmented with ASE_TSS.2, ALC_FLR.1. This implies that the
product satisfies the security requirements specified in Security Target [ST].
The Security Target claims ‘demonstrable’ conformance to the Protection Profile [PP].
2.10 Comments/Recommendations
The user guidance as outlined in section 2.5 “Documentation” contains necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. Certain aspects of the TOE’s security functionality, in particular the
countermeasures against attacks, depend on accurate conformance to the user guidance of both the
software and the hardware part of the TOE. There are no particular obligations or recommendations
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for the user apart from following the user guidance. Please note that the documents contain relevant
details concerning the resistance against certain attacks.
In addition, all aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not
covered by the TOE itself must be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his system risk
management process. For the evolution of attack methods and techniques to be covered, the
customer should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the TOE is required and thus
requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms and protocols was not rated in the course of this
evaluation. This specifically applies to the following proprietary or non-standard algorithms, protocols
and implementations: none.
Not all key sizes specified in the [ST] have sufficient cryptographic strength to satisfy the AVA_VAN.5
“high attack potential”. To be protected against attackers with a "high attack potential", appropriate
cryptographic algorithms with sufficiently large cryptographic key sizes shall be used (references can
be found in national and international documents and standards).
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3 Security Target
The JCOP 4 P71 Security Target, Security Target for JCOP 4 P71/SE050 Rev. 4.17 — 10 December
2025 [ST] is included here by reference.
Please note that, to satisfy the need for publication, a public version [ST-lite] has been created and
verified according to [ST-SAN].
4 Definitions
This list of acronyms and definitions contains elements that are not already defined by the CC or CEM:
AES Advanced Encryption Standard
CBC Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CRT Chinese Remainder Theorem
DES Data Encryption Standard
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
ECB Electronic Code Book (a block-cipher mode of operation)
ECC (Over GF) Elliptic Curve Cryptography (over Galois Fields)
ECDH Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm
ECDSA Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
IC Integrated Circuit
ITSEF IT Security Evaluation Facility
JCAPI Java Card Application Programming Interface
JCRE Java Card Runtime Environment
JCVM Java Card Virtual Machine
JIL Joint Interpretation Library
MAC Message Authentication Code
NSCIB Netherlands scheme for certification in the area of IT security
PP Protection Profile
RNG Random Number Generator
RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
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5 Bibliography
This section lists all referenced documentation used as source material in the compilation of this
report.
[CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Parts I, II and
III, Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[CEM] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 3.1 Revision 5, April 2017
[COMP] Joint Interpretation Library, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and
similar devices, Version 1.5.1, May 2018
[ETR] Evaluation Technical Report NXP "JCOP 4 P71” – EAL6+, version 4.0, 6
February 2026
[ETRfC] Evaluation Technical Report for Composition NXP “JCOP 4 P71” – EAL6+,
version 3.0, 6 February 2026
[Cert-N7121] Deutsches IT-Sicherheitszertifikat BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V5-2026 for NXP Smart
Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library
(R1/R2/R3/R4) from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 30 January 2026
[CR-N7121] Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V5-2026 for NXP Smart Card Controller
N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4) from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 30 January 2026
[ETRfC-N7121] Evaluation Technical Report for Composite Evaluation (ETR COMP) NXP
Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and Crypto
Library (R1/R2/R3/R4) B1, BSI-DSZ-CC-1136-V4, version 4, 10 December
2025
[ST-N7121] NXP Secure Smart Card Controller N7121 with IC Dedicated Software and
Crypto Library (R1/R2/R3/R4) Security Target, Rev.3.4, 9 December 2025
[GP] GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.3, GPC_SPE_034, GlobalPlatform Inc.,
October 2015
[JCAPI] Java Card 3 Platform, Application Programming Interface, Classic Edition,
Version 3.0.5., May 2015.
[JCRE] Java Card 3 Platform, Runtime Environment Specification, Classic Edition,
Version 3.0.5., May 2015.
[JCVM] Java Card 3 Platform, Virtual Machine Specification, Classic Edition, Version
3.0.5., May 2015.
[JIL-AAPS] JIL Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 3.2.1, February 2024
[JIL-AMS] Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, Version 2.5, May 2022
(sensitive with controlled distribution)
[NSCIB] Netherlands Scheme for Certification in the Area of IT Security, Version 2.6,
02 August 2022
[PP] Java Card Protection Profile – Open Configuration, BSI-CC-PP-0099-2017,
Version 3.0.5
[ST] JCOP 4 P71 Security Target, Security Target for JCOP 4 P71/SE050 Rev. 4.17
— 10 December 2025
Page: 15/15 of report number: NSCIB-CC-2300172-02-CR, dated 12 February 2026
®
TrustCB
is
a
registered
trademark.
Any
use
or
application
requires
prior
approval.
[ST-lite] JCOP 4 P71 Security Target Lite, Security Target Lite for JCOP 4 P71/SE050
Rev. 4.17 — 10 December 2025
[ST-SAN] ST sanitising for publication, CC Supporting Document CCDB-2006-04-004,
April 2006
(This is the end of this report.)