ePass ICAO essential
ST lite – BAC only
FQR No: 110 7561
FQR Issue: 1
ePass ICAO essential - ST lite - BAC only
T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves -
92700 Colombes - France I info@oberthur.com
S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534
Legal Notice
© OT. All rights reserved.
Specifications and information are subject to change without notice.
The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement.
All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties
of their respective owners.
** Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled **
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Document Management
A. Identification
Business Unit - Department ID R&D
Document type: FQR
Document Title: ePass ICAO essential - ST lite - BAC only
FQR No: 110 7561
FQR Issue: 1
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Table of contents
LIST OF FIGURES 7
LIST OF TABLES 8
1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION 9
1.1 Purpose ................................................................................................................9
1.2 Product description...............................................................................................9
1.3 Objective of the Security Target...........................................................................10
1.4 Security Target Identification...............................................................................10
1.5 TOE Technical Identification ................................................................................11
1.6 IC Identification...................................................................................................11
1.7 Reference documents..........................................................................................12
2 TOE OVERVIEW 14
2.1 Product overview................................................................................................14
2.2 TOE overview......................................................................................................14
2.3 TOE Usages .........................................................................................................14
2.4 TOE Definition.....................................................................................................16
2.5 TOE Guidance......................................................................................................16
2.6 TOE identification................................................................................................17
3 TOE ARCHITECTURE 18
3.1 Integrated Circuit – Infineon SLE 77......................................................................18
3.2 Low layer ............................................................................................................20
3.3 Tools modules.....................................................................................................20
3.4 Applicative modules............................................................................................21
3.5 Operating System................................................................................................21
3.6 Application layer.................................................................................................22
4 TOE LIFE CYCLE 23
4.1 Life cycle overview ..............................................................................................23
4.2 Phase 1 “Development” ......................................................................................25
4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”.....................................................................................25
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4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”................................................26
4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use” ..................................................................................26
5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS 27
5.1 Common Criteria conformance ............................................................................27
5.2 Protection Profile conformance ...........................................................................28
5.2.1 Protection Profile claims.......................................................................................... 28
5.3 Protection Profile additions.................................................................................28
5.3.1 Additional Threats.................................................................................................... 28
5.3.2 Additional objectives................................................................................................ 28
5.3.3 Additional SFR .......................................................................................................... 28
6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION 31
6.1 Subjects ..............................................................................................................31
6.1.1 PP BAC subjects........................................................................................................ 31
6.1.2 Additional Subjects .................................................................................................. 32
6.2 Assets .................................................................................................................33
6.3 Threats ...............................................................................................................34
6.3.1 Threats from the PP BAC.......................................................................................... 34
6.3.2 Threats for Prepersonalization and Personalization................................................ 36
6.4 Organisational Security Policies ...........................................................................36
6.4.1 OSP from PP BAC...................................................................................................... 36
6.5 Assumptions .......................................................................................................37
6.5.1 Assumptions from PP BAC ....................................................................................... 37
7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES 39
7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE............................................................................39
7.1.1 SO from PP BAC........................................................................................................ 39
7.1.2 SO for Prepersonalization and Personalization ....................................................... 40
7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment............................................40
7.2.1 OE from PP BAC........................................................................................................ 40
7.2.1.1 Issuing State or Organization .......................................................................................... 40
7.2.1.2 Receiving State or Organization ...................................................................................... 42
8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS 43
8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage.....................................................43
8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1........................................................................... 43
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8.2 Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers ................................43
8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1............................................................................ 43
8.3 Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability...........................43
8.3.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1............................................................................ 43
8.3.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2............................................................................ 43
8.4 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation .........................................................44
8.4.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1............................................................................ 44
9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 45
9.1 Security Functional Requirements........................................................................45
9.1.1 SFR from PP BAC ...................................................................................................... 46
9.1.2 Added SFR for Prepersonalization ........................................................................... 53
10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION 56
10.1 TOE Summary Specification .................................................................................56
10.2 Links between SFRs and TSF.................................................................................59
11 RATIONALES 60
APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY 61
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - TOE architecture 18
Figure 2: ePass ICAO Essential life cycle 24
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List of tables
Table 1 - General Identification 11
Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification 11
Table 3 - Chip Identification 11
Table 4: TOE Guidance reference 16
Table 5 - Supported Cryptography 20
Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle 23
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps 24
Table 8 - Conformance Rationale 27
Table 9 - User Data 33
Table 10 - TSF Data 33
Table 11 - SFR classification regarding TOE lifecycle 46
Table 12 - Links between SFR and TSF 59
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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The objective of this document is to present the Security Target Lite of the ePass ICAO essential
product configuration BAC on SLE77.
1.2 Product description
This product is designed to host configurable applications that can satisfy the following use case:
Machine Readable Travel Document.
This present Security Target considers BAC PP [R9] and is required for 2 products:
 ePass ICAO essential BAC + EAC ECC on SLE77;
 ePass ICAO essential BAC + EAC RSA on SLE77;
This security target also adds personalization security functions.
Cryptographic functions implemented depend of the configuration as presented in the table below:
Cryptographic Feature
Embedded
Configuration
BAC + EAC ECC
Embedded
Configuration
BAC + EAC RSA
SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256
RSA from 1024, to 2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits)
- signature for AA
verification for EAC
ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits :
- signature/verification (ECDSA)
- key agreement (ECDH)
- key pair generation
3DES with 112 bits key size
Random Generator compliant AIS31
The following interfaces are supported:
- Contactless
- Contact
A personalization application is embedded, supporting ISO 7816-4 and proprietary commands.
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1.3 Objective of the Security Target
This security target describes the security needs for ePass ICAO essential configuration BAC only
product. The configuration is conforming to PP BAC and adds requirements for Prepersonalization
and personalization.
This Security Target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL4 augmented
ALC_DVS.2 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing the
environment in which it operates.
The objectives of this Security Target are:
To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card
life cycle.
To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the
threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform
active phases.
To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and
its documentation) during the product active phases.
To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE
assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment.
To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security
functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements.
To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE
provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment,
and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements.
1.4 Security Target Identification
Title: Ariane - ST- BAC only
Editor: Oberthur Technologies
CC version: 3.1 revision 4
EAL:
EAL4 augmented with:
ALC_DVS.2
PP(s): BSI-CC-PP-055 [R9]
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Title: Ariane - ST- BAC only
ST Reference FQR: 110 7343 Issue 1
ITSEF: UL
Certification Body: CESG
Evaluation scheme: UK
Table 1 - General Identification
1.5 TOE Technical Identification
Product name:
ePass ICAO essential Configuration BAC + EAC ECC on SLE77
ePass ICAO essential Configuration BAC + EAC RSA on SLE77
Commercial name for Infineon
SLE77CLFX2400P & SLE77CLFX2407P
ePass ICAO essential configuration EAC ECC
ePass ICAO essential configuration EAC RSA
Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification
1.6 IC Identification
IC Reference: Infineon chips
IC EAL EAL5+, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5
Communication
protocol:
Contact, Contactless and Dual
Memory: Flash
Chip
Manufacturer:
Infineon
IC PP
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-
0035-2007
IC certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0917-2014
IC maintenance BSI-DSZ-CC-0917-2014-MA-01
IC ST lite
Security Target Lite of M7794 A12 and G12, Version 2.3, 2013-11-27, Infineon
Technologies AG.
Table 3 - Chip Identification
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1.7 Reference documents
MRTD specifications
[R1] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R2] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R3] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 – Machine Readable Offical
Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel documents with
biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008
[R4] Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion
technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a
Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[R5] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended
Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v2.10 part 1
[R6] Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts
from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
Oberthur Technologies Specification
[R7] FQR 110 7226 Ed 1 - ePass ICAO essential - Perso Guide, Oberthur Technologies
Protection Profiles
[R8] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007
[R9] Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSI-
PP-0055 v1.10 25th
march 2009
[R10] E- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control
– BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th
march 2009
[R11] E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles,
SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
[R12] Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations,
ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009
Chips References
[R13] BSI-DSZ-CC-0917 Certification report – SLE77CLFX2400P and SLE77CLFX2407P
[R14] Maintenance report BSI-DSZ-CC-0917 MA01 – SLE77CLFX2400P and SLE77CLFX2407P
Standards
[R15] ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 – Organization, security and commands for interchange
[R16] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO/IEC 15946.TR-ECC, BSI
2006
[R17] ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
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[R18] ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
[R19] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[R20] ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
[R21] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
[R22] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+
Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute
of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[R23] AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998
[R24] Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003
[R25] RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical
Note, 2002
[R26] ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998.
[R27] FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
[R28] ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes
utilisant un cryptogramme bloc"
[R29] NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)
[R30] FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
[R31] ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security techniques – Key management –
part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996
Misc
[R32] Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen
und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1,
25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[R33] NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1
[R34] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March 2012
[R35] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-2 – version 2.10 March 2012
[R36] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March 2012
CC
[R37] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012
[R38] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
[R39] Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
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2 TOE OVERVIEW
2.1 Product overview
The product EPass ICAO essential on SLE77 is multi-applicative native software, embeddable in
contact and/or contact-less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can
be configured to serve different use cases, during the Prepersonalization/personalization phases of
the product. For more information on the product, please refer to complete ST.
The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical
Data Structure as specified in [R2].
This product is embedded on an IC. The IC functionalities are described in § 1.6 IC Identification.
2.2 TOE overview
The TOE described in this security target is the BAC.
The BAC TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the Application Creation
Engine that creates the MF / DF required for the BAC configuration.
The TOE life cycle is described in § 4 TOE life cycle.
The TOE identification is described in § 1.6 IC Identification.
2.3 TOE Usages
State or organisation issues MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming
associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration,
verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder.
In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD to the inspection
system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent
and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used
on the field.
The MRTD in context of this security target contains:
Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet or
any other form fator.
A separate data summary for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine
Readable Zone,
And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for contact and contact-less machine reading.
The authentication of the holder is based on:
The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page.
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When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can perform extra
authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as
“visa information”…
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD can be viewed as the combination:
A physical MRTD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna.
It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
holder.
The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book or any other form
factor.
The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the
device.
The printed portrait.
A logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO on the integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-less readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder.
The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1).
The digitized portraits.
The other data according to LDS (up to DG24).
The Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD’s
chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding
of the MRTD’s chip to the physical support.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s
chip.
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2.4 TOE Definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents
(MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic
Access Control according to ICAO Doc 9303.
The physical scope of the TOE is:
Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
IC Dedicated Software
IC Embedded Software (operating system)
MRTD application
Associated guidance documentation
2.5 TOE Guidance
The table below identifies the guidance for the personalization of the TOE.
Guidance
document for
Prepersonalization
and Personalization
[R7] FQR 110 7226 - ePass ICAO essential - Perso Guide, Oberthur
Technologies
Guidance
documents for
Operational Phase
[R1] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for
Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access,
Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the
secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R2] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 –
Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil
Aviation Organization
[R3] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 –
Machine Readable Offical Travel Documents, Specifications for
electronically enabled offical travel documents with biometric
identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008
[R34] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents part 1 – Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March
2012
[R36] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents part 3 – Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March
2012
Table 4: TOE Guidance reference
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2.6 TOE identification
The means to identify the TOE is presented in the chapter 3 of guidance for personalization [R7].
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3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is an IC with software, composed of various modules and composed of the following
components:
The EPass ICAO essential configuration BAC on SLE77 architecture can be viewed as shown in the
following picture:
Figure 1 - TOE architecture
3.1 Integrated Circuit – Infineon SLE 77
The TOE is embedded on Infineon chips, as presented in Table 3 - Chip Identification.
The IC part of the TOE comprises the following:
Core System:
CPU
Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit (MED)
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
Memories:
Read-Only Memory (ROM)
Random Access Memory (RAM)
SOLID FLASH™ NVM
Infineon SLE77CLFX2400P / SLE77CLFX2407P
Platform
layer Low layer
Tools modules
Applicative modules
Operating System
Application
layer MRTD BAC application Personalization application
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Peripherals:
True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
Watchdog and timers
Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART)
Checksum module (CRC)
Radio Frequency Interface (RFI)
Control:
Dynamic Power Management
Internal Clock Oscillator (ICO)
Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller (ITP and PEC)
Interface Management Module (IMM)
User mode Security Life Control (UmSLC)
Voltage regulator
Coprocessors:
Crypto2304T for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and EC
Symmetric Crypto Coprocessor for AES and 3DES Standard
Security Peripherals:
Filters
Sensors
Buses:
Memory Bus
Peripheral Bus
And associated Firmware and Software, it comprises:
RMS and SAM routines for Solid Flash NVM programming; security functions test, random number
online testing. STS consisting of test and initialization routines. All stored in the ROM part.
The Flash Loader that allows the loading of TOE software.
And cryptographic libraries.
IC is part of the TOE and also part of the TSF. More information on the chips is given in the related
Security Target.
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3.2 Low layer
The native low layer of Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip
features from the applications. It is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design
which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.
The main features of the OS are the following:
Management Memories and secure data processing,
Transaction management,
APDU protocol management,
Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management (type A and type B),
Error processing.
A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies to
provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:
Cryptographic Feature
Embedded in
configuration BAC
+ EAC ECC
Embedded in
configuration BAC
+ EAC RSA
SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256
RSA from 1024, to 2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits)
- signature for AA
verification for EAC
ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521 bits :
- signature/verification (ECDSA)
- key agreement (ECDH)
- key pair generation
3DES with 112 bits key size
Random Generator compliant AIS31
Table 5 - Supported Cryptography
More information is available in complete ST.
Low layer is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
3.3 Tools modules
The tools modules provide ePAss ICAO essential product:
- File system compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4 and ISO/IEC 7816-9. It is also compliant with ICAO
recommendations [R1].
- ISO Secure Messaging as specified in [R15] and as described in annex E of [R36].
- Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation.
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- Symmetric Key management
- Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU
- Authentication and secure messaging to be used during Prepersonalization and
Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard
More information is available in complete ST.
Tools modules are part of the TOE and are also part of the TSF.
3.4 Applicative modules
The applicative modules provide ePASS ICAO essential product:
- Access Conditions Engine that checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data
object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID…).
More information is available in complete ST.
Those applicative modules are part of the TOE and are also part of the TSF.
Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring of a JPG
or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. This feature is the implementation of patents owned by
Oberthur Technologies. More information is available in complete ST.
This module is part of the TOE and outside the scope of this present certification
3.5 Operating System
The operating system manages the TOE in pre-personalization and personalization phases in order to
configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK)
or File management including data reading and writing. It can be addressed in clear mode for secure
environment or non-sensitive commands or using SCP02.
The operating system also manages protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access
Control or Active Authentication. The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [R2].
Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is
enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the
MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R31] key establishment
mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the
confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.
The inspection system:
- Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),
- Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data.
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After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC
rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
More information is available in complete ST.
The Operating System is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
3.6 Application layer
Two kinds of applications are available on the top of the product: MRTD BAC and resident application
used for Personalization.
More information is available in complete ST.
This layer is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
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4 TOE LIFE CYCLE
4.1 Life cycle overview
The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of four life-cycle phases. (With respect to the [R8], the TOE
life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps). The table below presents the TOE role:
Roles Subject
IC developer Infineon
IC
manufacturer
Infineon
Embedded
software
developer
Oberthur Technologies
Module
Manufacturer
Oberthur Technologies or Infineon
Prepersonalizer Oberthur Technologies or another agent: Agent in charge of the
Prepersonalization
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[R9]. It is the agent in charge of the Prepersonalization of the TOE.
It corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as described in [R9]
Personalization
Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize
the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing
the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the
biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical
and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national
interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the DSO.
MRTD Holder The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle
The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard
smart card life cycle [R8], the TOE delivery point and the coverage:
Steps Phase Subject Covered by
Step 1 Development Oberthur Technologies ALC R&D sites
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(Phase1)
Step 2
Development
(Phase1)
Infineon IC certification
Step 3
Manufacturing
(Phase2)
Infineon (code loading in flash Memory) IC certification
Step 4
Manufacturing
(Phase2)
Oberthur Technologies Manufacturer
(Code loading in flash Memory)
ALC sites
TOE delivery point
Step 5
Manufacturing
(Phase2)
Prepersonalization or Other agent AGD_OPE & AGD_PRE
Step 6
Personalization (p Oberthur Technologies Personalization or
Other agent
AGD_OPE & AGD_PRE
Step 7 Operational Use End user AGD_OPE & AGD_PRE
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps
The figure below summarizes the different phases of the development of any configuration of the
ePass ICAO Essential family.
Figure 2: ePass ICAO Essential life cycle
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4.2 Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC
Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
The Oberthur Technologies Code with associated documentation is ready to be loaded in the flash
memory.
4.3 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step 3) The Oberthur Technologies code is loaded in the flash memory, this operation can be done
in the step 3 and in the step 4:
At Infineon site; the code is then securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The Infineon site
is covered by an audit, step 3.
Or at Oberthur Technologies manufacturing Site. The code is then securely transferred to
audited Oberthur Technologies factories, step 4.
(Step) When the code is loaded by Infineon in the Step 3, the TOE integrated circuit is produced
containing the travel document’s chip Dedicated Software in the flash memories. The manufacturer
writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during
the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the Manufacturer.
The manufacturer adds initialization data and keys. The product is self protected, security functions
are active. The product can be sent:
to Oberthur Technologies or
directly to Oberthur Technologies Customers.
(Step4) Oberthur Technologies load the Code and data on the flash memories. The IC contains the
MRTD code and data with the required protection. The product can be sent to Oberthur
Technologies customers (another agent).
TOE delivery point
(Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it, (ii) creates the eMRTD
application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
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The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the
guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
4.4 Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes
the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data,
the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized
portraits),
the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document,
the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and
configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2),
and (iii) the Document security objects. The signing of the Document security object by the
Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel
document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for
TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use.
4.5 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing
State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they
can never be modified.
Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of
an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE
delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation
process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target outlines the split up of
P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs.
after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.
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5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
5.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R37],
[R38] and [R39].
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC Conformance rationale
Part 1 Strict conformance
Part 2
Conformance to the extended1
part:
FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
Part 3
Strict conformance to Part 3.
The product claims conformance to EAL 4, augmented with:
ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”
Table 8 - Conformance Rationale
Remark:
For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures against
eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may
protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets (e.g. the personal data of the TOE holder
which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic
attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).
FPT_EMSEC.1 from the Protection Profile has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep the SFR
formatting.
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5.2 Protection Profile conformance
5.2.1 Protection Profile claims
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PPs written in CC3.1 revision 2:
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSI-PP-0055
v1.10 25th
march 2009 [R9].
5.3 Protection Profile additions
This st has some additions related to prepersonalization and personalization phases. This
functionality is usable in step 5 and step 6. Once the product is locked, stated as personalized, it is no
more possible to perform this operation.
5.3.1 Additional Threats
This ST adds a specific threat on prepersonalization and personalization phases after loading of the
TOE code in the flash memory of the component. (elements related to the prepersonalization and
personalization phases are indicated by MP, for example: T.ACC_MP. This threats is related to access
control in phases prepersonalization and personalization)
T.ACC_MP
An attacker may access to the TOE at prepersonalization and personalization phases to try to (i)
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify
security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
5.3.2 Additional objectives
This additional objective doesn’t contradict the objectives of the TOE as this objectives aims to
protect integrity of the MRTD data.
OT.ACC_MP
The TOE must controls the access to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the
means to secure exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of
unused keys.
5.3.3 Additional SFR
This Security Target adds some SFRs in Prepersonalization step. The details of each sfr are in chapter
[9.1.2] ‘SFR for Prepersonalization’. The details below presents the list and explain that each sfr
doesn’t contradict the TOE SPD.
The added sfr contribute to ensure the security of the prepersonalization step. They are identified by
added “MP” in the sfrs names.
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FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
This SFR is added in step 5, to allow the creation of diversified MSK during the first command, and
then replaced by the first MSK.
The dependency of this SFR is ensured by the generic FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
This ST extends the use of cryptographic operation for MSK key diversification, SM, encryption and
decryption of exchanges and SM MAC for TDES in Prepersonalization step.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
The 2 sfrs are added to allow some operations (Get Data and Select File commands) before
identification and authentication of the users in prepersonalization Step.
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
This SFR is added to detect unsuccessful authentication and limits the authorized number of
unsuccessful authentication of the Prepersonalizer.
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
The policy ‘prepersonalization access control’ implemented in the TOE enforces access control over
all the performed operations in this step.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
This sfr completes the Prepersonalization Access Control by defining the rules of this control.
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
This SFR controls import of data in Step 5. This SFR ensures also the MSK diversification, which is
performed at first command, without any security requirements preliminary to this action.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
This SFR control confidentiality of data import in Step 5.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
This SFR control integrity of imported data in Step 5.
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FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
This sfr is added to ensure that some management of TSF data are only allowed to the
Prepersonalizer in Prepersonalization step : the life cycle transition from step 5 to step 6, the MSK
update with the Derivation data.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
This sfr ensures that the TSF provides a secure communication channel to ensure the confidentiality
and integrity of the exchanged data.
Application Note: The rationale between the SPD, taking into account the additional elements of the
SPD, and the Objectives and Objectives on the operational environment are given in the paragraph
Rationales.
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6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
6.1 Subjects
SFR Before step 5 Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
PP BAC subjects
Manufacturer x x
Personalization Agent x
Terminal x x x
Inspection System x
MRTD Holder x
Traveler x
Attacker x x x x
Additional subjects
IC Developer x
Sorftware Developer x
Prepersonalizer (refinement of
Manufacturer. It corresponds to the
MRTD manufacturer)
x
6.1.1 PP BAC subjects
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE
during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer
and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the
portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the
physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national
interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined
in [R2].
Application Note:
Personalization Agent is refered as the Personalizer in the Security Target.
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Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
Inspection System (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the
MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets
the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the
MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System
(GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the
Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The
security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
Application Note:
This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and EIS because the Extended Access
Control is outside the scope.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e.
without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical
MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application Note
An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a
genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks
against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
6.1.2 Additional Subjects
IC Developer
Developer of the IC.
TOE Developer
Developer of part of the TOE source code.
Prepersonalizer
Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as
described in [R9].
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6.2 Assets
Logical MRTD data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs) and
the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the TOE.
The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and
EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (CAPK) in
EF.DG 14 is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the
inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
User Data Description
CPLC Data
Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as
user data as they enable to track the holder
Personal Data of the MRTD holder
(EF.DGx, except EF.DG15)
Contains identification data of the holder
Document Security Object (SOD) in
EF.SOD
Contain a certificate ensuring the integrity of the file stored
within the MRTD and their authenticity. It ensures the data
are issued by a genuine country
Common data in EF.COM
Declare the data the travel document contains. This data is
optional and may be absent in the TOE
Table 9 - User Data
TSF Data Description
TOE_ID Data enabling to identify the TOE
Prepersonalizer reference
authentication data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer
Personalization Agent reference
authentication Data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization
Agent
Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between
the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
Session keys for the secure channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
Life Cycle State Life Cycle state of the TOE
Table 10 - TSF Data
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD
holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
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6.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its
IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment
and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
6.3.1 Threats from the PP BAC
T.Chip_ID
Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the
MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the contactless communication
interface.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data
printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: Anonymity of user
T.Skimming
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a communication to
read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data
printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Eavesdropping
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s chip and
an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data
printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically readable MRZ data
printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data.
T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the
changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack
scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data
page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the
traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric
authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of
different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait
and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another
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MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The
attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase
"Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate
or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal
operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to
measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even
for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples
are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g.
Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may
physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s
chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or
(iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of
the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification
of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC
failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security
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mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design
including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or
temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or
functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions,
exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To
exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
6.3.2 Threats for Prepersonalization and Personalization
T.ACC_MP
An attacker may access to the TOE at Prepersonalization and personalization phases to try to (i)
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify
security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
6.4 Organisational Security Policies
6.4.1 OSP from PP BAC
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent
Key.
P.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD
with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an
agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal_Data
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip
(EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of
finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4)3 and data according to LDS
(EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder.
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These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection
systems to which the MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic
Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based
on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [R9].
6.5 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
6.5.1 Assumptions from PP BAC
A.MRTD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security
procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to
its objectives:
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process and storage.
Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required
skill.
A.Pers_Agent
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD
holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if
stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the
MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization
Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by
symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD
holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public
Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements
the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical
MRTD.
A.BAC-Keys
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The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or
Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc
9303" [R2], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the
individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to
withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document
Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
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7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
7.1.1 SO from PP BAC
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object
according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The
logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be
changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection system is able to
detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT.Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. Read
access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Personalization
Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by
means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE
must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic
Inspection System.
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
"Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre- Personalization
data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE shall
identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User
Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass,
deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack
scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated
Test Software which are not specified here.
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OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed
in the MRTD's chip:
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data,
and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhanced-
basic attack potential by means of:
measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as controlled manipulation of
memory contents (User Data, TSF Data) with a prior reverse-engineering to understand the
design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic)
fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
7.1.2 SO for Prepersonalization and Personalization
OT.ACC_MP
The TOE must control the access to its sensitive information and its functions and must provide the
means to secure exchanges using cryptographic functions. It must also ensure secure erasing of
unused keys.
7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment
7.2.1 OE from PP BAC
7.2.1.1 Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through steps 4, 5
and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
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Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the
following objectives:
non-disclosure of any security relevant information
identification of the element under delivery
meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment)
physical protection to prevent external damage
secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE"s)
traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
origin and shipment details
reception, reception acknowledgement
location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and
highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, and reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet
the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the
issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical
data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the
encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the
holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality
and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key
Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer
Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country
Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity.
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair
and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of
genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the
Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS
according to [R2].
OE.BAC-Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing State or
Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the "ICAO Doc
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9303" [R2] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived from a defined subset of the
individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to
withstand any attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic
Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
7.2.1.2 Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i)
includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2].
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as
MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document
Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The
receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity
of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD being under
Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the terminal part of the Basic
Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the
transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection Systems).
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8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS
8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1
Description: see [R9].
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: see [R9]
8.2 Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1
Description: see [R9]
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R9]
8.3 Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability
8.3.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1
Description: see [R9]
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Rationale: See [R9]
8.3.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2
Description: See [R9]
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FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
Rationale: See [R9]
8.4 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
8.4.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1
Description: see [R9]
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R9]
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9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
9.1 Security Functional Requirements
The following table presents the classification of SFR regarding the TOE lifecycle:
SFR
Before
Step 5
Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
SFR from PP BAC
FAU_SAS.1 x
FCS_CKM.1 X
FCS_CKM.4 X
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA X
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC X
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH x
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC X
FCS_RND.1 x x x X
FIA_AFL.1 X
FIA_UID.1 x x x X
FIA_UAU.1 x x x X
FIA_UAU.4 x x x X
FIA_UAU.5 x x x X
FIA_UAU.6 X
FDP_ACC.1 X
FDP_ACF.1 X
FDP_UCT.1 X
FDP_UIT.1 X
FMT_SMF.1 x x x X
FMT_SMR.1 X x x X
FMT_LIM.1 X x x X
FMT_LIM.2 X x x X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA x x x X
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS x x x X
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE x x x X
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ x x x X
FPT_EMS.1 x
FPT_FLS.1 x x x X
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SFR
Before
Step 5
Step 5 Step 6 Step 7
FPT_TST.1 x x x X
FPT_PHP.3 x x x X
SFR for Personalization and Prepersonalization
FCS_CKM.1/MP x
FCS_CKM.4/MP x x x
FCS_COP.1/MP x
FDP_ACC.2/MP x x x
FDP_ACF.1/MP x x x
FDP_ITC.1/MP x
FDP_UCT.1/MP x
FDP_UIT.1/MP x
FIA_AFL.1/MP x
FIA_UAU.1 x
FIA_UID.1/MP x
FMT_MTD.1/MP X x x
FTP_ITC.1/MP x
Table 11 - SFR classification regarding TOE lifecycle
9.1.1 SFR from PP BAC
The SFRs listed in the present chapter are all issued from the PP BAC. Their scope can be the use
phase of the personalization phase.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit data storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and
specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following: [R2], normative appendix 5.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
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FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform cf. below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
cf. below and cryptographic key sizes cf. below that meet the following:
Iteration Operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
/BAC_SHA Hashing SHA1 None [R36]
/BAC_ENC SM (BAC), encryption and decryption TDES CBC 112 [R27]
/BAC_AUTH
Symmetric authentication, encryption and
decryption
TDES 112 [R1]
/BAC_MAC SM – MAC
TDES Retail
MAC
112 bits [R28]
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet (1) the
requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following AIS 31 [R32].
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/BAC The TSF shall allow
o 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing",
o 2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD",
o 3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 "Operational Use"
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/BAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/BAC The TSF shall allow:
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing",
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD",
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 "Operational Use"
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
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FIA_UAU.1.2/BAC The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/BAC The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES.
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/BAC The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/BAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the following
mechanism(s):
- the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key,
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic
Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/BAC The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to
the TOE during a BAC mechanism based communication after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/BAC The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within
range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to BAC authentication protocol.
FIA_AFL.1.2/BAC When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met
or surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an increasing time between receiving of the terminal challenge
and sending of the TSF response during the BAC authentication attempts.
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FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read
and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following:
Subjects:
Personalization Agent
Basic Inspection System
Terminal
Objects:
data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
data in EF.COM
data in EF.SOD
Security attributes
authentication status of terminals
FDP_ACF.1.2/BAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and read the data of the
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data in EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
FDP_ACF.1.3/BAC The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/BAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit and receive user
data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
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FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/BAC The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to transmit and receive user
data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer
2. Personalization Agent
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.1.1/BAC The TSF shall maintain the roles
3. Basic Inspection System
FMT_SMR.1.2/BAC The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o 1. User Data to be manipulated,
o 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o 3. software to be reconstructed and,
o 4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks.
FMT_LIM.1.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
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Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o 1. User Data to be disclosed
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed and,
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other attacks.
FMT_LIM.2.1/BAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic Access
Keys to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read:
1. the Document Basic Access Keys
2. the Personalization Agent Keys
to None.
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FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution
in excess of non useful information enabling access to:
- Prepersonalizer Key
- Personalization Agent Key
- EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
- MSK
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following interface
smart card circuit contacts to gain access to:
- Prepersonalizer Key
- Personalization Agent Key
- EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
- MSK
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions:
At reset
Before any cryptographic operation
When accessing a DG or any EF
Prior to any use of TSF data
Before execution of any command
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
executable code.
FPT_TST.1.1/BAC [Editorially refined] Additionally to FPT_TST.1.1, the TSF shall run a suite of self
tests at the conditions:
When performing a BAC authentication,
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2/BAC The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
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FPT_TST.1.3/BAC The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
9.1.2 Added SFR for Prepersonalization
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/MP The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm MSK derivation from initial MSK, using SHA-256 and
specified cryptographic key sizes 256 that meet the following: None
Application Note: In step 5, (Master) MSK is diversified during the first command, and then replaced
by the derived MSK generated by FCS_CKM.1/MP thanks to this SFR.
The secure erasing of the keys is ensured by the generic FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform cf. below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
cf. below and cryptographic key sizes cf. below that meet the following:
Iteration Operation Algo
Key length
(bits)
Standard
/MP_SHA
Hashing for MSK
diversification
SHA256 None [R22]
/MP_ENC
SM, encryption and
decryption
TDES CBC 112 [R27]
/MP_MAC SM - MAC Retail MAC 112 bits [R28]
Application Note
These requirements are duplicated in order to distinguish those required by the PP BAC and those
added by in the present ST.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/MP The TSF shall allow GET DATA, SELECT FILE on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/MP The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1/MP The TSF shall detect when 3 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
authentication of the Prepersonalizer.
FIA_AFL.1.2/MP When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met,
the TSF shall forbid any authentication attempt as Prepersonalizer.
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
FDP_ACC.2.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control on all subjects and all
objects and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
FDP_ACC.2.2/MP The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF
and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.
Application Note: This SFR enforces access control over all the operations performed in step 5.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization Access Control to objects based on
the following Prepersonalizer Authentication (AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS).
FDP_ACF.1.2/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: AS_AUTH_MSK_STATUS=TRUE (EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE).
FDP_ACF.1.3/MP The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/MP The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
Application Note: This SFR enforces access control over all the operation in Step 5.
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control when importing user
data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
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Application Note: This SFR control import of data in Step 5. This SFR ensures also the MSK
diversification, which is performs once, at first command, without any security requirements
preliminary to this action.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control to receive user data in
a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
Application note: This SFR control confidentiality of data import in Step 5.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/MP The TSF shall enforce the Prepersonalization access control SFP to receive user
data in a manner protected from modification errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification of
some of data sent by the Prepersonalizer has occurred.
Application Note: Modification errors should be understood as modification, substitution,
unrecoverable ordering change of data and any other integrity error.
This SFR control integrity of data import in Step 5.
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP The TSF shall restrict the ability to See below the See below to See below.
List of TSF data Authorized role
Write The MSK is diversified (by using Derivation data) by the TOE at
the first command
The MSK can still be changed between any other operation by
the Prepersonalizer
A final key (ISK) is created before the switch of the life cycle.
Prepersonalizer
Switch TOE life cycle from Step 5 to step 6 Prepersonalizer
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted
IT product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/MP The TSF shall permit the Prepersonalizer to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/MP The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for Personalization
Agent key loading.
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10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
10.1 TOE Summary Specification
Access Control in reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval.
Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks the access
conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:
BAC keys
Personalization Agent keys
MSK
It controls access to the CPLC data as well:
It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after BAC
authentication and through a valid secure channel.
In the personalization phase
The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated by the TOE
(using its authentication keys).
It ensures as well that no other part of the memory can be accessed at anytime
Access Control in writing
This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for data
writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions are
fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized.
Regarding the file structure
In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is
not possible to update any system files. However
the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs
In the personalization phase
The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data files it
needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys.
BAC mechanism
This security functionality ensures the BAC is correctly performed. It can only be performed once the
TOE is personalized with the symmetric BAC keys the Personalization Agent loaded beforehand
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during the personalization phase. Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the session keys
are destroyed at the end of each BAC session.
Personalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent, demands
an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric
Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging
described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Physical protection
This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.
Prepersonalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonnalization Agent,
demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric
Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES algorithm. This function is in charge of pre-
initializing the product.. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Safe state management
This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when
an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS
a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)
This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill
card" or becomes mute.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity & integrity of the communication
between the TOE and the IFD. After a successful BAC authentication, a secure channel is established
based on Triple DES algorithm.
This security functionality ensures
No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow
The data exchanged remain confidential
If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.
This TSF can provide a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02) for the Prepersonalization or Personalization.
Self tests
The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity on the TSF data and TSF Code:
At reset
Before any cryptographic operation
When accessing a DG or any EF
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Prior to any use of TSF data
Before execution of any command
When performing a BAC authentication,
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10.2 Links between SFRs and TSF
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/BAC_SHA
FCS_COP.1/BAC_ENC
FCS_COP.1/BAC_AUTH
FCS_COP.1/BAC_MAC
FCS_RND.1
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
Access Control in
reading
X X X X X X X X X X X
Access Control in
writing
X X X X
BAC mechanism X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Personalization X X X X X X
Physical protection X X X X
Prepersonalization X X X X X X X X X
Safe state
management
X X X X X X
Secure Messaging X X X X X X X X X X
Self tests X X
Table 12 - Links between SFR and TSF
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11 RATIONALES
The rationales are available in the complete ST.
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Appendix A: Glossary
Acronym Definition
AA Active Authentication
BAC Basic Access Control
CC Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4
CPLC Card personalization life cycle
DF Dedicated File
DFA Differential Fault Analysis
DG Data Group
EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
EF Elementary File
EFID File Identifier
DES Digital encryption standard
DH Diffie Hellmann
I/0 Input/Output
IC Integrated Circuit
ICAO International Civil Aviation organization
ICC Integrated Circuit Card
IFD Interface device
LDS Logical Data structure
MF Master File
MRTD Machine readable Travel Document
MRZ Machine readable Zone
MSK Manufacturer Secret Key
OCR Optical Character Recognition
OS Operating System
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PP Protection Profile
SFI Short File identifier
SHA Secure hashing Algorithm
SOD Security object Data
TOE Target of Evaluation
TSF TOE Security fonction