Ärendetyp 5.3 Diarienummer: 23FMV4510-35
Dokument ID CSEC2023012
Enligt säkerhetsskyddslagen (2018:585)
SEKRETESS
Enligt offentlighets- och
Sekretesslagen (2009:400)
2024-06-11
Försvarets materielverk
Swedish Defence Material Administration
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
Certification Report - HP G2.0 Samsung 2600
Issue: 1.0, 2024-jun-11
Authorisation: Helén Svensson, Lead Certifier , CSEC
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Table of Contents
1 Executive Summary 3
2 Identification 5
3 Security Policy 7
3.1 Auditing 7
3.2 Cryptography 7
3.3 Identification and authentication (I&A) 7
3.4 Data protection and access control 8
3.5 Protection of the TSF 9
3.6 TOE access protection 10
3.7 Trusted channel communication and certificate management 10
3.8 User and access management 10
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope 11
4.1 Usage Assumptions 11
4.2 Environmental Assumptions 11
4.3 Clarification of Scope 11
5 Architectural Information 13
6 Documentation 15
7 IT Product Testing 16
7.1 Developer Testing 16
7.2 Evaluator Testing 16
7.3 Penetration Testing 16
8 Evaluated Configuration 18
9 Results of the Evaluation 20
10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations 22
11 Bibliography 23
Appendix A Scheme Versions 25
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System 25
A.2 Scheme Notes 25
Swedish Certification Body for IT Security
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1 Executive Summary
The TOE is the HP FutureSmart 5.6.0.2 firmware for the Samsung Color MFP SL-
X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX, Samsung Color MFP SL-
G256X / SL-G306X, Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-
X9600LX / SL-X9700LX, Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X / SL-G509X, Samsung
Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-K9700LX, Samsung Mono MFP SL-
G509K / SL-G609K, Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-
K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX, and Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K multi-
function printers (MFPs).
The TOE is the contents of the firmware and the operating system. The operating sys-
tem is Linux 4.9.230. The following firmware modules are included in the TOE:
• System firmware
• Jetdirect Inside firmware
The firmware, [CCECG], and other supporting files are packaged in a single ZIP file
(i.e., a file in ZIP archive file format). This ZIP file is available for download from the
HP Inc. website. The firmware is packaged in this ZIP file as a single firmware bun-
dle.
The consumer receives the hardware independent of the ZIP file. The evaluated hard-
ware models are either already on the consumer's premises or must be obtained from
Samsung.
This Security Target claims conformance to the following Protection Profiles and PP
packages:
• [PP2600.1]: IEEE Std 2600.1-2009; "2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy
Devices, Operational Environment A". Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable
conformance.
• [PP2600.1-CPY]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Copy Functions. Version
1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
• [PP2600.1-DSR]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Document Storage and Re-
trieval (DSR) Functions. Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
• [PP2600.1-FAX]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Fax Functions. Version 1.0
as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
• [PP2600.1-PRT]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Print Functions. Version 1.0
as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
• [PP2600.1-SCN]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Scan Functions. Version 1.0
as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
• [PP2600.1-SMI]: SFR Package for Hardcopy Device Shared-medium Interface
Functions. Version 1.0 as of June 2009; demonstrable conformance.
The evaluation has been performed by atsec information security AB in Danderyd,
Sweden.
The evaluation was completed on 2024-05-22. The evaluation was conducted in ac-
cordance with the requirements of Common Criteria (CC), version. 3.1 release 5.
atsec information security AB is a licensed evaluation facility for Common Criteria
under the Swedish Common Criteria Evaluation and Certification Scheme. atsec infor-
mation security AB is also accredited by the Swedish accreditation body according to
ISO/IEC 17025 for Common Criteria.
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The certifier monitored the activities of the evaluator by reviewing all successive ver-
sions of the evaluation reports, and by observing site-visit. The certifier determined
that the evaluation results confirm the security claims in the Security Target (ST) and
the Common Methodology for evaluation assurance level EAL 3 augmented by
ALC_FLR.2.
The technical information in this report is based on the Security Target (ST) and the
Final Evaluation Report (FER) produced by atsec information security AB.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
certificate, and on the condition that all the stipulations in the Security Target are
met.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by CSEC or any other or-
ganisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the
IT product by CSEC or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate is either expressed or implied.
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2 Identification
Certification Identification
Certification ID CSEC2023012
Name and version of the cer-
tified IT product
• Samsung Color MFP SL-X6350ZX/ SL-G306X/
SL-G256X/ SL-X6350LX/ SL-X6300LX/ SL-
X6250LX
System firmware version: 2506649_040420
Inside firmware version: JOL25060606
• Samsung Color MFP SL-X9700LX/ SL-
X9600LX/SL-X9500LX/ SL-X9400LX/ SL-
G509X/ SL-G409X
System firmware version: 2506649_040426
Inside firmware version: JOL25060606
• Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9700LX/ SL-
K9600LX/ SL-K9500LX/ SL-G609K/ SL-
G509K
System firmware version: 2506649_040423
Inside firmware version: JOL25060606
• Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6400ZX/ SL-G356K/
SL-G306K/ SL-K6400LX/ SL-K6350LX/ SL-
K6300LX
System firmware version: 2506649_040417
Inside firmware version: JOL25060606
Security Target Identification Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX /
SL-X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX
Samsung Color MFP SL-G256X / SL-G306X
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX /
SL-X9600LX / SL-X9700LX
Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X / SL-G509X
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX /
SL-K9700LX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G509K / SL-G609K
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX /
SL-K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K
Security Target, HP Inc., 2024-01-25, document ver-
sion 1.0.
EAL EAL 3 + ALC_FLR.2
Sponsor HP Inc.
Developer HP Inc.
ITSEF atsec information security AB
Common Criteria version 3.1 release 5
CEM version 3.1 release 5
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QMS version 2.5.1
Scheme Notes Release 21.0
Recognition Scope CCRA, EA/MLA
Certification date 2024-06-11
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3 Security Policy
• Auditing
• Cryptography
• Identification and Authentication
• Data Protection and Access Control
• Protection of the TSF
• TOE Access Protection
• Trusted Channel Communication and Certificate Management
• User and Access Management
3.1 Auditing
The TOE performs auditing of security-relevant functions. The TOE connects and
sends audit records to a syslog server (part of the Operational Environment) for long-
term storage and audit review. Each audit record includes the date and time of the
event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or fail-
ure) of the event.
3.2 Cryptography
The TOE uses IPsec to protect its communications channels. The QuickSec crypto-
graphic library is used to supply the cryptographic algorithms for IKE, and the Linux
Kernel Crypto API is used to supply the cryptographic algorithms for IPsec.
The TOE supports the decrypting of an encrypted stored print job. To decrypt an en-
crypted stored print job, the TOE derives a key from a Job Encryption Password and
unlocks the decryption key using the derived key. The TOE then decrypts the en-
crypted stored print job using the decryption key.
The TOE’s on-demand Data Integrity Test and Code Integrity Test use the SHA-256
algorithm to verify the integrity of TSF Data and TOE executable code, respectively.
The OpenSSL 1.1.1n library within the TOE supplies the SHA2-256 algorithm.
3.3 Identification and authentication (I&A)
The TOE supports multiple Control Panel sign in methods, both local and remote
methods:
• Local sign in method:
− Local Device Sign In (Local Administrator account only)
• Remote sign in methods:
− LDAP Sign In
− Windows Sign In (via Kerberos)
The Control Panel allows both non-administrative users (U.NORMAL) and adminis-
trative users (U.ADMINISTRATOR) to sign in.
The TOE also uses IPsec to identify and mutually authenticate the following user
types:
• Administrative Computer (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
• Network Client Computers (U.NORMAL)
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3.4 Data protection and access control
• Permission Sets - For Control Panel users, the TOE uses a user's User Role (as de-
termined by each user's Permission Set) to determine a user's access to many TOE
functions. Only U.ADMINISTRATOR can query, create, modify, and delete Per-
mission Sets. In addition, only U.ADMINISTRATOR can query, create, modify,
and delete the Permission Set associations to users.
• Job PINs - Users can control access to each stored print and stored copy job that
they place under the TOE's control by assigning a Job PIN to each job. A Job PIN
limits access to a stored print or stored copy job while the job resides under the
TOE's control and allows a user to control when the job is printed so that physical
access to the hard copies can be controlled by the user. A Job PIN must be 4 dig-
its.
• Job Encryption Passwords - The TOE can store and decrypt encrypted stored print
jobs received from a client computer. To decrypt the encrypted stored print job at
the Control Panel, a user must enter the correct Job Encryption Password that was
used to derive the key to protect the job.
• Common access control - The TOE protects each non-fax job in Job Storage from
non-administrative users through the use of a user identifier and a Job PIN or
through the use of a Job Encryption Password. The TOE protects each fax job in
Job Storage through the Permission Set mechanism. A user must have a specific
fax permission in their Permission Set to access received fax jobs stored in Job
Storage. Scan jobs are ephemeral and not stored in Job Storage. Only the user per-
forming the scan can access the job on the TOE.
• TOE function access control - The TOE controls access to TOE functions availa-
ble at the Control Panel using permissions defined in Permission Sets. During the
Control Panel sign-in process, the TOE authorizes the user after they are success-
fully identified and authenticated. As part of the user authorization process, the
TOE associates Permission Sets to the user and then applies a Permission Set
(which is the combination of the Permission Sets associated to the user). The ap-
plied Permission Set (a.k.a. session Permission Set) becomes the user's User Role.
Control Panel applications (e.g., Copy, Fax, Print from Job Storage) use the user's
session Permission Set to determine which of the application's functions should be
allowed or disallowed for the user.
For IPsec users, the TOE uses the IPsec to control access to the supported network
service protocols. The IPsec contains the IP addresses of authorized client comput-
ers grouped into address templates and the network service protocols grouped into
service templates. The administrator maps an address template to a service tem-
plate using an IPsec rule. Service templates, therefore, act as the User Roles for
IPsec users. IP addresses of computers not contained in a rule are denied access to
the TOE.
• Managing Temporary Job Files - With the File Erase Mode for the Managing
Temporary Job Files feature set to a secure mode, temporary job files that have
been written to the hard disk during Copy, Scan to Job Storage, Retrieve from Job
Storage, Scan to E-mail, Scan to Network Folder, Scan to SharePoint®, or Fax op-
erations are overwritten in real time when the HCD is finished processing the jobs.
The evaluation configuration requires the administrator to change the factory de-
fault File Erase Mode to either of the following options:
− Secure Fast Erase
− Secure Sanitize Erase
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Secure Fast Erase is the File Erase Mode by which all addressable file locations
are overwritten once with a character.
Secure Sanitize Erase is the File Erase Mode by which file locations are overwrit-
ten with three passes using a secure, repetitive method to remove all residual or
remanent data as a file is deleted. The first pass is a character written to each byte
of each deleted sector. The second pass is the complement of the first character
written to each byte of each deleted sector. The third pass is a random character
written to each byte of each deleted sector.
• Erase Job Data - In the evaluated configuration (Data Erase Mode set to Secure
Fast Erase), the Erase Job Data feature enables administrators to delete (overwrite)
job data from the hard disk on demand.
The HCD stores various types of job data files on its hard disk. These files include
stored jobs, temporary job files created as a result of processing jobs, and installed
solutions stored as job data.
When the administrator initiates an Erase Job Data operation, the Erase Job Data
feature reboots the HCD. During this reboot, the TOE skips mounting the hard
disk scheduled for the overwrite operation. This allows the Erase Job Data feature
full access to the hard disk. This also causes other HCD services to become una-
vailable during the operation. As the process continues, all partition sectors on the
hard disk containing job data are overwritten. When overwriting is finished, the
HCD reboots to remount the hard disk normally and enable regular HCD opera-
tions.
If the HCD is turned off after beginning a scheduled Erase Job Data operation, the
HCD will continue to attempt the operation until it is successful. If the power to
the HCD is lost during an Erase Job Data operation, the HCD will restart the oper-
ation on reboot, starting at the first block and continuing sequentially until com-
pleted.
The evaluated configuration requires the administrator to use the following Data
Erase Mode:•
− Secure Fast Erase
Secure Fast Erase is the Data Erase Mode by which all addressable partition sec-
tors are overwritten once with a character.
3.5 Protection of the TSF
• Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (including fax separation) -
The TOE does not allow forwarding of data to an External Interface. The TOE
contains only one External Interface in the evaluated configuration and that inter-
face is the Shared-medium Interface. The analog fax hardware and the firmware
that controls the fax hardware do not have the ability to access the Shared-medium
fax functions. No pathway is provided to the Shared-medium interface from the
fax.
• TSF self-testing - The EWS interface allows an administrator (U.ADMINISTRA-
TOR) to execute a set of TSF functional tests (including system clock verification,
LDAP settings verification, and Windows settings verification), TSF data integrity
tests, and TSF code integrity tests.
• Reliable timestamps - The TOE contains a system clock that is used to generate
reliable timestamps. In the evaluated configuration, the administrator must config-
ure the TOE to synchronize its system clock with a Network Time Protocol (NTP)
server.
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3.6 TOE access protection
Inactivity timeout - The TOE supports an inactivity timeout for Control Panel sign-in
sessions. If a signed-in user is inactive for longer than the specified period of inactiv-
ity, the user is automatically signed out of the Control Panel by the TOE. The inactiv-
ity period is managed by the administrator through EWS (HTTP) or the Control Panel.
3.7 Trusted channel communication and certificate manage-
ment
Shared-medium communications (i.e., Ethernet) between the TOE and other trusted IT
products use a trusted channel mechanism to protect the communications from disclo-
sure and modification. The TOE also ensures the cryptographic operations are vali-
dated during policy processing such as validating digital signatures or encrypting and
decrypting data. IPsec with X.509v3 certificates is used to provide the trusted commu-
nication channels. The EWS (HTTP) allows administrators to manage X.509v3 certifi-
cates used by IPsec.
3.8 User and access management
The TOE supports the following roles:
• Administrators (U.ADMINISTRATOR)
• Users (U.NORMAL)
Administrators maintain and configure the TOE and Operational Environment. Users
perform the standard print, copy, fax, etc. functions on the system.
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4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
4.1 Usage Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes three assumptions on the usage of the TOE.
A.USER.TRAINING
TOE Users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization, and
are trained and competent to follow those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING
Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organization,
are trained and competent to follow the manufacturer's guidance and documentation,
and correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with those policies and
procedures. The organization security policies and procedures include security aware-
ness training covering topics such as how to identify and avoid clicking on malicious
links.
A.ADMIN.TRUST
Administrators do not use their privileged access rights for malicious purposes.
4.2 Environmental Assumptions
The Security Target [ST] makes five assumptions on the operational environment of
the TOE.
A.ACCESS.MANAGED
The TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment that provides protection
from unmanaged access to the physical components and data interfaces of the TOE.
A.ADMIN.PC.SECURE
The administrative computer is in a physically secured and managed environment and
only the authorized administrator has access to it.
A.USER.PC.POLICY
User computers are configured and used in conformance with the organization's secu-
rity policies.
A.SERVICES.RELIABLE
When the TOE uses any of the network services DNS, FTP, Kerberos, LDAP, NTP,
SMTP, syslog, SMB, SharePoint, and/or WINS, these services provide reliable infor-
mation and responses to the TOE.
A.EMAILS.PROTECTED
For emails received by the SMTP gateway from the TOE, the transmission of emails
between the SMTP gateway and the email’s destination is protected.
4.3 Clarification of Scope
The Security Target contains six threats, which have been considered during the eval-
uation.
T.DOC.DIS
User Document Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
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T.DOC.ALT
User Document Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.FUNC.ALT
User Function Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.PROT.ALT
TSF Protected Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.DIS
TSF Confidential Data may be disclosed to unauthorized persons.
T.CONF.ALT
TSF Confidential Data may be altered by unauthorized persons.
The Security Target contains seven Organisational Security Policies (OSPs), which
have been considered during the evaluation.
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
To preserve operational accountability and security, Users will be authorized to use
the TOE only as permitted by the TOE Owner.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION
To detect corruption of the executable code in the TSF, procedures will exist to self-
verify executable code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING
To preserve operational accountability and security, records that provide an audit trail
of TOE use and security-relevant events will be created, maintained, and protected
from unauthorized disclosure or alteration, and will be reviewed by authorized person-
nel.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
To prevent unauthorized use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those
interfaces will be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.
P.ADMIN.PASSWORD
To restrict access to administrative tasks, the Device Administrator Password will be
set in the evaluated configuration so that it is required to perform security-relevant ac-
tions through the EWS (HTTP), REST (HTTP), and Control Panel interfaces.
P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET
To prevent ambiguous user names in the TOE's audit trail, the user names of the
LDAP and Windows Sign In users must only contain ASCII printable characters ex-
cept for the double quote (22 hex) and single quote (27 hex) characters (i.e., allowed
ASCII characters in hexadecimal: 20, 21, 23 - 26, 28 - 7E).
P.REMOTE_PANEL.DISALLOWED
To preserve operational accountability and security, administrators must not use the
Remote Control-Panel feature.
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5 Architectural Information
The TOE is the firmware of an MFP designed to be shared by many client computers
and human users. It performs the functions of printing, copying, scanning, faxing,
storing, and retrieving of documents. It can be connected to a wired local network
through the embedded Jetdirect Inside print server's built-in Ethernet, to an analog tel-
ephone line using its internal analog fax modem, or to a USB device using its USB
port (but the use of which must be disabled in the evaluated configuration).
The EWS interface allows administrators to remotely manage the features of the TOE
using a web browser over HTTP. This interface is protected using IPsec.
The REST Web Services interface allow administrators to externally manage the TOE
over HTTP. This interface is protected using IPsec.
Printer Job Language (PJL) is used in a non-administrative capacity by the Adminis-
trative Computer. The Administrative Computer uses PJL to send print jobs to the
TOE as well as to receive job status. In general, PJL supports password-protected ad-
ministrative commands, but in the evaluated configuration these commands are disa-
bled.
The TOE protects all non-broadcast/non-multicast network communications with IP-
sec. Though IPsec supports multiple authentication methods, in the evaluated configu-
ration, both ends of the IPsec connection are authenticated using X.509v3 certificates.
An identity certificate for the TOE must be created outside the TOE, signed by a Cer-
tificate Authority (CA), and imported (added) into the TOE along with the CA certifi-
cate.
Because IPsec authenticates the computers (not the individual users of the computer),
access to the Administrative Computer should be restricted to TOE administrators
only.
The TOE distinguishes between the Administrative Computer and Network Client
Computers by using IP addresses, and IPsec. In the evaluated configuration, the num-
ber of Administrative Computers used to manage the TOE is limited to one and the
Device Administrator Password must be set.
Network Client Computers connect to the TOE using IPsec with X.509v3 certificates
to protect the communication and to mutually authenticate. These client computers can
send print jobs to the TOE using the PJL interface as well as receive job status.
The TOE supports an optional analog telephone line connection for sending and re-
ceiving faxes. The Control Panel uses identification and authentication to control ac-
cess for sending analog faxes.
The TOE protects stored non-fax jobs with either a 4-digit Job PIN or by accepting
(and storing) an encrypted print job from a client computer. Both protection mecha-
nisms are optional by default and are mutually exclusive of each other if used. In the
evaluated configuration, all stored non-fax jobs must either be assigned a 4-digit Job
PIN or be an encrypted print job.
The TOE also supports Microsoft SharePoint and remote file systems for the storing
of scanned documents. The TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the
communications and to mutually authenticate to SharePoint and the remote file sys-
tems. For remote file system connectivity, the TOE supports the FTP and SMB proto-
cols.
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The TOE can be used to email scanned documents. In addition, the TOE can send
email alert messages to administrator-specified email addresses, or send automated
emails regarding product configuration and MFP supplies. The TOE supports pro-
tected communications between itself and SMTP gateways. It uses IPsec with
X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate with
the SMTP gateway. The TOE can only protect unencrypted emails up to the SMTP
gateway. It is the responsibility of the Operational Environment to protect emails from
the SMTP gateway to the email’s destination. Also, the TOE can only send emails; it
does not accept inbound emails.
The TOE supports name resolution using the DNS and WINS. The TOE uses IPsec
with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually authenticate
to the name resolution servers.
The TOE automatically synchronizes its system clock with an NTP server. The TOE
uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications and to mutually
authenticate to the NTP server.
Each HCD contains a user interface called the Control Panel. The Control Panel con-
sists of a touchscreen LCD. The Control Panel is the physical interface that a user uses
to communicate with the TOE when physically using the HCD. The LCD screen dis-
plays information such as menus and status to the user. It also provides virtual buttons
to the user such as an alphanumeric keypad for entering usernames and passwords.
Both administrative and non-administrative users can access the Control Panel.
The TOE supports both Local sign-in method (Local Device Sign In) and Remote
sign-in methods (LDAP Sign In and Windows Sign In).
The TOE supports the auditing of document-processing functions and security-rele-
vant events by generating and forwarding audit records to a remote syslog server. The
TOE uses IPsec with X.509v3 certificates to protect the communications between it-
self and the syslog server and for mutual authentication of both endpoints.
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6 Documentation
Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for Samsung Multi-
function Printers
Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-X6350LX /
SL-X6350ZX
Samsung Color MFP SL-G256X / SL-G306X
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-X9600LX /
SL-X9700LX
Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X / SL-G509X
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-K9700LX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G509K / SL-G609K
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-K6400LX /
SL-K6400ZX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K
Edition 1, 2/2024
[CCECG]
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7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Developer Testing
Testing was performed by the developer at the HP site in Boise, Idaho, USA.
The approach for testing was to provide at least one test case for each Security Func-
tional Requirement mapped to the TOE security functionality documented.
The developer reported that all tests were completed successfully, and the evaluator
has examined the test evidence and verified that the test results for the manual and au-
tomated tests were consistent and clearly identify the outcome of the test action.
7.2 Evaluator Testing
The evaluator has re-run all automated tests, and a sample of manual tests. This in-
cluded both regular and IPsec tests. The evaluator executed 2 regular manual tests, 4
manual IPsec tests and all the 76 automated developer tests. The evaluator did not per-
form any additional tests as the existing tests, both manual and automated covered all
the interfaces.
Testing was performed on the following models of the TOE:
TOE Name (hardware Mo-
dels)
System Firmware
Version
Jetdirect Inside
Firmware
Version
Samsung Color MFP SL-
X6250LX
2506649_040420 JOL25060606
Samsung Mono MFP SL-
K9600LX
2506649_040423 JOL25060606
The evaluator chose to perform manual IPsec tests on Citrine (Samsung) TOE model
which uses the Jetdirect Inside Firmware Version JOL25060606 where IPsec imple-
mentation is located. This Jetdirect Inside Firmware Version is the same in all other
TOE models from both the evaluations CSEC2022013, CSEC2023012.
All tests performed by the evaluator were completed successfully.
7.3 Penetration Testing
Penetration testing was performed against the TOE interfaces that are accessible to a
potential attacker. I.e., the IPv4 and IPv6 TCP and UDP ports of the TOE.
Since an attack requires an attack surface, the evaluator decided to start by examining
if the TOE exposes such interfaces, i.e., open ports and available services.
The following TOE models were tested during penetration testing:
TOE Name (hardware Mo-
dels)
System Firmware
Version
Jetdirect Inside
Firmware
Version
Samsung Color MFP SL-
X6250LX
2506649_040420 JOL25060606
Samsung Mono MFP SL-
K9600LX
2506649_040423 JOL25060606
The evaluator examined the externally accessible interfaces (UDP and TCP ports), i.e.,
all IPv4 and IPv6 UDP and TCP ports.
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The results of the port scan indicate that no attack surface is present.
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8 Evaluated Configuration
The following components are required as part of the Operational Environment:
• The applicable MFP model for running the TOE firmware
• Domain Name System (DNS) server
• One administrative client computer connected to the TOE in the role of an Admin-
istrativeComputer. It must contain:
− Web browser
• One or both of the following:
− Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) server
− Windows domain controller/Kerberos server
• Syslog server
• Windows Internet Name Service (WINS) server
• Network Time Protocol (NTP) server
The following components are optional in the Operational Environment:
• Client computers connected to the TOE in a non-administrative computer role
• Universal Print Driver for client computers (for submitting print job requests from
client computers)
• Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) gateway
• Microsoft SharePoint
• Remote file systems:
− File Transfer Protocol (FTP)
− Server Message Block (SMB)
In the evaluated configuration the following requirements must be met:
• Only one Administrative Computer is used to manage the TOE.
• Third-party solutions must not be installed on the TOE.
• PC Fax Send must be disabled.
• Fax Polling Receive must be disabled.
• Device USB and Host USB plug and play must be disabled.
• Firmware upgrades sent as print jobs through P9100 interface must be disabled.
• All non-fax stored jobs must be assigned a Job PIN or Job Encryption Password.
• Networking XML Services must be disabled.
• External file system access through PJL and PS must be disabled.
• IPsec authentication using X.509v3 certificates must be enabled (IPsec authentica-
tion using Kerberos or Pre-Shared Key is not supported).
• IPsec Authentication Headers (AH) must be disabled.
• Control Panel Mandatory Sign-in must be enabled (this disables the Guest role).
• SNMP must be disabled.
• The Service PIN, used by a customer support engineer to access functions availa-
ble to support personnel, must be disabled.
• Wireless functionality must be disabled:
− Near Field Communication (NFC) must be disabled.
− Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) must be disabled.
− Wireless Direct Print must be disabled.
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− Wireless station must be disabled.
• PJL device access commands must be disabled.
• When using Windows Sign In, the Windows domain must reject Microsoft NT
LAN Manager (NTLM) connections.
• User names for the LDAP and Windows Sign In users must only contain the char-
acters defined in P.USERNAME.CHARACTER_SET.
• Remote Control-Panel use is disallowed per P.REMOTE_PANEL.DISAL-
LOWED.
• Local Device Sign In accounts must not be created (i.e., only the built-in Device
Administrator account is allowed as a Local Device Sign In account).
• Access must be blocked to the following Web Services (WS) using the Jetdirect
Inside’s IPsec Policy:
− Open Extensibility Platform device (OXPd) Web Services
− WS* Web Services
• Device Administrator Password must be set as per P.ADMIN.PASSWORD.
• Remote Configuration Password must not be set.
• OAUTH2 use is disallowed.
• SNMP over HTTP use is disallowed.
• HP Workpath Platform must be disabled.
• Licenses must not be installed to enable features beyond what is supported in the
evaluated configuration.
• All received faxes must be converted into stored faxes.
• Fax Archive must be disabled.
• Fax Forwarding must be disabled.
• Internet Fax and LAN Fax must be disabled.
• Firmware updates through REST Web Services is disallowed.
• Scan+ must be disabled.
• Remote User Auto Capture must be disabled.
• PS privileged operators must be disabled.
• Cancel print jobs after unattended error must be enabled.
• Smart Cloud Print must be disabled.
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9 Results of the Evaluation
The evaluators applied each work unit of the Common Methodology [CEM] within
the scope of the evaluation, and concluded that the TOE meets the security objectives
stated in the Security Target [ST] for an attack potential of Basic.
The certifier reviewed the work of the evaluators and determined that the evaluation
was conducted in accordance with the Common Criteria [CC].
The evaluators' overall verdict is PASS.
The verdicts for the assurance classes and components are summarised in the follow-
ing table:
Assurance Class Name / Assurance Family
Name
Short name Verdict
Development ADV PASS
Security architecture description ADV_ARC.1 PASS
Functional specification with complete
summary
ADV_FSP.3 PASS
Architectural design ADV_TDS.2 PASS
Guidance documents AGD: PASS
Operational user guidance AGD_OPE.1 PASS
Preparative procedures AGD_PRE.1 PASS
Life-cycle support ALC: PASS
Authorisation controls ALC_CMC.3 PASS
Implementation representation CM coverage ALC_CMS.3 PASS
Delivery procedures ALC_DEL.1 PASS
Identification of security measures ALC_DVS.1 PASS
Developer defined life-cycle model ALC_LCD.1 PASS
Flaw reporting procedures ALC_FLR.2 PASS
Security Target evaluation ASE: PASS
Conformance claims ASE_CCL.1 PASS
Extended components definition ASE_ECD.1 PASS
ST introduction ASE_INT.1 PASS
Security objectives ASE_OBJ.2 PASS
Derived security requirements ASE_REQ.2 PASS
Security problem definition ASE_SPD.1 PASS
TOE summary specification ASE_TSS.1 PASS
Tests ATE: PASS
Analysis of coverage ATE_COV.2 PASS
Testing: basic design ATE_DPT.1 PASS
Functional testing ATE_FUN.1 PASS
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Independent testing - sample ATE_IND.2 PASS
Vulnerability assessment AVA: PASS
Vulnerability analysis AVA_VAN.2 PASS
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10 Evaluator Comments and Recommendations
Based on the assessments in the AVA report, the evaluator determined that there are
no exploitable vulnerabilities in the TOE for attack potential basic. However, the eval-
uator identified one residual vulnerability (CVE-2024-0794).
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11 Bibliography
ST Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-
X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX
Samsung Color MFP SL-G256X / SL-G306X
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-
X9600LX / SL-X9700LX
Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X / SL-G509X
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-
K9700LX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G509K / SL-G609K
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-
K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K
Security Target, HP Inc., 2024-01-25, document version 1.0.
PP2600A 2600.1-PP, Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices, Operational
Environment A, IEEE Computer Society, 12 June 2009, version
1.0
CCECG Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration Guide for Samsung
Multifunction Printers
Samsung Color MFP SL-X6250LX / SL-X6300LX / SL-
X6350LX / SL-X6350ZX
Samsung Color MFP SL-G256X / SL-G306X
Samsung Color MFP SL-X9400LX / SL-X9500LX / SL-
X9600LX / SL-X9700LX
Samsung Color MFP SL-G409X / SL-G509X
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K9500LX / SL-K9600LX / SL-
K9700LX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G509K / SL-G609K
Samsung Mono MFP SL-K6300LX / SL-K6350LX / SL-
K6400LX / SL-K6400ZX
Samsung Mono MFP SL-G306K / SL-G356K
Edition 1, 2/2024
CCpart1 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evalua-
tion, Part 1, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04- 001
CCpart2 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evalua-
tion, Part 2, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-002
CCpart3 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evalua-
tion, Part 3, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-003
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CEM Common Methodology for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, version 3.1 revision 5, CCMB-2017-04-004
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Appendix A Scheme Versions
During the certification the following versions of the Swedish Common Criteria Eval-
uation and Certification scheme have been used.
A.1 Scheme/Quality Management System
Version Introduced Impact of changes
2.5 2024-01-25 None
2.4.2 Application Original version
A.2 Scheme Notes
The following Scheme Notes have been considered during the evaluation:
• Scheme Note 15 - Testing
• Scheme Note 18 - Highlighted Requirements on the Security Target
• Scheme Note 22 - Vulnerability assessment
• Scheme Note 25 - Use of CAVP-tests in CC evaluations
• Scheme Note 27 - ST requirements at the time of application for certification
• Scheme Note 28 - Updated procedures for application, evaluation and certification
• Scheme Note 31 - New procedures for site visit oversight and testing oversight